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Summary
In order to ensure a stable operation of the power system, Transmission System
Operators have to balance production and consumption of electiricty continu-
ously. For this purpose balancing services are utilised. With the European
objective to migrate to a sustainable power production, a signiﬁcant share of
generation is expected to be from renewable sources, with its inherent produc-
tion forecast errors. To balance this variable production, the requirement for
balancing services increases. The Nordic, particularly the Norwegian hydro-
based power system is predestinated of providing such balancing services to the
continental European power system.
This thesis studies the integration of national regulating power markets,
enabling the cross-border exchange of balancing services in Northern Europe.
The research encompasses the development of a mathematical model for the
regulating power market, which is based on a day-ahead spot market model.
Furthermore, data models for the Northern European power system are devel-
oped. Succeedingly, these models are utilised for a set of case studies.
The ﬁrst part of the thesis focuses on the model development and implemen-
tation of system scenarios. The mathematical model of the regulating power
market comprises the procurement as well as activation of regulating reserves
and explicitly addresses the exchange of balancing services. This model is used
to assess the integration of national regulating power markets.
Two detailed data models are compiled, encompassing 2010’s and 2020’s
state of the Northern European power system. For these scenarios the outcome
of the the day-ahead spot market is analysed, which shows signiﬁcant changes
in the future system dispatch. Taking the system dispatch as input to the
regulating power market model, its market outcome is investigated. The analysis
illustrates signiﬁcant cost savings for the integration of national regulating power
markets.
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Summary
The second part of the thesis comprises a set of analyses, executed with the
developed models. The increase in power production from renewable energy
sources, especially wind power production is taken as a basis for the future
development of the power system. With the changes in the power production
portfolio in Northern Europe, including higher variability and increased produc-
tion forecast error, the future outcome of the regulating power market is studied.
Moreover, the impact of various forecast horizons for wind power production and
the deﬁnition of diﬀerent reserve requirement levels are investigated. In general
the analyses illustrate the challenges due to increased power production from
renewable sources. These result in higher system imbalances and hence costs
in the regulating power market. It is shown, that an integration of national
regulating power markets in Northern Europe provides a good possibility to
counteract this cost increase, while the system security is enhanced.
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Summary
The main ﬁndings of the research are:
• With a signiﬁcant increase of wind power production in 2020, whilst a
share of fossil fuel power plants is decommissioned, average spot market
prices for electricity decrease, but become more volatile.
• Moreover, the operating hours and concurrently net revenues of thermal
power plants will be reduced down to a level, where the operation espe-
cially of mid-merit power plants will not be proﬁtable any longer.
• In 2010, the potential cost savings by means of integrating Northern Eu-
ropean regulating power markets amounts to approximately 140 million e
per annum. These savings result from the netting of imbalances between
countries and the utilisation of cheaper reserve capacity provided from the
Nordic area.
• The assumed forecast horizon of wind power production is essential for the
estimation of balancing costs. In 2020, these costs become tremendous,
when a forecast horizon of 24 hours is assumed, but are much lower using a
3 hour forecast uncertainties. However, the latter forecast horizon requires
liquid intra-day markets.
• With the utilisation of a 3 hour forecast horizon for the wind power produc-
tion, the analysis shows an increase of 230 million e in system balancing
costs from 2010 to 2020.
• In 2020, the cost savings resulting from the integration of regulating power
markets amount to 170 million e per annum, which can account for about
70% for the increase of system balancing costs up to 2020.
• In addition to the increase of system balancing costs, the system will be
at the limits of secure operation in 2020. Among others, this results in an
increasing number of hours with rationing.
• With an integration of regulating power markets the system security is
enhanced as well, facilitated by the eﬃcient system-wide utilisation of all
available regulating reserves.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis deals with the integration of regulating power markets in Northern
Europe. The motivation for the exchange of balancing services between the
Nordic countries and northern continental Europe is addressed in Section 1.1.
Section 1.2 presents the framework of the research, the Balance Management
Project, while Section 1.3 highlights the major scientiﬁc contribution of the
research. An overview of the content of the thesis with its structure and the
underlying publications are ﬁnally given in Sections 1.4 and 1.5.
1.1 Research motivation
1.1.1 Electricity production from renewable energy sources
In 2007 a set of ambitious climate and energy targets was set by the EU Heads of
State and Government, tackling climate changes. These targets are to be met by
2020, commonly known as the "20-20-20" targets. In reaction on these targets,
the European Commission proposed the EU climate and energy package1 in the
beginning of 2008 containing the legislation to implement those targets. Among
other targets, these include 20% of energy consumption covered by renewable
energy sources by 2020 in the European Union.
In line with these speciﬁc 2020 targets, the further development is envisioned
in the Roadmap 2050 leading the way to a low-carbon economy with a sustain-
able power production. To achieve this ambitious goal a signiﬁcant increase
of energy production from renewable sources in the European power system is
necessary in most of the member states.
1http://www.ec.europa.eu/climate/policies/package/
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Already today Denmark has a share of 29% of power production from re-
newable sources [1], with temporary production levels higher than the demand
in the country. This imposes severe challenges on the operation of the power
system. While Denmark only constitutes a small part of the European power
system, potential operational challenges can be solved with external help. By
moving to a sustainable power production portfolio in Europe, system operation
paradigms have to change. In order to ensure a secure and eﬃcient operation,
the view has to be broadened from national to multinational.
Renewable energy sources are various, such as wind, sun, hydro, bio-gas, etc.
Beside the traditional utilisation of hydro power production in Northern Europe,
the main share of sustainable power production currently is and prospectively
is expected to be from wind2. A signiﬁcant share of power production from
renewable energy sources implies a power production from intermittent sources,
like wind or solar power. Furthermore, as these energy sources cannot be stored,
power has to be consumed instantaneously. This results in a varying and not
perfectly predictable power production. As production always has to equal
the demand for electricity, resources to balance the ﬂuctuating production are
required.
1.1.2 System balance management
Consumption and production of electricity in a power system have to be in bal-
ance continuously, as electricity cannot be stored in the transmission system to
a large extent3. Each disturbance of the equilibrium between consumption and
production (imbalance) leads to a deviation of the system frequency from its set
point. These deviations aﬀect the operation of the power system and connected
electrical devices. Large disturbances can cause disconnections, eventually lead-
ing to black-outs of parts or the whole power system. Thus, imbalances between
production and consumption have to be handled continuously in order to ensure
a secure system operation.
Beside imbalances resulting from outages of generation or transmission facil-
ities, these occur due to consumption forecast errors and increasingly due to the
power production from renewable energy sources. Consumption as well as the
production from renewable energy sources are independent varying processes.
Figure 1.1 shows the forecasted and actual values for load and wind power pro-
duction for the ﬁrst week in December 2011 in Eastern Germany provided by
2The largest share of WPP will be in and along the North Sea. This includes onshore as
well as oﬀshore WPP. Optimistic prognoses expect up to 96 GW of WPP in Northern Europe
in 2020 [2].
3Due to the inertia of the power system, small deviations in the time frame of seconds are
handled within the transmission grid.
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the according TSO4. The ﬁgure illustrates, that the general pattern of load and
wind power production can be forecasted quite well. However, a certain forecast
error remains, resulting in imbalances. To handle these imbalances, balancing
services are necessary, which are mostly provided by thermal power plants in
this area.
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Figure 1.1: Actual and forecasted load and wind power production in December
2011 (50Hertz control area)
One further type of power production from renewable energy sources is hy-
dro power. It has an intermittent energy source (precipitation) as well, but
additionally has a large storage capabilities in hydro reservoirs. In the Nordic
countries a large share of power production is based on hydro, especially in Nor-
way with almost 100% of production from hydro power. Beside the technical
features of hydro turbines, allowing rapid changes in the production level5, the
characteristics of the Nordic hydro system6 facilitates a higly ﬂexible power pro-
duction. On the other hand, the interconnection of reservoirs in water courses
with certain discharge requirements complicates the planning of the hydro power
production. Furthermore, due to the stochastic inﬂow to the reservoirs and the
potential storage with time-horizons longer than a year, the long-term utilisation
of the stored water has to be optimised.
Considering the long-term hydro scheduling, the high production ﬂexibility
and the large hydro power production capacity, the Nordic power system is
4For further data see http://www.50hertz.com
5Hydro turbines can change there electricity output with more than 40% of their nominal
capacity per minute, which is ten times as fast as thermal turbines, with the exception of
open-cycle gas turbines [3].
6Especially the Norwegian system contains big reservoirs and hydro power plants with
large heads. The hydro reservoirs are able to store the inﬂow on a long-term.
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capable of providing balancing services to continental Europe. These can be
used to balance ﬂuctuating power production from renewable energy sources in
continental Europe.
1.1.3 Exchange of balancing services
To utilise the Nordic balancing capabilities in continental Europe an exchange
of balancing services between two asynchronous systems is necessary. Figure
1.2 shows the northern part of the European interconnected power system to-
gether with the corresponding Transmission System Operators. The Nordic
synchronous system with its control areas is plotted in green, while the conti-
nental system is labelled in orange. The dotted red line indicates the boundary
between the two synchronous systems, cutting Denmark in a western and an
eastern control area. Within a synchronous system, control areas are connected
by AC lines. However, the asynchronous systems are connected with HVDC
lines, across which balancing services need to be exchanged.
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Figure 1.2: North Europe’s control blocks [4]
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In the European power market environment, balancing services are used
to balance power production and consumption. These services are traded in
regulating power markets, which are national markets by now.
With its Electricity Market Directive 2009/72/EC the European Union en-
forces the contemporaneous process of liberalisation and integration of national
European power markets. Regulation 714/2009 explicitly addresses cross-border
issues. While there is signiﬁcant progress in the coupling and integration of day-
ahead power markets, the integration of European regulating power markets is
only at its initial state. For the ﬁrst time the integration of European regulating
power markets was addressed by the European Transmission System Operators
in 2007 [5]. Meanwhile bi-lateral projects for the exchange of balancing ser-
vices are commenced [6]. However, it still is long way to achieve one integrated
multinational Northern European regulating power market.
1.2 The Balance Management Project
In order to study the exchange of balancing services between diﬀerent control ar-
eas / countries and the development of multinational regulating power markets,
the project Balance Management in Multinational Power Markets was initiated
by SINTEF Energy Research in 20077.
The main objective of the project is to design the scientiﬁc foundation of
a framework for eﬃcient, market-based balancing of power systems that can
be implemented in multinational (’regional’ in the wording of the European
commission) power markets.
The framework should minimize costs and maximize social welfare by co-
ordinating the dispatch of all available system resources. Besides reduction of
costs the overall reliability of systems will be increased due to additional reserve
resources. In this regard, it is necessary to obtain good estimates of the balanc-
ing cost under various assumptions with respect to the integration of balancing
markets.
Although the project’s objective has a general scope, the focus is on the
exchange of balancing services in Northern Europe, including the Nordic coun-
tries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as well as the continental European
countries Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
7http://www.sintef.no/balance-management
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1.3 Scientiﬁc contributions
As one out of four PhD studies in the project, the research presented in this
thesis takes a socio-economic perspective investigating the outcome of integrat-
ing Northern European regulating power markets. The scientiﬁc contributions
are:
• The development of a detailed data model for the unit-commitment and
dispatch of the power system in Northern Europe, encompassing the Nordic
area, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. The model includes a 2010
and a 2020 scenario for the power system. These scenarios are simulated
with EMPS, a model developed by SINTEF Energy Research. The result-
ing day-ahead spot market outcome is investigated.
• The development of a mathematical model for the regulating power mar-
ket, which is based on the outcome of the day-ahead spot market model.
To that end, the procurement and the activation of reserves is modelled
explicitly, including the exchange of balancing services across borders. The
regulating power market model has the objective of maximising the social
welfare in the modelled area. It is used to assess the integration of national
regulating power markets.
• A set of case studies analysing:
– The large scale wind integration in the power system on the system
balancing by means simulating the 2020 scenario
– The impact of wind forecast uncertainty on the regulating power
market outcome
– Diﬀerent reserve requirement levels and their impact on the system
security as well as the regulating power market outcome
– The outcome of reserving transmission capacity to the exclusive util-
isation in the regulating power markets
• Quantifying the socio-economic beneﬁt, that can be achieved by the inte-
gration of regulating power markets. The main reasons for the potential
savings are pointed out as:
– Procurement of cheaper reserves in the Nordic area, which are re-
quired in continental Europe
– Reduced reserve activation due to the netting of imbalances
6
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1.4 List of publications
The main research contributions are presented in the following publications.
These publications form the foundation of the thesis.
Publication A S. Jaehnert and G. Doorman. "The Northern European power
system dispatch in 2010 and 2020 expecting a large share of wind power
production." Submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
2011. Resubmitted in March 2012 after the ﬁrst review.
Publication B S. Jaehnert and G. Doorman. "Modelling an integrated North-
ern European regulating power market based on a common day-ahead
market." In 33th IAEE International Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 2010.
Publication C S. Jaehnert and G. Doorman. "Assessing regulating power
market integration in Northern Europe". Accepted for the International
Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2012.
Publication D S. Jaehnert and G. Doorman. "Reservation of transmission
capacity for the exchange of regulating resources in Northern Europe: Is
there a beneﬁt?" In 11th IAEE European Conference, Vilnius, 2010.
Publication E S. Jaehnert, T. Aigner, G. Doorman and T. Gjengedal. "Im-
pact of large scale wind integration on power system balancing." In 2011
IEEE PowerTech Conference, Trondheim, 2011.
Publication F T. Aigner, S. Jaehnert, G. Doorman and T. Gjengedal. "The
eﬀect of large scale wind power on system balancing in Northern Europe."
Accepted for the IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy, 2012.
Publication G S. Jaehnert and G. Doorman. "European regulating power
market operation: The impact of wind forecasts and reserve requirements."
In 9th International conference on the European Energy Market, Florence,
2012.
The research included following additional publications, which are not part of
this thesis.
Publication H S. Jaehnert, H. Farahmand and G. Doorman. "Modelling
prices using the volume in the Norwegian regulating power market." In
2009 IEEE PowerTech Conference, Bucharest, 2009.
Publication I S. Jaehnert et al. "Balance Management in Multinational Power
Markets." In Enerday 2010, Dresden, 2010.
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1.5 Thesis outline
This thesis is prepared on the basis of the previously listed publications. Chapter
4 to 8 include parts of these publications, which is outlined in the beginning
of each of these chapters. The motivation for the research and their main
contributions were given in the previous sections. The main body of the thesis
consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part describes the modelling of the European
power markets, while the second part presents the set of analyses, which were
performed. The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 compiles the background for the research, ﬁnalising with a review
of relevant literature in the ﬁeld of the research.
Part I
Chapter 3 introduces the approach for modelling the European power markets.
The general overview includes schematics of the simulation process as well as a
geographic overview of the modelled area.
Chapter 4 describes the day-ahead spot market model EMPS and the de-
veloped power system scenarios for 2010 and 2020 which are developed. The
outcome of the simulations with the day-ahead spot market model is presented.
The presentation of simulation results is taken from Publication A
Chapter 5 presents the full mathematical description of the regulating power
market model IRiE, which was developed during the research. The chapter is
ﬁnalised with a brief case study of regulating power market integration, illus-
trating the capabilities of the model. The chapter compiles Publication B
and Publication C. The presentation of the case study is taken from the latter
publication.
Part II
Chapter 6 is based on Publication D, which investigates the reservation
of transmission capacity for the exclusive utilisation in the regulating power
market, taking into account impacts on the day-ahead market clearing.
Chapter 7 presents an analysis of the impacts from large scale integration of
wind power production on the regulating power market outcome. The ﬁrst stage
of the analysis is presented in Publication E. An extension and update of the
analysis is included in Publication F
8
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Chapter 8 investigates the impact of various wind forecast horizons and the
deﬁnition of diﬀerent reserve requirement levels on regulating power markets.
This analysis is presented in Publication G.
Chapter 9 ﬁnalises the thesis. It sums up the conclusions of the previous
chapters and gives recommendations for further research topics.
9
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Chapter 2
Background
The previous chapter outlined the future challenges to the European power sys-
tem, in particular the integration of power production from renewable sources.
This chapter compiles a background of the European power system, its opera-
tion and liberalised European electricity markets.
Section 2.1 presents the organisation and operation of the European power
system, including a brief overview on established Northern European power
markets.
As electricity is a special commodity, which cannot be stored in large amounts,
its production and consumption need to be in balance continuously. In order to
keep the system in balance diﬀerent control mechanisms are necessary. These
control mechanisms and their trade in the form of balancing services is addressed
in Section 2.2.
The contemporaneous process of integrating European power markets, fo-
cusing on the integration of regulating power markets, is reviewed in Section
2.3.
Finally, Section 2.4 constitutes a literature review, including a comprehen-
sion of surveys and analyses, which address national regulating power markets
and their integration.
2.1 Power system organization and operation
Since the beginning of the 1990s restructuring of the electricity sector has taken
place in Europe. Historically, vertically integrated utility companies or govern-
mental institutions owned and operated production, transmission and distribu-
tion facilities, with end-consumers as their costumers.
The aim of deregulation and liberalisation in the electricity sector is to form
11
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competitive electricity markets, facilitating an eﬃcient production and retailing
of electricity. A competitive European electricity market should provide incen-
tives for the investment in new power production including production from
renewable energy sources (RES), achieving the ambitious goal of 20% electricty
production from RES. According to the European Commission [7], a competi-
tive internal European electricity market should promote a more eﬃcient use of
energy, for which the secure supply of energy is preconditional.
Along with the deregulation process comes a necessary unbundling of the
vertical integrated industry, leading to separated generation, transmission and
distribution companies. Unbundling and hence the increased competition will
lead to an eﬃcient utilisation of resources and will give the right incentives to
invest in the generation and transmission system [7].
The deregulation started in England and Wales with its Electricity Act in
1989 followed by Norway with its Energy Act in 1990. In 1996 the European
Union introduced the Electricity Market Directive 1996/92/EC enforcing the
liberalisation process. The Directive states that, the "(...) establishment of
the internal market in electricity is particularly important in order to increase
eﬃciency in the production, transmission and distribution of this product, while
reinforcing security of supply and the competitiveness of the European economy
and respecting environmental protection." [8, pg. 1].
2.1.1 The European power system
Today the European power system consists of ﬁve interconnected synchronous
subsystems, all working at a nominal frequency of 50Hz (see Fig. 2.1). The
separate synchronous systems are mutually interconnected by high voltage di-
rect current (HVDC) lines. The power systems cover 34 European countries,
continuously serving over 530 million customers with electricity at an annual
consumption of about 3200 TWh (in 2011) [9].
With the foundation of the European Network of Transmission System Op-
erators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)1 as the successor of ETSO2, the various Eu-
ropean power systems are now coordinated under one body. Thus, technical
operation rules in the individual power systems are expected to converge grad-
ually. Each of the synchronous subsystem is represented by one regional group
in ENTSO-E. Table 2.1 lists the regional groups and their according former
organisation names.
In addition to the system-based regional groups, voluntary regional groups
are introduced addressing special tasks. Among them, the Voluntary Regional
1http://www.entsoe.eu
2The organisation of European Transmission System Operators was formed in 1999 by the
regional groups of European TSOs in the course of the development of regional European
power markets.
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Figure 2.1: Europe’s synchronously connected systems [10]
Table 2.1: Synchronous areas / regional groups under ENTSO-E [10]
Abbr. Name under ENSTO-E Former name
RG CE Regional Group Continental Europe UCTE
RGN Regional Group Nordic Nordel
RGB Regional Group Baltic BALTSO
GBRG Regional Group Great Britain UKTSOA
INI-RG Regional Group Ireland-Northern Ireland ATSOI
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Group Northern Europe concentrates on the joint operation and security of
supply of the Nordic and the northern part of the continental European syn-
chronous systems. The voluntary group especially deals with operational issues
related to the HVDC-interconnectors with the focus on system security issues
and market operation [10].
2.1.2 The electricity sector
Fig. 2.2 depicts the general structure of the unbundled electricity sector. The
structure chart is divided into two main parts. Firstly, the provision of electricity
from the generation via transmission to the consumption, which implies the
physical ﬂow of electricity. Secondly, it includes the trade of electricity, between
these three entities mentioned above, implying a ﬁnancial ﬂow.
 	









Figure 2.2: Structure of electricity markets
Consumption
The main driver for the development of a power system is the demand for elec-
tricity. The consumption of electricity is a stochastic process, which however
can be forecasted to a certain extent. The consumption has a quite clear daily,
weekly and seasonal pattern, which in certain countries has an additional tem-
perature dependency3.
3The temperature dependency results from a potential high share of installed electrical
heating or cooling devices. The former is the case in the Nordic area.
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Production
Demand for electricity is supplied by electric power production. Electric power
is generated in power plants by converting primary energy sources into elec-
tricity. There is a huge variety of energy sources such as fossil sources (e.g.
uranium, lignite, hard coal, gas, etc.) and renewable sources (e.g. biomass,
wind power, hydro, etc.). The power plants are owned and operated by gener-
ation companies, who attempt to proﬁt from their operation.
As electric power production serves a varying demand and electricity cannot
be stored easily to a large extent, production has to be adapted to the demand.
Most power plants cannot be switched on or oﬀ immediately, hence their op-
eration has to be scheduled beforehand. In order to maximise the proﬁt from
operating power plants, companies which own several production assets can op-
timise their production portfolio. This scheduling and optimisation of electric
power production is called the unit-commitment and dispatch process.
This process determines, which power plants are set in operation (unit-
commitment) and the according production level (dispatch). Performing the
unit-commitment and dispatch, several constraints have to be taken into ac-
count. Among those, the availability of generation units, marginal production
costs, start and stop costs of generation units, ramping rates are of special
concern. Beside these general constraints, various challenges occur in the opti-
misation for diﬀerent types of power plants.
Thermal power plants: For the generation planning of power plants like
nuclear, lignite, hard coal, gas and oil especially ramping constraints as well as
minimum up and down times have to be taken into account resulting in a lower
ﬂexibility of production.
Hydro power plants: In the case of hydro power production, the marginal
production costs are very low, but the available water to produce energy is
limited. Thus, the long-term utilisation of the hydro production has to be
considered. Furthermore, constraints due to water courses limit the ﬂexibility
of hydro production.
Wind power production, Photovoltaics: Production based on the occur-
rence of wind or sunshine has low marginal cost, but is not available all the time
(variable production). Furthermore, the production is not known beforehand,
but needs to be forecasted. The variability and the necessity to forecast power
production complicates the optimisation process further.
The unit-commitment and dispatch process is normally executed for each hour
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one day ahead. However, due to an increasing forecast accuracy for the demand
and variable power production, schedules can be updated continuously up to the
hour of operation. These updates allow production and distribution companies
to balance their portfolios, resulting in as few as possible imbalances, cf. Section
2.2.
Transmission
To supply consumers with electricity, which is generated in power plants, a
transmission of electricity is necessary. In the last century there has been a de-
velopment from small independent transmission systems, which connected local
generation and consumption, to large interconnected grids, e.g. the European
power system. The power system topology is vertically divided in a transmis-
sion and a distribution grid, operating at diﬀerent voltage levels. Furthermore,
it is horizontally split into several control areas, with one Transmission System
Operator (TSO) and several Distribution System Operators (DSO) in each of
the areas. In Europe the electricity grids are mostly owned as well as operated
by Transmission System Operators respectively Distribution System Operators.
The system operators have the task to assure a stable operation of the system
and to transmit electricity from generators to consumers. To that, the transmis-
sion grid serves for the bulk transport of electricity between diﬀerent regions.
The distribution grid, operating at a lower voltage level, provides electricity to
end-consumers. System operators are responsible for maintaining the secure
and stable operation of the power system, aiming at a high level of security of
supply.
Trading
As shown in Fig. 2.2 the physical production, transmission and consumption
of electricity is the fundamental part of an electricity market. The overlaying
part is the trading between market participants in the power market, resulting
in a ﬁnancial exchange. Trading is done with diﬀerent products and on diﬀerent
time horizons, from several years ahead up to real-time, shown in Fig. 2.3
Using the disposable trading possibilities, market participants can reduce
their ﬁnancial risk by changing their positions according to their updated ex-
pectations. The trading possibilities include bilateral and ﬁnancial contracts,
the day-ahead spot market, intra-day markets, balancing and ancillary services.
Bilateral contracts A big share of electricity is traded via bilateral contracts,
also known as over-the-counter (OTC). Two contract parties agree upon an
amount of electricity to be supplied in a certain time. Usually these are long-
term agreements with a horizon of one up to several years.
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Figure 2.3: Electricity market time line [11]
Financial contracts More standardized long-term contracts are forward con-
tracts, which are traded at power-exchanges, where the amount of electricity and
the time of delivery are speciﬁed. These contracts do not include the physical
delivery of electricity, but are used for hedging based on future price expecta-
tions.
Day-ahead spot market As the actual operation gets closer, plans of oper-
ation and consumption become more precise and short-term trading is needed.
Contrary to the long-term contracts, in the day-ahead spot market the physical
delivery of electricity is contracted. In Europe the day-ahead market is mostly
a spot market, which is cleared once a day, on the day before the electricity
delivery. The day-ahead spot markets are expected to be the place with the
highest turn-over of electricity, determining the next day’s system dispatch. A
main result is the clearing price, the spot market price, which is used as the
main price indicator for the commodity electricity.
Intra-day market With real-time approaching and improved forecasts, sched-
ules are updated. In order to account for updated forecasts, trades can be ex-
ecuted in intra-day markets. These are bilateral markets, cleared anonymously
at power exchanges. In contrast to the central clearance of the day-ahead spot
17
2. Background
markets, bids in the intra-day markets are cleared as soon as they match. This
rolling clearance of intra-day markets closes shortly before the hour of operation.
Balancing services After the closure of the intra-day markets, the responsi-
bility to match supply and demand of electricity is passed on to the TSOs. In
order to ensure this balance TSOs need to acquire balancing services, comprising
reserve capacity and balancing energy.
Ancillary services In addition to balancing services, TSOs need further an-
cillary services to ensure a secure and stable operation of the system. Among
others, these include the provision of reactive power for the voltage stability and
resources for the black start capability in order to be able to restore the system
after a black-out.
18
2.2. Balancing the system
2.2 Balancing the system
Electricity is a special commodity, which cannot be stored to a large extent4.
Thus, the generation of electricity has to match its consumption continuously.
Any diﬀerence between generation and consumption results in a deviation of
the system frequency from the nominal frequency. Maintaining the nominal
system frequency is crucial to ensure the stable operation of the power system.
As soon as there is a severe deviation of the system frequency from its nominal
value, the operation of the system is challenged, potentially resulting in partial
or complete black-outs of the power system, see also [13].
To ensure a safe and stable operation of the power system, there are legal
rules of operation for each of the synchronous systems. In Northern Europe,
these operation rules are laid down in the UCTE Operation Handbook [14] (valid
in the continental power system - RG CE) and in Nordel’s system operation
agreement [15] (valid in the Nordic power system - RGN). These operation
rules deﬁne a set of control mechanisms respectively ancillary and balancing
services. The various control mechanisms and balancing services are presented
in the following. Section 2.2.1 elaborates on the technical characteristics of the
control mechanisms, whereas succeeding Section 2.2.2 reviews the trade of the
according balancing services in a regulating power market.
2.2.1 Control mechanisms
In Europe TSOs are the entities obliged to operate the transmission system.
Thus, they are responsible for keeping the system balanced. The Northern Eu-
ropean countries with their according TSOs are shown in Fig. 1.2. In the ﬁgure,
the red dotted line indicates the border between the Nordic (RGN) and the conti-
nental European (RG CE) synchronous systems. There are AC-interconnections
between the countries within a synchronous system and HVDC lines connecting
both synchronous systems.
For the system operation TSOs have several control mechanisms at their
disposal. Among those mechanism is a set of frequency control mechanisms,
which are used to keep the system in balance. Due to diverse characteristics
of the synchronous systems, these control mechanisms diﬀer in RGN and RG
CE. There are two approaches to classify the control mechanisms. The ﬁrst
approach, introduced by ETSO [5], does the classiﬁcation by the objective of
utilising the mechanisms. The division is done in the following way:
4Due to its inertia a small amount of electricity is stored in the power system. Thus, small
deviations are handled within the transmission grid. However, the time-frame of storage is
not more than a couple of seconds, cf. [12].
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Frequency containment reserves (FCR) "... are operating reserves neces-
sary for constant containment of frequency deviations (ﬂuctuations) from
nominal value in order to constantly maintain the power balance in the
whole synchronously interconnected system. Activation of these reserves
results in a restored power balance at a frequency deviating from nom-
inal value. This category typically includes operating reserves with the
activation time up to 30 seconds. Operating reserves of this category are
usually activated automatically and locally." [5, pg. 15]
Frequency restoration reserves (FRR) "... are operating reserves neces-
sary to restore frequency to the nominal value after sudden system distur-
bance occurrence and consequently replace FCR if the frequency deviation
lasts longer than 30 seconds. This category includes operating reserves
with an activation time typically between 30 seconds up to 15 minutes.
Operating reserves of this category are typically activated centrally and
can be activated automatically or manually." [5, pg. 15]
Replacement reserves (RR) "... are operating reserves necessary to restore
the required level of operating reserves in the categories of frequency con-
tainment (FCR) and frequency restoration (FRR) reserves due to their
earlier usage. This category includes operating reserves with activation
time from several minutes up to hours." [5, pg. 15]
However, the deﬁnition of control mechanisms used in the operation rules
of the synchronous systems diﬀers from the ﬁrst approach. Here, the control
mechanisms are classiﬁed by their technical and operational implementation.
Regional Group Central Europe
The control structure used in RG CE, according to its operation handbook, is
depicted in Fig. 2.4. The control mechanisms are divided by their sequence of
activation and are sorted hierarchically. As shown in the schematic, all control
mechanisms react on the system frequency, which is the central control signal.
The implemented control structure includes the following mechanisms:
Primary control "...aims at the operational reliability of the power system of
the synchronous area and stabilises the system frequency at a stationary
value after a disturbance or incident in the time-frame of seconds, but
without restoring the system frequency and the power exchanges to their
reference values." [16, pg. 4]
Secondary control "...makes use of a centralised and continuous automatic
generation control, modifying the active power set points / adjustments
of generation sets / controllable load in the time-frame of seconds up to
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Figure 2.4: Schematic diagram of the control hierarchy in RG CE [16]
typically 15 minutes after an incident. Secondary control is based on
Secondary control reserves that are under automatic control." [16, pg. 12]
Tertiary control "...is primarily used to free up the secondary reserves in a
balanced system situation, but it is also activated as a supplement to
secondary reserve after larger incidents to restore the system frequency
and consequently free the system wide activated primary reserve. Tertiary
control is typically operated in the responsibility of the TSO." [16, pg. 25]
Time control monitors and limits "..discrepancies observed between synchronous
time and universal co-ordinated time (UTC) in the synchronous area." [16,
pg. 29]
Regional Group Nordic
In the Nordic system reserves are basically divided into frequency controlled
reserves and fast active reserves. Frequency controlled reserves (FCR) are acti-
vated automatically by frequency deviations. Fast reserves are activated manu-
ally in order to free automatic activated reserves. In addition there are peaking
reserves, which are utilised during peak load situations, to ensure adequate gen-
eration capacity. Peaking reserves can take several hours to be activated, thus
they do not interfere with real-time control mechanisms.
In RGN the control mechanisms are deﬁned as the following:
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Frequency controlled normal reserve (FCNR) "...is the momentarily avail-
able active power available for frequency regulation in the range of 49.9
– 50.1 Hz and which is activated automatically by the system frequency."
"In the event of a rapid change of frequency to 49.9/50.1 Hz, the reserve
shall be regulated upwards/downwards within 2-3 minutes." [15, pg. 17]
Frequency controlled disturbance reserve (FCDR) "...is the momentar-
ily available active power available for frequency regulation in the range
of 49.9 – 49.5 Hz and which is activated automatically by the system
frequency." "In the event of a frequency drop to 49.5 Hz caused by a mo-
mentary loss of production (...) frequency controlled disturbance reserve
shall be regulated upwards within 30 seconds." [15, pg. 17]
Automatic reserves (AR) are planned to be introduced in the Nordic power
system [17, pg. 19]. E-Bridge Consulting GmbH [18] discusses its require-
ments, recommending the implementation of a Load Frequency Control
(LFC).
Fast active disturbance reserve (FADR) "...is the manual reserve avail-
able within 15 minutes in the event of the loss of an individual principal
component (production unit, line, transformer, bus bar etc.)." It "...shall
exist in order to restore the frequency controlled normal operation reserve
and the frequency controlled disturbance reserve when these reserves have
been used or lost, and in order to restore transmissions within applicable
limits following disturbances." [15, pg. 17]
During the last decade, an increasing amount of signiﬁcant frequency de-
viations was observed in the Nordic area. Hence, the introduction of AGC is
discussed and planned in RGN [17]. A successful trial AGC operation on se-
lected hydro power plants in Southern Norway was achieved, paving the way for
a further joint operation of RGN and RG CE. The introduction of automatic
reserves coevally harmonises the operation of the Nordic and continental Euro-
pean system as well as enables the provision of secondary reserves from RGN
to RG CE.
A comprehension of the diﬀerent types of reserves and control mechanisms in
RG CE and RGN is given in Tab. 2.2. The overview refers to the previous
classiﬁcations, showing a certain overlap of the categories FRR and RR. FCR
and primary control is similar in all systems, mainly due to its decentral and
direct installation on generation units as well as its rather technical nature5.
5Primary control is achieved through the implementation of turbine govenors. It constitutes
a P-control loop, with the system frequency as input and the generation of the turbine as
output, see also [12].
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Table 2.2: Reserve categories and cross references [5]
Category. Function Reserves
FCR contain frequency deviations primary reserves, FCR
secondary reserves
FRR restore nominal frequency LFC, AR, FADR
tertiary reserves
RR replace used FCR and FRR tertiary reserves, FADR
Area control error
A further diﬀerence between RGN and RG CE is the calculation and utilisation
of the area control error (ACE). Primary control is activated decentrally in the
whole system, when a system frequency deviation occurs. As the steady-state
frequency is equal in a synchronously interconnected system, there is a solidarity
in the activation and utilisation of primary control all over the system. In
contrast, FRR is activated centrally by TSOs, likewise based on the frequency
deviation. In order to take into account the location of imbalances and activate
FRR in the according control area the ACE is calculated. The utilisation of
ACE results in a restoration of the prior scheduled exchange between the single
control areas. ACE is used in RG CE, but abolished in RGN.
Cross-border control mechanisms
As described above, the control mechanisms in a synchronous power system
act system-wide, due to the common system frequency and are only limited
to certain country borders by the utilisation of ACE. AC-transmission lines do
not need to be controlled actively in order to apply control mechanisms across
borders, as it is the case in RGN.
This is diﬀerent in the case of two distinct synchronous power systems, which
are connect by HVDC-lines. As there is no common system frequency, the real-
time transmission of HVDC-lines has to be controlled actively in order achieve
a cross-border control, cf. [19]. Hence, HVDC-lines form a natural border of
control areas and need to be handled particularly, in order to form larger control
areas encompassing HVDC-lines.
2.2.2 Regulating power market
After the unbundling of generation and transmission, TSOs do not own resources
for balancing services themselves, but need to obtain them by trade. In the
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framework of the liberalisation of electricity markets these services are traded,
either bilateral or via centralised markets, called regulating power markets.
Due to the historic national responsibility for system balancing, market de-
signs and hence terminology diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the European countries,
cf. van der Veen et al. [20] and Vandezande [21]. While balancing market is a
term commonly used in recent literature, the term regulating power market is
used throughout this thesis, following the terminology used in the Nordic coun-
tries and referring to the naming Regulerkraft (Norwegian) and Regelleistung
(German) used in the according markets.
A general schematic for regulating power markets is shown in Fig. 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Regulating Power Market Structure [20]
There are three main participants in regulating power markets, TSOs, Bal-
ancing Service Providers (BSP) and Balance Responsible Parties (BRP). TSOs
are the entities responsible to balance the power system, hence running the reg-
ulating power market. In order to balance the system, TSO obtain balancing
services from BSPs. Outside a certain time-frame, called Program Time Unit
(PTU), TSOs pass on their balancing responsibility to BRPs. The BRPs need
to have a balanced portfolio over each PTU, according to their schedule submit-
ted to the TSO ex-ante. Ex-post imbalances of BRPs over each PTU are settled
with the TSO. The length of one PTU is 15 minutes in RG CE and one hour
in RGN. The introduction of a PTU length of likewise 15 minutes is currently
discussed in RGN.
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2.2.3 Balancing services
The balancing services encompass all the control mechanisms described in Sec-
tion 2.2.1. In contrary to the day-ahead spot markets, where solely energy
delivery is traded, in regulating power markets the capacity (MW) and energy
(MWh) are distinguished. To that end, balancing services encompass products
of these two diﬀerent types, namely reserve capacity and balancing energy.
Reserve capacity refers to the procurement of regulating reserves, where
BSPs are paid by TSOs for the availability of regulating reserves, which can
be activated in real-time. Payments for reserve capacity are done in e/MW
for the whole procurement horizon. In contrast, balancing energy refers to the
actual activation of regulating reserves by TSOs in real-time. The delivery of
balancing energy from BSPs to TSOs is paid in e/MWh.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the frequency of market clearance and re-
muneration for balancing services among the European countries. Not all of the
balancing services necessarily need to be traded in all of the countries. Further-
more, bids for reserve capacity and balancing energy might not be independent,
as it is currently the case in Germany.
Tab. 2.3 and 2.4 give an overview for the balancing service remuneration in
the Northern European countries, for RG CE and RGN respectively. In addition
to the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of control mechanisms, these tables clearly show the
lack of harmonisation between the diﬀerent national regulating power markets
in Northern Europe.
Table 2.3: Balancing services remuneration in RG CE [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]
DE NL BE DK-W
Primary capacity weekly mandatory 4-yearly daily
pay-as-bid - bilateral marginal
energy unpaid unpaid unpaid unpaid
- - - -
Secondary capacity weekly annually 2-yearly monthly
pay-as-bid bilateral pay-as-bid pay-as-bid
energy weekly daily daily daily
average marginal pay-as-bid spot-based
Tertiary capacity daily unpaid 4-yearly daily
pay-as-bid - bilateral marginal
energy daily daily daily daily
average marginal mixed marginal
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Table 2.4: Balancing services remuneration in RGN [26, 27, 28, 29, 30]
NO SE FI DK-E
FCR capacity yearly / daily weekly / hourly yearly / daily daily
marginal pay-as-bid pay-as-bid pay-as-bid
energy unpaid unpaid unpaid unpaid
- - - -
AR capacity to be
energy decided
FADR capacity yearly / weekly yearly yearly daily
marginal bilateral pay-as-bid pay-as-bid
energy hourly
marginal
In a market environment TSOs are natural monopolists, cf. [31], being the
single entity which owns and operates the transmission grid. Thus, TSOs need
to be regulated, which is normally done by governmental institutions. Due
to the natural monopoly of TSOs, regulating power markets are single-buyer
markets. Costs an beneﬁts to TSOs in the regulating power market are mostly
recovered by the imbalance settlement and/or assigned transmission tariﬀs, cf.
[27].
2.2.4 Market sequence
Beside the forward, day-ahead spot and intra-day market trading, Fig. 2.3
shows the trading in the regulating power market, which includes the capacity
allocation (reserve procurement) and the balancing market (system balancing).
Reserve procurement
The procurement of reserves is done on very diﬀerent time scales (see Tab. 2.3
and 2.4), from long before the actual operation of the system (e.g. Belgium) to
a daily procurement (e.g. Germany).
During the reserve procurement BSPs are contracted to provide reserve ca-
pacity to TSOs, according to reserve requirements speciﬁed for each control
area. The procurement is done for all types of reserves (FCR, FRR and RR).
If reserve capacity is procured from a BSP, the BSP is required to give bids for
balancing energy. By this means, TSOs ensure that suﬃcient bids for balanc-
ing energy are available, i.e. suﬃcient regulating reserves are available in the
system.
26
2.2. Balancing the system
The reserve procurement is not as important in a hydro as in a thermal based
power system. Thermal power plants have longer start up times and are most
eﬃcient at maximum production. Hence, once they are started up, it is most
proﬁtable to operate thermal power plants at full production. Thus, it is neces-
sary to pay those plants to provide reserves, i.e. to start up and operate below
maximum production. On the contrary, hydro power plants can be started up
quite fast and have their optimal operation point below maximum production.
Thus, it is not costly for them to provide regulating reserves. However, during
severe situations it might be also necessary to procure reserves in the hydro
system .
Considering the Northern European power systems, in RG CE (a thermal
based system) it is necessary to procure reserves and pay for their availability.
In RGN (with a large share of hydro power production) often reserve capacity
is freely available and not necessary to be procured. However, during high-load
periods it is also necessary to procure reserves in the Nordic area6.
System balancing
During the real-time operation of the power system imbalances occur. In the
case of such imbalances, reserve capacity (provided by BSPs) is activated. This
activation stands for an upward or downward regulation of the system. Based
on the frequency deviation, FCR is activated decentrally on all participating
power plants primarily. The activation of primary control is expected to be
symmetric, i.e. the net balancing energy delivered by FCR is zero. Thus, their
activation is mostly not reimbursed.
In the case of larger and longer imbalances FRR is activated centrally. The
activation is either done automatically, based on automatic generation control
(AGC), or done manually by TSOs. To free up used reserve capacity, RR are
activated manually by TSOs. The balancing energy delivered by FRR and RR
is reimbursed. The remuneration of these balancing energy is done based on
diﬀerent pricing mechanisms, which are normally deﬁned by the responsible
national regulator.
Imbalance settlement
Finally, the imbalances which occurred during real-time operation in the system
are settled. The settlement is done between TSOs and BRPs over each PTU.
Thereto, the diﬀerence between the energy schedule delivered from a BRP to
the TSO prior to real-time operation and the actual measured energy ﬂow is de-
termined and integrated over each single PTU. The resulting position of a BRP
6In Norway the capacity market RKOM is run only during winter and early spring
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can be short or long7. As for balancing services, there are diﬀerent frequen-
cies and pricing schemes for the imbalance settlement in the diﬀerent countries.
Pricing schemes can be as diﬀerent as one-price or two-price settlement, single
or dual-price, average or marginal pricing8.
7A short position means that a BRP delivered less or consumed more energy than sched-
uled. A long position stands for the opposite direction.
8Further details of the imbalances settlement are outside the scope of this thesis. A
throughout presentation of various settlement schemes can be found in van der Veen et al.
[20] or Vandezande [21].
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2.3 European power market integration
In the beginning of the 1990s restructuring and deregulation of European elec-
tricity markets was driven by economic policy in order to remove or make cross-
subsidies transparent, to allocate capital eﬃciently and to achieve the lowest
cost to end-users. The pioneer was England and Wales with the Act of 1989
[32]. Norway followed with the energy Act of 1990 [33] and the other Scandina-
vian countries joined the Norwegian market during the 1990s. Spain (1998) and
the Netherlands (1999) also created fully competitive markets. Most other Eu-
ropean countries followed. Nowadays there are well established power exchanges
all over Europe.
The Council of The European Union issued an Internal Electricity Mar-
ket Directive in 1996 (1996/92/EC) that set goals for a gradual opening of
the electricity markets for all member states. The directive was updated in
2003 (2003/54/EC) and 2009 (2009/72/EC), which included the regulations
1228/2003 and 714/2009. Regulation 1228/2003 for the ﬁrst time explicitly ad-
dressed cross-border issues, aiming "(...) at setting fair rules for cross-border
exchanges in electricity, thus enhancing competition within the internal elec-
tricity market, taking into account the speciﬁcities of national and regional
markets." [34, pg. 3]
2.3.1 Day-ahead spot market coupling
The development of an internal (one single) electricity market in Europe is a
long-term process, starting with the integration of day-ahead spot markets. The
ﬁrst steps toward this aim is the establishment of regional9 markets. Meanwhile
there are several regional markets established in Europe, leading the future way
[35].
The oldest and best-known regional market is the Nordic market (Nord-
Pool). NordPool started as the Norwegian power exchange in 1995, which by
now includes forward, day-ahead spot and intra-day trading. The market area
was extended to Sweden in 1996, Finland in 1998, Denmark in 2000, partly to
Germany in 2005 and Estonia in 2010 [36]. The day-ahead spot markets covers
74% of the consumption in the Nordic countries. Countries are represented by
one or more bidding areas in order to achieve a optimal clearing of orders bidden
from the diﬀerent countries.
Central Western Europe (CWE) is another regional market, which is based
on market coupling. It started out as the Trilateral Market Coupling (TLC) con-
sisting of France, Belgium and the Netherlands, launched in 2006. In November
9’Regional’ is according to the wording of the European Commission. It describes multi-
national power markets, within a certain region of Europe, e.g. Central Western Europe.
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2010 the CWE replaced TLC, now also including Germany, Luxembourg and
Austria. These countries already had established power exchanges, which are
now coordinated instead of implementing one single trading system. A further
step in expanding the market area is the establishment of the Interim Tight
Volume Coupling (ITVC)10, ﬁrst started between Denmark and Germany and
now coupling CWE and NordPool. CWE-ITVC now represents a regional day-
ahead spot market area reaching from the Northern Cape to the Mediterranean
Sea.
The Iberian regional market called MIBEL was launched in 2007. In contrast
to CWE, the existing exchanges in Spain and Portugal divided responsibilities.
The Spanish exchange OMEL takes care of the day-ahead market for both coun-
tries and the Portuguese exchange OMIP organizes the futures market.
A set of Western European power exchanges has started a project called
Price Coupling of Regions (PCR)11, aiming for a pan-European price coupling.
The initiative shall be the basis for an eﬀective European power market, keeping
all the current established power exchanges. This development can ﬁnally lead
to one internal European electricity market.
2.3.2 Integration of regulating power markets
The successful integration of European day-ahead markets, can provide experi-
ence and the basis for the integration of European regulating power markets. In
contrary to day-ahead markets, regulating power markets still diﬀer quite much
due to individual national rules, illustrated by Rebours [37]. For the exchange
of balancing services between countries, an integration of national regulating
power markets is necessary. This requires a harmonisation of regulating power
market rules, as discussed by van der Veen et al. [20]. Furthermore, in January
2007, the European Commission published its energy sector inquiry [38], which
stressed the fact that regulating power are highly concentrated, pointing to the
fact that the inadequate integration of balancing markets is a key impediment
to the development of a single European electricity market.
By now there are several proposals for the cross-border exchange of balancing
services, e.g. from ETSO [5], ERGEG [11], Frontier Economics and Consentec
[39], Eurelectric [40] and Bundesnetzagentur [41]. These proposals can be gen-
erally divided into two approaches, requiring diﬀerent levels of balancing market
harmonization. These approaches sorted by increasing degree of integration are:
10ITVC is a volume market coupling solution developed by EMCC and introduced between
the Central Western European and Nordic area in 2010, cf. http://www.marketcoupling.com.
11http://www.europex.org
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TSO-BSP, where TSOs allow BSPs to bid either in the local or a neighbouring
regulating power market. BSPs are directly contracted by neighbouring
TSOs. This model can only be implemented for the exchange of balancing
services in one direction.
TSO-TSO, where BSPs are only contacted to their own TSOs, but TSOs
mutually exchange balancing services. The model can be implemented
without or with a common merit-order list.
In September 2009 ERGEG, which merged into the EU Agency for the Co-
operation of Energy Regulators (ACER)12 in March 2011, published its "Re-
vised Guidelines of Good Practice for Electricity Balancing Markets Integration
(GGP-EBMI)". The Guidelines explicitly state, that "balancing market inte-
gration has been highlighted as a necessary step to reach the ERGEG and EU
aim of the development of an eﬀective, competitive single market for electricity
across the whole of the EU. Balancing market integration will allow TSOs to
more eﬃciently procure balancing services and avoid ineﬃcient concomitant up
and down regulation in adjacent areas. This integration will promote eﬃcient
and competitive price formation and market liquidity." [11, pg. 12]
Furthermore, the Guidelines declare the TSO-TSO model with a common
merit-order list as the target model, which however requires the highest degree
of harmonisation. To ensure a faster market integration, the TSO-TSO model
without a common merit-order list can be accepted and "(...) a ﬁrst step towards
integrating balancing markets and even the TSO-Provider approach may be
implemented in case of incompatible characteristics of balancing markets to
ensure a fast implementation" [11, pg. 25].
There are already a couple of ongoing initiatives to exchange manually acti-
vated reserves in Europe, where a pragmatic approach is taken. The grid control
cooperation implemented by the four TSOs in Germany additionally includes
the imbalance netting as well as the exchange of automatically activated sec-
ondary reserves. In the following a brief overview of the initiatives and their
implementation is given.
Germany
Due to obligations by the German regulator13 [42], two diﬀerent concepts for
the integration of the German control areas were suggested in 2008 [43] by
the corresponding TSOs. The ﬁrst concept is a central grid control, i.e. the
abolishment of the individual control areas. The second concept is the so called
Grid Control Cooperation (GCC), which keeps the current control areas, but
12http://acer.europa.eu
13Bundesnetzagentur / Federal Net Agency
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implements a cooperation between the TSOs. The cooperation encompasses four
steps, reaching from an imbalance netting in the ﬁrst step to a common market
with a merit-order list in the last step. From December 2008 to September 2009,
this GCC was implemented stepwise by three of the TSOs. In March 2010 the
remaining TSO was ordered by the regulator to take part in the cooperation as
well [44]. The cooperation is open for the participation of further control areas,
with the ﬁrst and newest member being Western Denmark. Since October
2011 Western Denmark implemented the ﬁrst module, i.e. taking part in the
imbalance netting [45].
Regional Group Nordic
In the Nordic market area, the exchange of balancing energy is already in use
for several years. The common Nordic regulating power market was introduced
in 2002 [46]. It is based on a cooperation between TSOs, with a common merit-
order list for balancing energy, which is displayed on the Nordic Operational
Information System (NOIS) [47]. With the establishment of the common Nordic
regulating power market ACE was abolished in the Nordic system, utilising
regulating reserves system-wide. Since September 2009 there is a harmonisation
of rules for bidding and the imbalance settlement across the Nordic area, cf. [48].
United Kingdom - France
The BALIT mechanism, a cross-border mechanism via a HVDC line between
the TSOs National Grid (UK) and RTE (France), is in operation since Decem-
ber 2010. Its objective is to enhance balancing competition, reduce costs and
increase operational security. The exchange is based on a TSO-TSO approach.
To that, in the case of free transmission capacity on the Cross-Channel HVDC
line after the closure of the intra-day market, unused surpluses of balancing
energy are put at disposal mutually [49]. A similar mechanism is expected to
be introduced on the newly commenced BritNed cable [6].
France - Switzerland/Germany
A TSO-BRP approach of exchanging manually activated reserves is taken on
the border between France to Switzerland (since 2003) and the border between
France and Germany (since 2005). In this project Swiss and German BSPs are
enabled to give bids for balancing energy to the French TSO (RTE), in the case
of free cross-border transmission capacity, cf. [6, 50].
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France - Switzerland
In contrast to the export of manually activated balancing energy from Switzer-
land to France, since December 2010 there is the possibility of procuring pri-
mary reserves from France to Switzerland. The amount is limited to 25MW
out of 77MW, which are required in Switzerland. By meeting additional organ-
isational and technical requirements, the exchange of further regulating power
market products will be enabled across the Swiss-French border [51].
Norway - Denmark
With the expected commissioning of the Skagerrak IV cable in 2014 [52] it is
planned to reserve in total 110MW for the exchange of balancing services on
the HVDC connection [53, pg. 13]. These are ±10MW for primary control and
±100MW for secondary control, which will be delivered from Statnett (Norway)
to Energinet.dk (Denmark), based on a TSO-TSO approach.
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2.4 Regulating power market analyses and inte-
gration studies
The day-ahead spot market is a well covered topic and various analyses with
national and multinational scope are reported, e.g. European studies as SUS-
PLAN14 or TradeWind15. A discussion of diﬀerent power system models is
presented by Foley et al. [54]. Various studies have been done on national
regulating power markets as well. However, those mostly deal with the investi-
gation of price behaviour, the forecast of prices and the optimisation of bidding
strategies for market participants. Another ﬁeld of investigation covers sur-
veys on regulating power markets and the underlying system balancing/control
mechanisms. These studies aid pointing out signiﬁcant national diﬀerences in
regulating power markets and show the harmonisation potential as well as ne-
cessities.
In the following an overview on relevant literature is presented, covering sur-
veys on, price forecasting in and integration studies of regulating power markets.
This literature review is limited to Europe with a scope on Northern Europe16.
2.4.1 Surveys
Rebours et al. [55, 56] survey frequency and voltage control ancillary services,
comprehending the frequency control for 11 diﬀerent countries. This survey
can serve as a basis for future comparison of frequency ancillary services, which
mainly represent balancing services in the European system. In the second part,
the survey gives an overview on the market design/rules used in the diﬀerent
countries.
A comprehension of balancing services and voltage control services, particu-
larly for the Nordic area, is presented by Kristiansen [28]. This survey likewise
presents the deﬁnition of the ancillary services utilised in the Nordic area. Suc-
ceedingly the market rules for the Nordic countries are presented, including cost
estimates for the diﬀerent services and a discussion of policies and future trends.
Diﬀerent alternative multinational balancing market designs for Europe are
discussed by van der Veen et al. [20, 57]. The survey discusses eight diﬀerent
designs of multinational balancing markets, suggested by literature. The objec-
tive is to compile a complete overview of market designs, which will provide the
basis for the decision making in future market design.
14http://www.susplan.eu/
15http://www.trade-wind.eu/
16There is manifold literature on system balancing / real-time markets in other parts of the
world. However, due to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in market designs and system operation (cf.
Rebours [37]), the focus is set on Northern Europe.
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2.4.2 Price forecasting
In vertically integrated utility companies the system balancing was realised in-
ternally. With the unbundling and establishment of regulating power markets
prices for balancing services were introduced. Statistical analyses of market out-
comes give insight to characteristics of regulating power markets. These analyses
can be used for further forecasting of prices in regulating power markets.
Skytte [58] investigates the cost of acting in the regulating power market on
a longer time-horizon. An econometric analysis of the regulating power market
is executed. To that a linear model is developed, which is based on the day-
ahead spot market price and takes into account the activated regulating volume.
It is shown that there is a premium of readiness to be paid. In addition, prices
for upward regulating balancing energy are aﬀected more by the volume of acti-
vated reserves than the price for downward balancing energy in the Norwegian
regulating power market.
For a short-term horizon, Olsson and Söder [59] propose a model based on
seasonal auto regressive integration moving average (SARIMA) and Markov
processes. Its objective is to create scenarios of prices in the regulating power
market, which can be used in planning models. The model is applied to the
Nordic power market, recreating typical behaviour of prices.
Fleten and Pettersen [60] present an optimisation problem using a method
called generation of moment matching scenarios. Scenarios are created for the
day-ahead spot price, the prediction error and for the diﬀerence of day-ahead
spot and the price of balancing energy. The scenarios are utilised to optimise
the bidding-behaviour of a price-taking retailer in the Norwegian power market.
Jaehnert et al. [61] propose a linear model, which is extended by error terms.
In addition a SARIMA process is introduced in order to generate price scenarios
in the regulating power market. The model is used to estimate balancing energy
prices for the area of Southern Norway.
Frunt et al. [62, 63] analyse the deployment of balancing energy in the
Netherlands. They include an analysis of the so called raw price diﬀerence,
the diﬀerence between day-ahead spot market and the price of balancing en-
ergy. The analysis points out the increase of imbalance settlement costs during
the years. But the costs for the settlement of long respectively short positions
become more symmetrical in the Netherlands.
An analysis of the German regulating power market is presented by Riedel
and Weigt [64]. It is concluded that "the most important requirement for eco-
nomically eﬃcient reserve markets is the joint operation of the four German
control areas." [64, pg. 21] The general suggestion are shorter bidding periods
for reserve markets up to the procurement of regulating reserves through intra-
day markets. Wieschhaus and Weigt [65] test the interdependency between the
German day-ahead spot and the reserve market. It is shown, that the spot
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market outcome is aﬀected by the design of the reserve markets.
A comparable analysis is done by Just and Weber [66] valuing reserve capac-
ity prices against day-ahead spot prices in Germany. The analysis likewise shows
that there is no strong correlation between the reservation price of spinning reg-
ulating reserves and the forward as well as day-ahead spot market prices, due
to long contracting periods for reserve capacity. In order to achieve a more eﬃ-
cient reserve procurement leading to lower reserve capacity prices, the authors
suggest a reduction of the contract duration for reserves.
An application for price scenarios in the regulating power market is presented
by Matevosyan and Söder [67]. The objective is to minimise imbalance costs
for the trade of wind power, which is applied to a wind turbine. It evinces that
adopting the suggested strategy, savings of around 5% are achieved.
Jonsson et al. [68] investigate the impact of large-scale wind power on the
electricity market, including the regulating power market. It shows, that wind
power production has a signiﬁcant impact, resulting in much more downward
regulation, when there is a high wind power penetration in the system [68, pg.
9]. This is argued to occur due to wind power producers risk management or
insuﬃciencies of forecasting models.
Zugno et al. [69] discuss strategies for trading wind power in deregulated
energy markets. The newly introduced optimal quantile strategy relies on prob-
abilistic forecasts of wind power production and point forecasts of prices in the
day-ahead spot and regulating power markets. A proﬁt optimisation is achieved
due to reducing the exposure to risk, which a wind power producer sees.
Farahmand et al. [70] use price scenarios to likewise optimize wind producers
bidding strategies. The analysis includes a comparison of two diﬀerent imbal-
ance settlement schemes, demonstrating their impact on the optimal strategy.
For the one-price settlement it is optimal to bid either zero or maximum pro-
duction, depending on the expected regulating state of the system. Whereas
for the two-price settlement it is optimal to bid rather close to the expected
production.
Plazas et al. [71] optimise the bidding strategy for a thermal power producer,
which participates in the day-ahead spot and the regulating power market (in-
cluding reserve capacity and balancing energy). Prices and volumes are mod-
elled as ARIMA processes. It is concluded that the use of a stochastic approach
is much better than classical deterministic ones and only when prices are near
to its expected values the deterministic approach is advantageous.
2.4.3 Integration studies
Several studies and reports are published on the integration of day-ahead spot
markets in Europe. However, literature on the integration of regulating power
market in Europe is scarce so far.
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Bakken [19] studies the exchange of balancing services via HVDC lines be-
tween asynchronous areas, concentrating on technical and control aspects. The
"primary control co-operation" is found to be not realistic, due to the signiﬁ-
cant negative impacts on the exporting power system. However, the exchange
of secondary control reserves across HVDC connections appears to be of much
higher interest. Furthermore, "(...) during oﬀ-peak hours with price-dependent
energy exchange, the alternative of using at least part of the HVDC capacity for
secondary, or possibly tertiary, control reserves for the thermal system should
be seriously considered." [19, pg. 130] The introduction of AGC in the Nordic
area and the possibility of exchanging automatic activated balancing services is
presented by Bakken and Uhlen [72].
Due to the decentral characteristics of primary control, there already is a
common (mutually supporting) utilisation of primary reserves in a synchronous
area, cf. Kundur [12]. However, when it comes to FRR and RR, ACE is
still in use in the continental European system, relying on national control.
Particularly, ACE is still in use in the four German control areas. The ineﬃcient
utilisation of regulating reserves prior to the implementation of the grid control
cooperation in Germany is addressed by two studies.
Haubrich and Consentec [73] investigate reserve requirements in the German
control areas, which shows there is a signiﬁcant over-procurement of reserves.
In a second part the integration of the control areas is analysed, which results
in a possible further reduction of requirements. The reduction mainly results
from the netting of imbalances between the diﬀerent control areas.
The second study done by Lichtblick [74] addresses the saving possibilities for
the integration of the German control areas, regarding the activated balancing
energy. It concludes, that in 75% of all PTUs balancing energy could be reduced
due to imbalance netting, which amounts up to about 30% of the activated
balancing energy. The economic savings are estimated to about 300 million e.
TU Dortmund and E-Bridge Consulting GmbH [43] evaluate the two sug-
gested integration concepts for the German control areas and estimate savings
of about 200 million e. In the report, which was prepared for the Bundesnet-
zagentur, the concept of the central grid controller is favoured, however the
immediate implementation of the grid control cooperation is suggested.
Flinkerbusch and Heuterkes [75] examine the cost reduction potential in the
German regulating power market, including secondary and tertiary reserves.
The analysis is based on market data available for 2008. The simulation of a
reference scenario and a scenario with an integrated German regulating power
market shows a savings potential of about 160 million e, corresponding to 17%
of the costs in the regulating power market. The main reason for the saving is
observed to be the reduced activation of regulating reserves due to imbalance
netting.
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The actual implementation of the grid control cooperation is presented by
Zolotarev [76]. The presentation demonstrates the successful implementation of
the grid control cooperation with savings of about 300 million e per annum.
Frontier Economics [77] investigate the reservation of transmission capacity
for the exchange of balancing services based on a stylised simulation, taking day-
ahead and balancing prices from diﬀerent countries as the basis. "The results
show that across all of the scenarios analysed, there would be an expected beneﬁt
(i.e. an option value) to retaining the option to use capacity for the purpose of
balancing trade." [77, pg. 28].
A rough estimation of the economic value of exchanging balancing services
between the Nordic system and continental Europe is presented by Abbasy et al.
[78]. As basis for the analysis it is assumed that suﬃcient exchange capacity
is available. It is concluded that regulating power market integration reduces
the total balancing costs signiﬁcantly. The eﬀect of imbalance netting and thus
reduced reserve activation is shown likewise.
Van der Veen et al. [79] do a qualitative analysis of diﬀerent cross-border
arrangements for the exchange of balancing services. For the analysis seven
diﬀerent arrangements are analysed and evaluated by a set of high level per-
formance criteria. The qualitative analysis shows, that ACE netting already
is a beneﬁcial integration step. It is suggested not to implement a BSP-TSO
trading arrangement and that a common merit-order list has a positive eﬀect.
Furthermore, it is concluded that the outcome on individual markets can be
quite diﬀerent.
Succeedingly, Van der Veen et al. [80, 81] and Abbasy et al. [82] present an
agent-based analysis of cross-border arrangements for the exchange of balancing
services. The analyses [80, 81] conﬁrm the possible beneﬁt of the cross-border
arrangements, showing that a common merit-order list is most beneﬁcial. How-
ever, it is also stated that economic risks of being imbalanced change signiﬁ-
cantly with the implementation of a merit-order list. Especially Nordic BRPs
will face a much higher risk due to the regional marginal pricing. The speciﬁc
BSP-TSO cross-border arrangement is studied in [82], investigating the outcome
on individual markets. It is concluded that the question for a possible beneﬁt
has to be studied speciﬁcally for each case. In case of a cross-border exchange
between Norway and the Netherlands, the results show, that prices in Norway
are not aﬀected largely, however it can inﬂuence prices in the Netherlands sig-
niﬁcantly. This indicates a diﬀerent resistance in both countries against the
integration of regulating power markets.
Vandezande [21] explicitly discusses the integration of balancing markets
in Europe. The integration is investigated by the means of Belgium and the
Netherlands. The analysis takes into account constructed merit-order bid curves
for each country, recorded imbalance data, as well as available transmission ca-
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pacity between the countries. Simulations show, that in 2008 the imbalance
netting and TSO-TSO exchange of balancing energy with a merit-order list,
would have induced cost savings of 37%. At the same time the activation of
regulating reserves would have been reduced by 22%. It is pointed out that there
normally is suﬃcient transmission capacity available after the day-ahead spot
market clearing to net imbalances and exchange the necessary balancing ser-
vices. This shows that there actually is suﬃcient cross border capacity available
and that network investments are not necessarily required in order to implement
the integration of regulating power markets. In a second step the distortion of
imbalance settlement due to the exchange of balancing services is analysed. To
that end a set of strategies is analysed. "Due to current diﬀerences between
imbalance pricing methods in Belgium and the Netherlands, cross-border set-
tlement strategies induce ﬂows that are sometimes opposite to those occuring
under [a optimal balancing service exchange]. [These ﬂows] distort - rather than
enhance - the optimal deployment of [balancing] services." [21, pg. 121] Thus,
only with a full harmonisation of market designs prices would reﬂect costs and
the most proﬁtable BRP strategies would simultaneously enhance the social
welfare.
Farahmand and Doorman [83, 84] analyse the integration of regulating power
markets in Northern Europe. The analysis is based on a DC-power ﬂow model
and includes a cross-border procurement of reserves as well as their cross-border
activation. The simulations for a fully integrated Northern European regulating
power market show moderate savings for the reserve procurement, but consid-
erable savings in the system balancing. It is argued, that these saving are due
to the netting of imbalances and the activation of cheaper reserves, which are
located in the Nordic power system. The analyses clearly illustrate the possibil-
ity and proﬁtability of exchanging balancing services between two asynchronous
systems, via HVDC lines.
2.4.4 Review conclusion
There is some literature on multinational regulating power markets and the
integration of national markets, mostly focussing on Northern Europe. Most of
the literature focuses on market design and qualitative rather than quantitative
analyses.
The quantitative analyses presented by Van der Veen et al. [80, 81], Abbasy
et al. [82] and Vandezande [21] are based on recorded market data, which is
not suited for the assessment of future scenarios. Farahmand and Doorman
[83, 84], who use a fundamental modelling approach, lack a detailed model for
the Nordic hydro system. However, all of these referred analyses point out
beneﬁts by integrating national regulating power markets.
Thus, the objective of the research is to quantify the outcome of regulating
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power market integration in the entire area of Northern Europe, currently and
prospectively. To asses the outcome, a multinational regulating power market
model for Northern Europe is developed during the research. The model is
based on a common day-ahead spot market, covers several countries and in-
cludes future scenarios of the power system. Such a model was not found in
the literature. The developed regulating power market model and succeeding
analyses are presented in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3
Power market modelling
The development of the mathematical model for the regulating power market,
which is based on a common day-ahead spot market is put forward in the ﬁrst
part of the thesis. This chapter contains an overview on power market modelling.
Section 3.1 presents diﬀerent power market model types. In the succeeding
Section 3.2 the chosen modelling approach is presented, including an overview
on the simulation process and stating general assumptions.
The following Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate on the day-ahead spot market
model and regulating power market model, respectively. Both chapters are
ﬁnalised with an analysis performed with each of the models, illustrating their
capabilities.
3.1 Power market model characterization
Several diﬀerent approaches have been developed to investigate and forecast
power market outcomes and prices. Meibom et al. [85] classify the approaches
by ﬁve diﬀerent categories, being ﬁnancial, statistical, fundamental and game-
theoretic models as well as technical analysis. The attempt is to present a short
description of the diﬀerent approaches and give examples for their implementa-
tion, especially considering the modelling of regulating power markets.
3.1.1 Financial
Financial models describe the stochastic price movements, for which diﬀerent
stochastic processes are used. Olsson and Söder [59] present a model for the
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regulating power market using a stochastic process1 combined with a Markov
chain in order to describe the state as well as the price in the regulating power
market. Fleten and Pettersen [60] present a momentum based method, which
is used to generate price scenarios for balancing energy.
3.1.2 Statistical
In contrast, statistical or econometric models try to include deterministic regres-
sors. Due to the non-storability of electricity, especially the demand has a high
impact on market clearing prices. Skytte [58] does an econometric analysis of
the Norwegian regulating power market, using the state of the regulating power
market and the volume as regressors. Jaehnert et al. [61] extend this approach
by a SARIMA process in order to generate price scenarios of balancing energy
for southern Norway.
3.1.3 Fundamental
In contrast to the former models, fundamental modelling takes a bottom-up
approach. To analyse power markets, generation as well as transmission and
demand are modelled explicitly. The basic assumption of most fundamental
models is the eﬃcient operation of power markets, leading to a dispatch with
minimal system operation costs, which satisﬁes the demand2. This eﬃcient
clearing of the power market results in a electricity price, which equals the
marginal generation cost of the marginal generation unit.
In order to represent realistic sized electricity systems, a representation of
the transmission system is necessary, as there often are transmission limitations
between countries or even within country. Congestions on transmission lines
lead to diﬀerent electricity prices in the areas that are connected by the con-
gested transmission lines. There are diﬀerent approaches of representing the
transmission system. The most common are the corridor-based, Power Transfer
Distribution Factor (PTDF)-based and the ﬂow-based approaches. The ﬁrst
approach solely utilises Net Transfer Capacities (NTC) as constraints for trans-
mission on a corridor, while the transmission on the corridors is independent.
With the deﬁnition of PTDFs, the linear inter-dependency of transmission on
diﬀerent lines is described, which is only valid for a certain state of the power
system. The last approach includes the full description of the power-ﬂow either
as DC- or AC-power ﬂow, which however complicates the solution signiﬁcantly.
1The process used here is a SARIMA process (Seasonal Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving-
Average), which is a well established methods to model loads and market prices.
2This assumptions results in the modelling of a perfect market, neglecting potential strate-
gic behaviour of market participants.
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For a detailed description of power ﬂow methodologies, see e.g. Grainger and
Stevenson [86].
Up to now fundamental models are almost only developed for long-term
investment analyses, day-ahead spot markets simulations and to assess their
integration. Krause et al. [87] present a multi-energy carrier model based on
energy hubs, with a general representation of countries. Nüssler and Lienert
[88] developed the power market model DIANA for central Europe, which is
divided into several regions. Transmission is solely based on NTCs. Meibom
et al. [89] introduce the multi-market model WILMAR including the reservation
of required reserve and the intra-day market.
A more detailed representation of the transmission grid is presented by EE2 -
TU Dresden [90]. In ELMOD the transmission is modelled ﬂow-based, however
it only covers Germany in detail. All of Europe is modelled by European Wind
Energy Association [2]. This PSST model is expanded by the simulation of
reserve procurement and system balancing by Farahmand and Doorman [83, 84].
3.1.4 Game-theoretic
An enhancement of fundamental models is the consideration of game theory
in the market clearing process. This allows the modelling of competition and
strategic behaviour in power markets. A comprehension of diﬀerent approaches
and current modelling trends is given by Ventosa et al. [91], however regulating
power markets are not considered.
Hobbs and Rĳkers [92], Hobbs et al. [93] develop and apply a game-theoretic
model, which calculates an oligopolistic equilibrium among competing genera-
tion companies. The model includes diﬀerent transmission pricing methodolo-
gies. The model is applied to north west Europe. It shows economic ineﬃcien-
cies and illustrates the eﬀects of generator conjectures regarding the supply of
competing generation companies.
Neuhoﬀ et al. [94] discuss diﬀerences between a set of game-theoretic models,
showing that results converge in the case of a perfect market assumption. How-
ever, in the case of considering the strategic behaviour of market participants,
the results from the compared models strongly depend on modelling assump-
tions. This conﬁrms that results of models assuming perfect market behaviour
are quite reliable, but that results of game-theoretic models need to be viewed
critically.
Van der Veen et al. [80, 81] and Abbasy et al. [82, 95] present analyses of
competition in the regulating power markets. The analyses take an agent-based
approach in order to analyse the behaviour of single market participants. They
assess diﬀerent market rules and market coupling approaches. However, due to
the level of detail and complexity of the simulations only a limited area and
snapshots of the regulating power market can be simulated.
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3.2 Implemented modelling approach
In order to develop a model of an integrated Northern European regulating
power market, a generic electricity market design is assumed, supposing a har-
monisation of the national regulating power markets. The regulating power
market is based on the outcome of the day-ahead spot market. It is assumed
that there is a common Northern European day-ahead spot market, resem-
bling today’s situation of day-ahead spot market coupling (ITVC-CWE market
coupling, see Section 2.3). The modelled markets are assumed to be perfect,
neglecting strategic behaviour of market participants. As mentioned in Section
2.2.2 there are diﬀerent designs and sequences of electricity markets. Sequence
refers to the temporal order of clearing the markets, e.g. procuring required
reserves ﬁrst and clearing the day-ahead spot market afterwards or vice versa.
The market sequence concerns the knowledge of day-ahead spot market clearing
prices and dispatch when running the regulating power market, particularly the
reserve procurement. In case of procuring reserves prior to the day-ahead spot
market clearing, an expected day-ahead market clearing has to be taken into
account, resulting in a stochastic optimisation problem.
In the presented model, a deterministic approach is implemented. Thus,
a sequence is chosen, where ﬁrst the day-ahead spot market is cleared and
subsequently the regulating power market is run. Running the regulating power
market includes the reserve procurement and ﬁnally the balancing of the power
system. The chosen time basis for the day-ahead spot market clearing is one
hour according to the European spot markets NordPool, APX and EEX. As
PTU length for the regulating power market, i.e. the reserve procurement and
the system balancing, 15 minutes are chosen to match the shorter PTU length
of RG CE3.
Following the suggestions by Bakken [19], the exchange of primary control
(FCR) across HVDC-lines is unrealistic. Moreover, the procurement of FCR is
mandatory in some of the countries (e.g. the Netherlands). A remuneration is
only done for the reserve capacity and not the energy, cf. Tab. 2.3 and 2.4.
Thus, fast reacting FCR is neglected in the model and it is focussed on FRR
and RR as well as their exchange.
The schematic diagram of the power market model is shown in Fig. 3.1. It
consists of the following three subsequent steps: the common day-ahead spot
market, the reserve procurement and the system balancing. The common day-
ahead spot market is simulated by the utilisation of EFI’s Multi-area Power-
market Simulator (EMPS)4. The outputs of EMPS include the optimal day-
3The current PTU length in RGN is 60 minutes.
4The development of EMPS started at the Norwegian energy research institute EFI, which
now is merged into SINTEF Energy Research, cf. http://www.sintef.no/home/SINTEF-
Energy-Research/Software/EOPS-and-EMPS/.
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ahead system dispatch, taking the unit-commitment into account. Furthermore,
EMPS calculates area prices and water values. These results are used as inputs
to the subsequent steps, which are simulated using the regulating power mar-
ket model developed during the research, called Integrated Regulating power
market in Europe (IRiE). In the second step the reserve capacity according to
deﬁned reserve requirements is procured, resulting in a redispatch of the pro-
duction and transmission capacity. The redispatch is input to the ﬁnal step, in
which the real-time system balancing is simulated.
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- Reserve 
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   - minimum share
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  - load forecast error 
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Figure 3.1: Model structure and work ﬂow
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the geographic spread of the model, consisting of 46
interconnected areas in the 2010 and 2020 scenarios. The areas are deﬁned
according to country borders, the geographic distribution of generation capacity
and existing bottlenecks in the transmission system.
The model includes a detailed description of the Nordic area (red) and north
west Europe (yellow) as well as a generalized description of neighbouring coun-
tries (green). Oﬀshore areas with no wind power production installed in 2010
are plotted with dotted lines. The detailed modelled areas (1-41) are aggregated
into 12 and 15 control area5. These aggregated areas are in accordance with
the current control areas in the RG CE [96] and in RGN6 [15]. In October 2011
5Up to now Finland is disregarded in the regulating power market simulations, due to
insuﬃcient system data.
6According to RGN’s (Nordel’s) System Operation Agreement [15] the Nordic area is one
control area, with a common Nordic merit order list of bids for balancing energy. Just as
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Sweden was split in four areas [97], resulting in an increased number of control
areas, which is expected still to be valid in 2020.
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Figure 3.2: Geographic overview of the day-ahead spot market and regulating
power market models
The system is modelled in its 2010 and 2020 state regarding the installed
generation capacity, the transmission system, the exchange with neighbouring
countries, power production and consumption. The power market model simu-
lates a generic year with 364 days including 8736 hours, which corresponds to
34944 PTUs. To model the stochastic power production from renewable sources,
75 diﬀerent annual inﬂow and corresponding wind speed scenarios, covering the
years 1931 to 2005, are used during the day-ahead spot market clearing. Af-
terwards a set of characteristic years is chosen to simulate the regulating power
market.
The following chapters 4 and 5 contain a further description of the day-ahead
spot market as well as regulating power market model.
the areas deﬁned in the day-ahead market clearing by NordPool [36], the Nordic system can
be split into areas during real-time system operation, taking into account congestions. In
this case the activation bids can deviate from the common merit-order list. The areas during
real-time operation can, but do not need to match the day-ahead areas. The division chosen
in this model is according to 2010’s division.
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Chapter 4
EMPS - The day-ahead
spot market model
In this chapter the model and simulations of the common Northern European
day-ahead spot market are presented. It includes scenarios for 2010’s and
2020’s state of the power system in Northern Europe. The day-ahead spot
market model is described comprehensively and assumptions for the scenarios
are stated. Simulation results for the two power system scenarios are presented
and discussed succeedingly.
The chapter includes Publication A, which presents an investigation of a
possible future development of the Northern European power system, expecting
a large increase of installed wind power production capacity. Section 4.2 to 4.5
are identical to Section III to VI of the publication, with minor editorial changes.
In addition, this thesis includes Section 4.1, which elaborates the methodology
of EMPS in more detail than in the publication. Section 4.2 presents underlying
data for the 2010 and 2020 scenarios. Simulation results of both scenarios are
presented in Section 4.3 and discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 ﬁnalises the
chapter with concluding remarks on the simulations made.
4.1 Power market model
The common Northern European day-ahead spot market is simulated with
EMPS [98]. It is a mid- and long-term operation scheduling model on a weekly
basis with a time horizon of several years, suited for hydro-thermal power sys-
tems and taking the unit-commitment into account. Its objective is the socio-
economic optimal dispatch for generation, transmission and consumption of elec-
tricity, assuming perfect market behaviour.
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EMPS is developed by SINTEF Energy Research [99] originally for the
Nordic power system, including Finland, Norway and Sweden, explicitly taking
into account hydro based power production. As there is no real cost for wa-
ter, but rather a limited amount of water in the hydro reservoirs, its long-term
utilisation1 has to be optimised. To that end, EMPS contains a detailed water
course description for the hydro power production system. Fig. 4.1 shows the
sketch of an exemplary water course, including inﬂow, hydro reservoirs, hydro
power plants and the hydraulic interconnections.
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Figure 4.1: Example of a water course deﬁned in EMPS [100]
The EMPS model consists of two parts, the determination of the hydro
reservoir strategy and a detailed simulation of the power system.
Within the strategy part the long-term utilisation of reservoirs is determined.
Based on stochastic dynamic programming, water values for the water stored
in reservoirs are determined, cf. Section 4.1.2. The water value represents the
opportunity cost of hydro power production, using the water stored in a hydro
reservoir. During the simulation the optimal weekly dispatch of the hydro power
1Some of the Norwegian hydro reservoirs store water for several years. Thus, a optimisation
horizon of several years is necessary to ensure an optimal utilisation of the stored water.
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production, the thermal power production and the transmission is determined
through a market clearing process, cf. Section 4.1.3. Weeks are divided in several
subsequent periods, by which an hourly resolution of the optimal dispatch is
approximated.
4.1.1 System model
The model is divided into several spot market areas, which include aggregated
production and consumption. The example of Northern Europe is shown in
Fig. 3.2. The areas are connected via transmission corridors, described by
their NTCs and linear losses. The area deﬁnition is based on country borders,
bottlenecks in the transmission system and diﬀerent water courses.
Each of the areas can contain modules for hydro power, thermal power, wind
power and demand, as shown in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Model of an aggregated area with the its utilisable modules [100]
Hydro power production
The hydro power production consists of several modules, each containing storable
and non-storable inﬂow as well as a hydro power station, depicted in Fig. 4.3. In
addition to the plant discharge, bypass of the power plant and potential spillage
are modelled. These may go to diﬀerent downstream reservoirs or to the sea.
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Figure 4.3: Model of an aggregated area with the included modules [100]
Storable inﬂow goes into the reservoir, whereat non-storable inﬂow has to
be used for power production instantaneously. Inﬂow is available as weekly
recorded data with a high geographical resolution, covering more than 75 years.
Reservoirs are deﬁned by their volume and a piecewise linear curve describ-
ing the relation between reservoir ﬁlling and the level above sea. The reservoirs
are discharged through hydro power plants, which are deﬁned by their energy
conversion factor (kWh/m3). The power plant output is deﬁned as a piece-
wise linear function, giving the dependency between the discharge and power
production.
Beside the discharge through a hydro power plant, the bypass of hydro power
plants and spillage are deﬁned. These are necessary due to constraints in the
water course, which are maximum and minimum reservoir levels as well as max-
imum and minimum discharges.
For pumping the eﬃciency as well as the source and ﬁnal reservoir are deﬁned
in EMPS.
Thermal power production
In EMPS, thermal power production is modelled by its capacity, the marginal
production costs, start-/ stop costs and an availability rate. The availability rate
accounts for planned and unplanned outages. The start up state of thermal
power plants is modelled with a linear approximation, presented by Warland
et al. [101].
Wind power production
Wind power production is modelled as ﬁxed energy input to the system per
area, based on installed generation capacity and wind speed data. The wind
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speed data has an hourly resolution, accounting for the variability of the wind
power production.
Demand
Demand is divided into ﬁrm and elastic demand. In addition, temperature
dependency of the demand can be included, to represent the signiﬁcant share of
electric heating, especially Nordic countries. The ﬁrm demand is deﬁned by its
annual quantity, a weekly proﬁle during the year and a proﬁle within a week.
Elastic demand respectively ﬂexible demand is deﬁned by a weekly proﬁle
and a disconnection price. This ﬂexible demand is used to model dual-fuel
boilers and power intensive industry, which has the possibility to react on prices.
Transmission
Transmission corridors are modelled by their NTCs and linear losses, not distin-
guishing between AC and DC. Exchange to continental neighbouring countries
is represented by a scheduled energy exchange rather than a price-dependent
exchange.
Reserve capacity
A deﬁnition of reserve requirements for countries can be included. In EMPS,
the requirements only contain upward spinning reserve, which can be provided
from hydro power or running thermal power plants.
4.1.2 Strategy part
In the ﬁrst part of EMPS, the strategy part, water values are determined, using
stochastic dynamic programming. For this determination the hydro system
in each area is aggregated into one energy reservoir and one equivalent hydro
power plant as well as time series for storable and non-storable inﬂow. In order
to achieve a realistic utilisation of the reservoirs, constraints in the water courses
have to be incorporated in the storable and non-storable inﬂow [98].
Inﬂow scenarios
In total, inﬂow data for more than 75 years is available. These inﬂow records are
used to represent the stochasticity of inﬂow to the Nordic hydro system. Fig. 4.4
shows the aggregated inﬂow to the Norwegian hydro system for 10 succeeding
years. The diagram illustrates signiﬁcant diﬀerences in inﬂow. However, the
main characteristics are the same, with high inﬂow during late spring, summer
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and early autumn while the inﬂow is low during the rest of the year. Thus, the
year is split in a ﬁlling and a depletion season of the hydro reservoirs.
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Figure 4.4: Inﬂow scenarios to the Norwegian hydro system
Water values
To achieve an optimal operation of the hydro power system, the long-term
utilisation of water stored in reservoirs has to be optimised. The objective of
the optimisation is deﬁned as the expected minimum operation cost J(x,N),
from week k until the end of the planning period N . It can be expressed as
J (x, k) = E
[
min
(
N∑
i=k
L(Pi, x, i)
)
− S(x,N)
]
(4.1)
x represents the reservoir level,
Pi represents the production from a reservoir in week i,
L(Pi, x, i) represents the operation cost in week i, including costs of thermal
generation, power purchases, curtailment of demand and possible income
from power sales,
S(x,N) is the value of the remaining water in the reservoir at the end of the
planning period.
The optimisation is done through backward recursive stochastic dynamic
programming, deﬁning the objective as:
J (x, k) =
N∑
i=k
L (Pi, x, i)− S (x,N) = J (x, k + 1) + L (Pk, x, k) (4.2)
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The operation cost L(Pi, x, k) is a function of the production from reservoir
Pi in each week. Hence, the aim is to ﬁnd the production2 which minimizes the
operation cost.
minPi (J (x, k)) =minPi (J (x, k + 1) + L (Pk, x, k)) (4.3)
⇒ dJ
dPk
= 0 (4.4)
The result of solving the minimisation is the optimal operation strategy for
each period k [102], being
∂L
∂Pk
= ∂J
∂xk+1
(4.5)
In Equation 4.5
∂L
∂Pk
is the marginal operation cost in week k
∂J
∂xk+1
is the dependence of the total future cost on the reservoir level, which
represents the marginal water value in week k+1 for reservoir level xk+1.
The optimal handling of hydro power production is achieved if the marginal
operation cost equals the water value, i.e. the water value is used as the marginal
production cost for hydro power. To account for the stochasticity, the calcula-
tion is run with all of the inﬂow scenarios, each with a certain probability. The
ﬁnal water values are the weighted averages of the single inﬂow scenarios.
The water value calculation is done for each aggregated reservoir in each area.
Fig. 4.5 exemplarily shows the water value for one area (Western Norway). It
illustrates the dependency water values depend on the week and the reservoir
level.
The procedure above describes the calculation of water values for one area.
During the water value calculation the areas are disconnected. Thus, the ex-
change with other areas has to be taken into account exogenously. The exchange
is adjusted by running a simulation of the full aggregated model and comparing
the diﬀerence to the dispatch of the single area. In case of a diﬀerence, the
exogenously deﬁned parameters describing the exchange are adapted and the
water value calculation is rerun. After the dispatch for the single areas and the
simulation of the full model has converged, the water value calculation is ﬁn-
ished. A detailed explanation of the water value approach is given by Wolfgang
et al. [98].
2The production from a reservoir per week represents the reservoir utilisation strategy.
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Figure 4.5: Water value map for Western Norway
4.1.3 Simulation part
With the water values calculated in the strategy part, the simulation part is
executed. The simulation is run in two stages; ﬁrst the optimal system dispatch
is determined for the full model on the aggregate area level using the calculated
water values as the marginal production costs for hydro power plants. Then
the dispatch for the detailed reservoir draw-down model is determined, using a
rule-based strategy to distribute the optimal production dispatch on the single
hydro power plants.
In the draw-down model, reservoirs are divided into two types (buﬀer and
regulation reservoirs), which are run with diﬀerent strategies. The objective of
the reservoir draw-down strategy is to produce a speciﬁed amount of energy
at minimized operational costs. The minimisation attempts to reduce the risk
of spillage during the ﬁlling and the avoidance of production capacity shortage
during the depletion season.
If the optimal system dispatch cannot be achieved with a detailed draw-down
strategy, the optimization of the full model on the aggregated area level is ad-
justed and rerun. The simulation is run for all the given inﬂow scenarios. When
convergence is reached, the optimal system dispatch is determined, including
the power production and transmission for each of the inﬂow scenarios.
4.2 Model input data
Fig. 3.2 shows the implementation of the Northern European power system in
EMPS. Continental neighbouring countries, drawn in dotted circles, are mod-
elled in less detail. Germany is subdivided based on suggestion by Amprion,
EnBW TNG, transpower, VE-T [103] and Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH
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(Dena) [104]. The subdivision of the Norwegian and Swedish systems takes into
account known transmission bottlenecks as well as diﬀerent water courses in the
hydro system.
For the Northern European power system a 2010 and a 2020 scenario are
developed. Input data and assumptions are stated hereafter. As development
plans change continuously, the scenario 2020 does not give the exact year of
the system development, but rather a future state of the power system. The
adaptation of the power system includes increased WPP capacity, a changed
power plant portfolio as well as expanded transmission capabilities.
The 2010 scenario represents the current state of the Nordic and north-
ern continental European power system. NTCs for the transmission corridors
are determined according to the methodology proposed by Deutsche Energie-
Agentur GmbH (Dena) [104]. Consumption data is taken from the Nordic power
exchange NordPool [105], continental TSOs TenneT TSO B.V. [23], Elia Sys-
tem Operator SA [24], 50 Hertz Transmission GmbH [106], Amprion GmbH
[107], EnBW Transportnetze AG [108], TenneT TSO GmbH [109] and annual
consumption data published by Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Tech-
nologie [110]. For a detailed overview see Tables 4.7 and 4.8 in the appendix of
this chapter. Finally, the 2010 scenario is ﬁtted to reﬂect the annual generation
mix and price characteristics in the modelled countries. The ﬁtting is mainly
done by adapting the availability rates of thermal power plants.
The 2020 scenario deﬁnition is based on several reviewed reports for the dif-
ferent countries. These are reports by Svenska Kraftnät and Statnett [17], Nordel
[111], European Commission [112] for the Nordic system including Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Reports by Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH
(Dena) [104], EWI - Universität zu Köln [113], Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft
und Technologie [114], European Commission [112] are used as a basis for Ger-
many. The development in the Netherlands is based on reports by European
Commission [112], Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving [115] and ﬁnally Belgium
is based on the report by European Commission [112]. Installed WPP capaci-
ties are taken from the TradeWind project [116]. Future transmission capacities
are based on the Ten-Year-Network-Development-Plan by ENSTO-E [117], the
extensive study by Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH (Dena) [104] and individ-
ual projects, like the extension of the Skagerrak cable [53]. The consumption
is mostly expected to stay constant, as the forecasts in the reports above men-
tioned were not consistent.
The following subsections give a detailed overview of assumptions for the
2010 and 2020 scenarios.
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4.2.1 Transmission lines
Besides a transmission expansion inside countries, the expansion of cross-border
transmission capacity is crucial in order to use power production sources eﬃ-
ciently and enable the large-scale integration of power production from renew-
able sources. Table 4.1 lists the transmission capacities of the HVDC cables
connecting Nordic to continental Europe. Presented are the NTCs, stating the
potential exchange capacities. In the 2020 scenario the new commissioning of
the Nordlink cable and planned expansions on some of the interconnections [118]
are included3. This expansion results in almost doubling of the interconnection
capacity.
Table 4.1: NTCs of HVDC cables from Nordic to continental Europe in MW
Area 2010 2020
from to from-to to-from from-to to-from
NorNed NO NL 700 -700 1400 -1400
Nordlink NO DE - - 1400 -1400
Skagerak NO DK 850 -850 1550 -1550
Konti-Skan SE DK 485 -485 680 -740
Baltic SE DE 525 -400 600 -600
Storebælt DK DK 600 -600 600 -600
Kontek DK DE 550 -550 600 -600
Sum 3710 -3585 6830 -6890
4.2.2 Power plant portfolio
Fig. 4.6 shows the installed power plant capacities in the modelled countries in
2010 and 2020. The future development is based on the decommissioning of old
power plants, which will reach their maximum lifetime and the commissioning of
new power plants. For the commissioning, only power plants, which are actually
planned are regarded. The challenge is to give a good estimate on the expected
capacity of nuclear power plants. In this analysis, it is assumed to be constant,
apart from Germany, where the generation capacity is halved. This is in line
with the current policies. To account for the large increase in WPP additional
thermal capacity needs to be decommissioned. This is done by taking out about
30% of the lignite power plants in Germany and some of the hard coal power
plants, which would have rather low running hours.
3The plans for new HVDC cables change constantly. At the time of the scenario develop-
ment the extension of NorNed 2 was still regarded by Statnett SF [118].
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Figure 4.6: Power plant portfolio per country in 2010 and 2020
The thermal power production is implemented in two diﬀerent ways, either as
scheduled production, for which a production proﬁle is given, or as dispatchable
production. The division of power plant types in scheduled and dispatchable
production is shown in Table 4.2. However, some of the hard coal, gas and
oil ﬁred power plants are used for district heating, thus having a partly ﬁxed
production proﬁle. The available dispatchable generation capacity is modelled
in the form of single power plants with individual marginal production as well
as start up and shut down costs.
Table 4.2: Classiﬁcation of modelled thermal power plant types as dispatchable
/ non-dispatchable
Non-dispatchable generation Dispatchable generation
Nuclear Hard coal
CHP Lignite
Biomass Gas ﬁred
Oil ﬁred
A detailed overview on the installed generation capacity in each of the coun-
tries is given in Tab. 4.5 and 4.6 in Appendix 4.6. In addition Fig. 4.21 and
4.22 show the resulting marginal cost curves of the production for one week in
each of the countries for the 2010 and 2020 scenario respectively. WPP is bid
at zero cost in this curves and hydro power production according to its water
value. The cost curves illustrate, that the marginal production costs slightly
decrease from 2010 to 2020, due to the expected increase in eﬃciency of the
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power plants.
Apart from the changes in the thermal plant portfolio, there are also some
increases in hydro capacities in the Nordic area. The main increase is only in
power plant capacity and not in reservoirs, which increases the plants ﬂexibility.
Thus, the hydro power plant has the ability to produce more when prices are
high, without an increase in the total energy production. In addition some
energy is expected from new small hydro production.
4.2.3 Wind power production
WPP is expected to be one of the main drivers for future changes in the power
system. As shown in Fig. 4.6 a signiﬁcant increase of installed WPP capacity is
expected. The increase is estimated to be from about 34GW in 2010 to 96GW in
2020, corresponding to the high wind scenario in the TradeWind project [116].
To simulate WPP, two diﬀerent wind production data sets are used. The
ﬁrst data set includes historic wind speed data of several years, provided from
the TradeWind project [116]. Thus, the annual variation of WPP is taken into
account. However, this data has a rather low spatial and temporal resolution (6h
time steps and 2.5 degrees point-to-point distance). The second data set includes
the hourly WPP data with a much higher geographic resolution (approx. 7
km), which is based on wind speed data from the COSMO EU model [119].
For the simulation of WPP over 3200 WPP facilities are included to model the
geographical spread of WPP. The WPP is aggregated in each area, resulting in
a smoothing of the power production from the single WPP facilities. A detailed
explanation of the methodology can be found in [120]. However, due to its high
grade of detail hourly WPP data is only available for one year, which is then
used for all inﬂow scenarios.
For the ﬁtting of the scenarios, the ﬁrst data set is used, accounting for
annual diﬀerences in WPP. However, as the day-ahead spot market outcome is
used as the basis for the regulating power market, hourly WPP data is used
for the ﬁnal runs of EMPS. Moreover, for the hourly WPP data set also WPP
forecasts are available, which are essential in the further research dedicated to
regulating power markets.
4.2.4 Reserve requirements
As stated in section 4.1, EMPS includes the deﬁnition of start and stop costs
for thermal power plants as well as reserve requirements for countries. Those
are handled using a linearised approximation, similar to Warland et al. [101]
and to the methodology used in the regulating power market model, described
in Chapter 5. In EMPS only spinning upward reserves are regarded, which
can be procured from hydro plants and running thermal power plants. The
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requirements for the 2010 and 2020 scenario used in EMPS are stated in Table
4.3. The increase of the reserve requirements is based on the increasing WPP,
using the three-sigma approach, see also Holttinen et al. [121].
Table 4.3: Reserve requirements per country in MW
NO SE FI DK DE NL BE
2010 2000 2020 865 1200 5800 300 150
2020 3000 2750 1050 1500 9400 1330 345
4.3 Simulation results
The previously deﬁned 2010 and 2020 scenario are run with EMPS. The out-
come of both scenarios is presented below. The simulations use 75 years of
inﬂow and WPP for the strategy part. Due to the high level of detail and com-
putational eﬀort, only 10 diﬀerent inﬂow years and hourly WPP is used during
the simulation part. The presented results show these ten years.
4.3.1 Generation mix
The resulting annual generation mix per country is drawn in Fig. 4.7 and
given in Tab. 4.7 and 4.8 in the Appendix 4.6. It is divided between thermal,
wind, photovoltaic and hydro power production, illustrating the shift of power
production from fossil to renewable energy sources.
For 2010 the current generation mix is reproduced quite well, as it is one
of the ﬁtting criteria for the model. In Norway electricity production is al-
most 100% from hydro power plants, while Sweden has a share of about 50%
of hydro prodcution. In Denmark and Germany there already is a noticeable
share of WPP, suming up to 51TWh in total. The remaining power produc-
tion is by thermal power plants from diﬀerent sources and a small portion by
photovoltaics.
In 2020 the generation mix changes noticeably. The main diﬀerence is the
growing WPP in all countries according to the scenario assumptions, resulting
in a WPP of 233TWh in total. Besides the rising WPP, there is a shift of power
production between the countries. The total production increases in Sweden
and especially the Netherlands and decreases in Germany. The shift is mainly
due to the change in the portfolio of thermal power plants and an expected load
increase in the Netherlands.
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The change in the generation mix likewise has an impact on the exchange
between the countries. Most noticeably is, that Germany turns from an electric-
ity exporting country in 2010 to an importing country in 2020. Furthermore,
there generally is an increasing export from the Nordic area in 2020.
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Figure 4.7: Resulting generation mix per country
4.3.2 Operation of thermal power plants
As seen in the previous ﬁgures, there is a reduction in the power production
from thermal power plants. This is due to less installed thermal capacity as
well as decreasing operating hours of the thermal power plants. The operating
hours for the thermal power plants grouped by type are plotted in Fig. 4.8 and
Fig. 4.9. Only power plants which are assumed to be freely dispatchable are
included. These are hard coal, gas- and oil-ﬁred power plants.
In Fig. 4.8 data for the 2010 scenario is plotted. All of the hard coal power
plants run more than 7000 hours, with most of them operating full time4. The
operation hours are far less for gas-ﬁred plants, as they have higher marginal
production costs and thus are dispatched more seldom. It is even more the case
for oil-ﬁred power plants, where only a couple run for several thousand hours a
year. Most of them are only dispatched for less than 500 hours.
4Outages of thermal power plants are taken into account by reducing the available thermal
capacity in each individual week. The available capacity per week is based on published data
at the European Energy Exchange[122].
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Figure 4.8: Operating hours of thermal power plants in 2010
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
2184
4368
6552
8736
Hard coal
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
[h
ou
rs
]
Power plant capacity [GW]
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
2184
4368
6552
8736
Gas
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
[h
ou
rs
]
Power plant capacity [GW]
0 2 4 6 8
0
2184
4368
6552
8736
Oil
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
[h
ou
rs
]
Power plant capacity [GW]
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
Belgium
Figure 4.9: Operating hours of thermal power plants in 2020
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Operating hours change in the 2020 scenarios, due to the increasing amount
of intermittent WPP with zero marginal cost. There is a recognizable reduction
for hard coal power plants with some plants running below 75% of the time. For
gas-ﬁred power plants this reduction is even higher with more than two-third
of the installed capacity running below 50% of the time and a share of those
running only about 1000 hours. For oil-ﬁred power plants, there is no signiﬁcant
change. The annual short-term margin per installed capacity of thermal power
plants (in e/kW), deﬁned as the revenues minus the variable costs, are plotted
in Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11, for 2010 and 2020 respectively. This margin must also
cover ﬁxed costs like investment and maintenance. The low number of operating
hours, especially for gas-ﬁred power plants challenges their proﬁtability. To be
proﬁtable these power plants have to recover their costs in only a limited number
of peak-production hours. Open-cycle gas turbines with high marginal costs but
low investment costs might be able to recover these during the occasional price
spikes.
In general, between 2010 and 2020, not only running hours of the power
plants are reduced, but also annual margins. For hard coal plants the reduc-
tion is about 20%, but for gas-ﬁred power plants the margins are reduced by
more than two-third. Oil-ﬁred power plants do not have a positive margin in
2020 anymore, but in fact operate at a deﬁcit. Losses can occur due to the
implemented reserve requirements, which do not imply capacity payments to
plant owners in the model. In reality, there has to be some form of payment for
reserves, resulting in positive margins for peaking plants.
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Figure 4.10: Margin of thermal power plants in 2010
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Figure 4.11: Margin of thermal power plants in 2020
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It is important to mention that reduced operating hours do not imply a
reduction to zero, i.e. a power plant is never in operation. This indicates that
keeping the thermal capacity is probably not proﬁtable, but it is essential to have
suﬃcient production capacity in the system to serve the load at any instance.
Ensuring security of supply during peak demand and low wind production hours
is a major challenge for the future power system, cf. the ongoing discussion on
capacity payments [123].
4.3.3 Reservoir levels
Fig. 4.12 present the percentiles of the Norwegian reservoir levels during a
year. The general characteristic, is an emptying of the reservoirs during winter
and early spring and the ﬁlling up during late spring and summer. There are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between wet and dry years. The total installed reservoir
capacity in Norway is about 86TWh, which is nearly reached in the wettest year
in 2010. This maximum level is lower in the 2020 scenarios. One of the diﬀer-
ences in the 2020 scenario is that the mean reservoir level is higher than in 2010.
Further the diﬀerence between the percentiles increases, thus the percentiles get
ﬂatter. This indicates a decreasing utilization of the long-term energy storage
possibility of hydro-reservoirs. However, these percentiles are not suitable for
the analysis of the short-term ﬂexibility of the hydro production. This would be
interesting to display the impact of increasing WPP, where storage on hourly
or daily basis is necessary.
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Figure 4.12: Norwegian reservoir levels
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4.3.4 Transmission
To analyse the short-term ﬂexibility of the power production, the transmission
dispatch between Nordic and continental Europe is meaningful, shown in Fig.
4.13. Plotted is the average transmission dispatch for the whole transmission
corridor, including all of the transmission lines presented in Table 4.1. The
dotted black lines, indicate the minimum and maximum capacity. It shows that
the volatility of the transmission dispatch is much higher in 2020 than in 2010,
showing an increasing ﬂexibility of the Nordic hydro production.
2000 4000 6000 8000
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Time [hours]
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
[G
W
]
(a) 2010
2000 4000 6000 8000
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Time [hours]
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
[G
W
]
(b) 2020
Figure 4.13: Day-ahead transmission dispatch Nordic to continental Europe
With the increased capacity of the corridor comes an increasing exchange
between Nordic and continental Europe. The average annual values are given
in Table 4.4. In 2010 in Fig. 4.13a a regular exchange pattern can be observed,
with a high export during summer time, resulting from a low consumption and
high hydro production in the Nordic system. Furthermore, the average export
and import of energy from the Nordic area are almost counterbalanced. This
results in a net export of only 476GWh, see Table 4.4. However, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between inﬂow scenarios. In a wet year the net export is
as much as 13.1TWh, whereas in a dry year 11.5TWh are imported. Evaluating
the diﬀerent cables, it can be seen that there is a relatively high export on
the cables from Norway to continental Europe (NorNed and Skagerrak), while
Sweden imports electricity from continental Europe.
In 2020 the transmission dispatch changes signiﬁcantly. The main diﬀerence
is that there now is a net export of energy to continental Europe of about
16.2TWh in average. Due to the increasing transmission capacity the gross
exchange energy is nearly 75% higher compared to 2010.
Fig. 4.14 shows ﬁve weeks of exchange from continental to Nordic Europe
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Table 4.4: Average annual transmission from Nordic to continental Europe in
GWh
2010 2020
net gross net gross
NorNed 693 4845 3584 8350
Nordlink - - 2943 8464
Skagerrak 959 4881 3638 5108
Konti-Skan 7 2915 1655 4698
Baltic -203 2999 1192 4127
Storebælt -25 866 1196 2255
Kontek -956 3367 2038 4004
Overall 476 19083 16246 36171
together with continental WPP5. There are two main diﬀerences between 2010
and 2020. Firstly, in 2010 there is only a minor relation between the exchange
and WPP. On the Contrary in 2020, there is a strong inﬂuence of WPP on
the transmission. During high WPP there is a higher export of energy from
continental to Nordic Europe and vice versa. The second diﬀerence is the ex-
change pattern. A distinct pattern can be observed in 2010, with export from
the Nordic area during day-time and import during night and the weekends. In
2020 a pattern can still be observed. However, it is largely disturbed by WPP.
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Figure 4.14: Comparison transmission dispatch continental to Nordic Europe
(blue) and continental WPP (red) for 5 weeks
5The exchange direction is inverted compared to the previous diagrams, as it now illustrates
the dependency between the exchange and the WPP more clearly.
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Fig. 4.15 shows the annual utilization of the individual transmission lines.
The utilization of a transmission line is the ratio between gross transmitted
energy and the available transmission capacity. In 2010 besides the Storbælt
cable the utilisation of the HVDC cables is 50% to 60%, whereat the NorNed
cable has the highest value. Furthermore, there are country internal cables with
a quite high utilisation, indicating potential congestions.
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Figure 4.15: Transmission corridor utilization in percentage of installed capacity
Fig. 4.16 shows the annual revenues per installed MW of the transmission
corridors, which is determined by the price diﬀerence between both ends mul-
tiplied with the transmitted energy. These revenues are also a rough indicator
for the marginal beneﬁt of a transmission line to the society. It clearly shows,
that the HVDC-connections create signiﬁcant revenues in 2010, especially the
NorNed cable.
In spite of the increasing transmission capacity, the average utilisation reaches
more than 60% in 2020 for most of the HVDC-connections (see Fig. 4.15b). The
revenues per MW of the HVDC-lines decrease signiﬁcantly compared to 2010.
However, the connections between Nordic and continental Europe still generate
the highest revenues, indicating their beneﬁt to the European society. Beside
these connections, both internal corridors to Southern Norway, show high rev-
enues, indicating congestions and the high importance of the lines.
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Figure 4.16: Average annual transmission corridor revenue per installed MW
4.3.5 Area prices
Beside the optimal dispatch of the power system, EMPS provides marginal
prices for each area. An overview of the average annual price per area is given
in Fig. 4.17. The diagram shows the current characteristics with low prices in
the Nordic area and higher prices on the continent. However, there are some
exceptions, which are Southern Sweden and Eastern Germany. Prices diﬀer
here due to congested lines. These price diﬀerences are not seen in the market,
because Sweden as well as Germany are deﬁned as one price area in the presented
markets6. In 2020 there is a decrease of the average price and a consistent course
with low prices in the north to high prices in the south.
Fig. 4.18 and Fig. 4.19 depict prices in Norway and Germany as percentiles
of the inﬂow scenarios. In EMPS, countries consist of several areas, which
normally do not have one single price for the whole country. Thus the price
for the country is calculated by a weighted average, where weighting is done by
the annual consumption of each area. Norway and Germany are chosen as they
represent a typical hydro and a thermal production system. Furthermore, there
is a signiﬁcant amount of new WPP capacity in Northern Germany, having an
impact on the prices.
6Sweden was divided into four price areas in November 2011 [97].
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Figure 4.17: Average area electricity prices in EUR/MWh
Fig. 4.18 shows percentiles of the prices for 2010, where the characteristics of
each of the countries can be seen clearly. In the Norwegian hydro based system
(Fig. 4.18a), there is a diﬀerence in the long-term behaviour of day-ahead prices,
due to diﬀerent inﬂows to the hydro system in the diﬀerent years7. However,
prices do not vary much from one hour to the next. In the German thermal
based system (Fig. 4.18b) an opposite behaviour can be seen, as there is no
energy constrain due to inﬂow. But there are big diﬀerences between sequential
hours, e.g. peak, oﬀ-peak and night hours. These diﬀerences are due to diﬀerent
fuel types of the thermal power plants resulting in diﬀerent marginal production
and start/stop costs. The yearly average price of both countries is similar, being
about 50e/MWh. In both countries higher prices are observed during late
winter and early spring time and low prices in the summer. Furthermore, a dip
is noticeable in the thermal system during Christmas due to the country-wide
holiday season.
The prices for the 2020 scenario are depicted in Fig. 4.19. The general
development is diﬀerent for both countries. In Norway diﬀerences between the
years diminish, i.e. the inﬂow to the hydro system has less impact on electricity
prices, induced by the stronger interconnections with the continental system.
7During wet years with high inﬂow, prices are low due to excessive hydro production. In
contrary, during dry years with low inﬂow, prices become high.
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Figure 4.18: Percentiles of day-ahead electricity prices in 2010
Furthermore, the average of prices decreases from 47e/MWh to 35e/MWh.
The day-ahead price reduction also occurs in Germany, with an average price of
about 40e/MWh. In addition, the regularity of the price pattern vanishes and
irregular price spikes emerge. Beside price spikes there are price dips, which
occur in cases of excessive WPP, mostly seen during winter time.
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Figure 4.19: Percentiles of day-ahead electricity prices in 2020
A more detailed view on the prices in Norway and Germany is given in Fig.
4.20, showing ﬁve weeks of a regular year. In addition to the prices the conti-
nental WPP is plotted. The above mentioned changes in price characteristics
are illustrated in these plots. In 2010 there is a quite clear day and night pattern
in Germany. This pattern is disturbed by the increased WPP in 2020. The de-
pendency between WPP and prices emerges in Germany in 2020, i.e. low prices
during high wind periods and high prices during low wind periods. However,
these price changes do not inﬂuence Norwegian prices signiﬁcantly.
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Figure 4.20: Comparison day-ahead country electricity prices and continental
WPP for 5 weeks
4.4 Discussion
As an initial observation, it must be taken into account that the model is a
long-term operation optimisation model and not an investment optimisation
model. Investment, i.e. decommissioning and commissioning of power plants
and transmission lines is exogenous to the model. Especially with the high
increase of WPP capacity, the available capacity of thermal power plants in
2020 may be overestimated in the model, resulting in the low operating hours
of the thermal power plants. However, operating hours do not decrease to zero,
indicating the necessity for this thermal capacity.
An arguable simulation outcome are the decreased average prices of elec-
tricity in the 2020 scenario, which were also observed in an ELMOD study
[124]. The decrease occurs due to several reasons. Firstly, fuel prices are kept
constant. Combined with expected increased eﬃciency of power plants, lower
marginal production costs occur. Keeping fuel prices constant is done to allow
comparability between the 2010 and 2020 scenario. Moreover, due to the signif-
icant uncertainty of future fuel prices, it is diﬃcult to make a realistic forecast
of such prices in 2020. As a results of the increased WPP in 2020 and the dis-
placement of more expensive thermal power plants by WPP, cheaper ones set
the marginal costs more often.
4.5 Conclusion
The long- and mid-term operation optimisation model EMPS is used to analyse
the Northern European power market outcome in 2010 and 2020. In 2020 a
signiﬁcant share of WPP capacity is expected in the system, likewise resulting
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in a signiﬁcant share of electricity production from that source. The power plant
portfolio and transmission capacities are updated based on referred studies.
Although some thermal capacity is assumed to be decommissioned in 2020, a
substantial quantity of thermal generation is still available.
The simulations show, that there are signiﬁcant changes in the system up to
2020. There is a substantial reduction in the operating hours of thermal power
plants, challenging their proﬁtability. Due to the increasing transmission capa-
bilities, the energy exchange between Nordic and continental Europe increases
drastically, (almost doubled in 2020). The analyses show that in 2010 as well as
in 2020 the transmission lines generating the highest revenues are the connec-
tions between Nordic and continental Europe, which is also a measure for their
beneﬁt to the society.
Comparing electricity prices in 2010 and 2020, several diﬀerences can be
observed. Firstly, average prices are reduced. Secondly, the stronger intercon-
nections between the Nordic and the continental system reduce the impact of
the stochastic inﬂow, i.e. the diﬀerences between inﬂow years in the Nordic sys-
tem. In the thermal system the diurnal pattern with high peak and low night
prices vanishes. Instead a higher price volatility with random peaks and dips
occurs, resulting from the increased amount of variable WPP.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.5: Installed generation capacity per type and country in 2010 [MW]
Norway Sweden Finland Denmark Germany Netherlands Belgium
Nuclear 0 9352 4256 0 21251 485 6050
Lignite 0 0 0 0 23893 0 0
Hard coal 0 340 4612 5566 30056 5364 3348
Gas 0 2710 1645 723 26657 9058 3612
Oil 0 4084 973 520 3160 1285 965
Photo 0 0 0 0 8600 0 0
Wind 545 1250 350 3700 24900 2800 1000
Hydro 33800 16900 2450 0 11200 0 0
Table 4.6: Installed generation capacity per type and country in 2020 [MW]
Norway Sweden Finland Denmark Germany Netherlands Belgium
Nuclear 0 9352 4256 0 8000 2985 6050
Lignite 0 0 0 0 12780 0 0
Hard coal 0 340 3715 4918 30318 7882 694
Gas 0 2710 1645 597 23494 13583 6812
Oil 0 4114 973 520 3160 819 2765
Photo 0 0 0 0 22000 0 0
Wind 6600 10000 3000 6000 57300 10400 2950
Hydro 39600 18000 2700 0 12000 0 0
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Figure 4.21: Marginal cost curve for production per country in week 13 in 2010
0 20 40 60 80
0
100
200
300
400
Power [MW]
P
ric
e 
[E
U
R
/M
W
h] Norway
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
Belgium
Figure 4.22: Marginal production cost curve per country in week 13 in 2020
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Table 4.7: Demand and generation mix per country in 2010 [GWh]
Norway Sweden Finland Denmark Germany Netherlands Belgium
Demand 115367 152499 76400 38096 616800 108001 8826
Thermal 0 88702 59626 33654 589443 92351 75156
Wind 0 0 0 0 4380 0 0
Photo 1710 1387 581 7885 29570 7109 2427
Hydro 119691 64107 13004 0 20419 0 0
Table 4.8: Demand and generation mix per country in 2020 [GWh]
Norway Sweden Finland Denmark Germany Netherlands Belgium
Demand 115367 152499 76400 38096 601377 120001 95000
Thermal 0 78652 43885 22861 405267 114706 67585
Wind 0 0 0 0 25000 0 0
Photo 15535 22407 5985 14880 134121 32275 7649
Hydro 119625 69203 15037 0 25500 0 0
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Chapter 5
IRiE - The regulating
power market model
The chapter presents the regulating power market model, called "Integrated
Regulating power market in Europe" (IRiE1). It simulates the procurement of
reserve capacity and the real-time system balancing. In addition, the chapter
includes an example of the application of IRiE, containing an analysis of regu-
lating power market integration. The chapter is based on Publication B and
its succeeding Publication C. The former publication contains the mathemat-
ical description of the regulating power market model, excluding transmission
availability aspects for cross-border reserve procurement. This issue is dealt
within the latter publication.
Section 5.1 presents the methodology and the full mathematical description
of the regulating power market model, while the model’s notation is given in
the Appendix of this chapter. Section 5.2 to 5.5, which contain the analysis, are
identical to Sections 4 to 7 of Publication C, with minor editorial changes.
5.1 Modelling
IRiE is based on linear and mixed-integer programming. It is implemented in
AMPL [126], using the CPLEX2 and GUROBI3 solvers for the optimization.
1irie: to be at total peace with your current state of being [125].
2http://www.ibm.com/software/integration/optimization/cplex-optimizer/
3http://www.gurobi.com/
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5.1.1 Day-ahead spot market results
The outcome of the day-ahead spot market, which is simulated with EMPS,
is presented in the previous chapter 4. These simulations already treated re-
quirements for regulating reserves on a simpliﬁed level. The requirements are
included to achieve realistic results of the day-ahead market clearing. However,
in the following regulating power market model, the procurement of reserves,
i.e. reserve requirements are treated explicitly. Thus, the basis for the reg-
ulating power market model are detailed day-ahead market simulations with
reserve requirements set to zero. Some results from these day-ahead spot mar-
ket simulations, which are essential for the succeeding regulating power market
simulation, are presented in the following.
Available reserve capacity
With reserve requirements set to zero, still a certain amount of reserve capacity
is available in the system. Fig. 5.1 shows the freely available reserve capacity
during one year in Norway (Fig. 5.1a) and in Germany (Fig. 5.1b). Available
upward reserve capacity is plotted in red, downward reserve capacity in blue.
In addition recorded system imbalances are plotted in green. These plots are
based on day-ahead spot market simulations, without the implementation of
reserve requirements and using the deﬁnition of reserve capacity, as deﬁned
in succeeding section 5.1.2. During summertime, upward reserve capacity is
certainly overestimated in Norway, as the maintenance of hydro power plants
is not regarded. Furthermore, the plot shows the sum of all reserve capacities
within the countries, disregarding constraints in the transmission grid.
However, the plot illustrates several important issues. Firstly, in the hydro
power based Norwegian system, often a suﬃcient amount of reserve capacity is
available in order to handle imbalances. Only during winter and early spring a
procurement of reserves is necessary, to safeguard suﬃcient reserves. Secondly,
in the German thermal based power system, there are numerous instances, where
system imbalances would exceed the freely available reserve capacity. Thus, a
procurement of reserves is necessary all the time. The procurement is necessary
for upward as well as downward reserve capacity. Finally, during periods with
excessive reserve capacity in the Norwegian power system, a share of the reserve
capacity could be provided to the German power system.
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Figure 5.1: Available upward and downward reserve capacity after day-ahead
spot market clearing vs. system imbalance
Transmission dispatch
Fig. 5.2 shows the day-ahead dispatch of the transmission corridor4 from RGN
to RG CE. It illustrates, that there is plenty of transmission capacity available
on the corridor after the day-ahead spot market clearing, which can be used
for cross-border procurement of reserve capacity and the exchange of balancing
energy, as suggested in Chapter 2. The plot shows the percentiles of the an-
nual duration curve for the transmission dispatch in the diﬀerent inﬂow years.
Furthermore, the exchange strongly depends on the inﬂow to the Nordic hydro
power system, also described in Chapter 4. However, only during 200 hours in
a wet year, the transmission lines are coevally congested in one direction. But
also during these hours, the cross border procurement of reserve capacity and
an exchange of balancing energy is possible in the reverse direction.
Hydro power plant deﬁnition
Hydro power production is modelled in high detail in EMPS, including full
water courses (see Fig. 4.1). The individual hydro power plants are modelled
with a piece-wise linear production-discharge curve. As described in Chapter 4,
the discharge is calculated in the equivalent energy, using the energy conversion
factor5.
4Transmission corridor refers to the sum of all transmission lines. These lines include all
the HVDC lines presented in Table 4.1, which connect RGN to RG CE.
5The energy conversion factor is deﬁned for every hydro module, taking into account the
head-height and the average eﬃciency of the discharging hydro power plant. As the average
eﬃciency is used to determine the conversion factor, the actual output of a hydro power plant
can be higher than the equivalent energy discharged from a reservoir. This causes an marginal
production eﬃciency higher than 1.0.
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Figure 5.2: Percentiles of the duration curves of the day-ahead transmission
dispatch from RGN to RG CE for hydro inﬂow scenarios
An example for a production-discharge curve is shown in Tab. 5.1. The
presented hydro power plant has an energy conversion factor of 0.0783 kWh/m3.
The discharge of equivalent energy is calculated by:
z(V ) = V · 0.0783kWh
m3
· 3600 s
h
(5.1)
Table 5.1 shows the production of the power plant y with the according
discharge, given in volume of water V and in terms of the equivalent energy
z. The left side of the table shows the linear production-discharge curve, while
the ride side contains their single linear pieces. The last column of the table
presents the marginal eﬃciency ηp for each of the linear pieces p.
The marginal eﬃciency is calculated by the ratio between the equivalent
energy discharge and the production of each linear piece, see Equation 5.2.
ηp =
yhpp
zp
(5.2)
Equation 5.3 deﬁnes the total production yhydh of a hydro power plant h as
the sum of its single linear pieces (p ∈ Ph) .
yhydh =
∑
p∈Ph
yhpp =
∑
p∈Ph
(
zhpp · ηp
)
(5.3)
Finally, the production cost Chydh of a hydro power plant h is stated in
Equation 5.4. The cost is the equivalent energy discharge multiplied with the
water value va,ω of the reservoir. This equals the production of each linear piece
divided by the marginal eﬃciency times the water value.
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Table 5.1: Example of a production-discharge curve as deﬁned in EMPS
Linear curve Linear pieces
Water Energy Production Energy Production Marginal
discharge discharge discharge eﬃciency
V z(V ) y(V ) zhpp yhpp ηp
[m3/s] [MWh/h] [MWh/h] [MWh/h] [MWh/h]
0 0 0
22.55 23.17 1.027
80 22.55 23.17
16.91 16.81 0.958
140 39.46 39.98
5.64 4.98 0.973
160 45.10 44.87
11.27 10.76 0.954
200 56.37 55.63
28.19 21.75 0.771
300 84.56 77.38
19.64 10.53 0.533
370 104.2 87.91
Chydh =
∑
p∈Ph
zhpp · va,ω =
∑
p∈Ph
(
yhpp ·
va,ω
ηp
)
(5.4)
The term va,ωηp represents the marginal production cost of each linear piece
for a hydro production plant, given the water value and the marginal eﬃciency.
As shown in Tab. 5.1, the marginal discharge curve is not strictly increas-
ing, due to the non-convexity of the production-discharge curve. To handle this
non-convexity, the day-ahead dispatch of hydro power plants is determined by a
rule-based approach in EMPS, cf. Wolfgang et al. [98]. For the implementation
of a linear problem, the convexity is necessary. Thus, before running the reg-
ulating power market model the day-ahead dispatch is converted in a dispatch
with strictly increasing marginal production costs, by sorting the linear pieces
according to their marginal eﬃciency. The piece-wise linear representation of
the hydro power plants is used in the following regulating power market model.
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5.1.2 Reserve procurement
After the day-ahead spot market clearing, required reserve capacity is procured,
see Fig. 3.1. The procurement is done by a redispatch of the generation and
transmission. The approach of reserve procurement in the model is diﬀerent
from the reserve capacity markets run in the Northern European countries, as
described in Chapter 2. The reserve capacity markets are normally run prior
to day-ahead spot markets, detracting production capacity from the day-ahead
spot market, in order to ensure that enough reserve capacity is available during
real-time operation of the power system.
In the presented model a perfect market is assumed, hence all available pro-
duction capacity is bid into the markets, the day-ahead spot as well as the regu-
lating power market. Thus, it is assumed that withdrawing production capacity
from the day-ahead spot market beforehand does not diﬀer from procuring the
reserve capacity through redispatch afterwards. The only diﬀerence in procur-
ing reserve capacity after day-ahead spot market clearing is, that the marginal
production capacity is always chosen for the provision. If reserve capacity is
procured prior to the day-ahead spot market clearing, the procurement has to
be based on an expected day-ahead spot market outcome, cf. Just and Weber
[66]. Thus, it is not ensured that marginal power plants are chosen to provide
the reserve capacity. The sequence chosen in this model can be interpreted as
the socio-economic most beneﬁcial approach or an idealized reserve procure-
ment. The implemented approach gives the lower boundary of procurement
costs, which are implied by set reserve requirements. This potentially results
in a too low reserve procurement cost estimation, when compared with costs
occurring in the real regulating power markets.
Reserve deﬁnition
In the model procured reserves comprise spinning upward and downward regula-
tion. The deﬁnition of spinning reserves used throughout the presented research
is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. There is a distinction between hydro and thermal
power plants providing reserve capacity. For hydro power plants it is assumed
that start up and stop costs can be neglected, they can be started up imme-
diately and no minimum production is required. Thus, their full generation
capacity can be used as reserve capacity and hydro power plants do not need to
be started up in order to provide reserves.
However, the start up and stop costs of thermal power plants are not negli-
gible. They need longer time to start up and have a minimum production level.
Hence, only thermal power plants that are started up and consequently produce
above their minimum production level can provide spinning reserves. Spinning
upward reserves can be provided up to the power plant’s maximum production
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capacity (Pmax). On the other hand, spinning downward reserves can only be
provided down to the minimum production level (Pmin) of a thermal power
plant, as depicted in Fig. 5.3. The remaining production capacity of thermal
power plants is deﬁned as non-spinning reserve capacity, to make all generation
capacity available during system balancing.
Pmax
Pmin P
Pmax
Pmin 
Pmax
P
Started thermal unit Not started thermal unit Hydro unit 
Spinning reserve 
Non-spinning 
reserve 
up   down 
P
Figure 5.3: Deﬁnition of spinning and non-spinning reserves
In order to deﬁne the reserve requirements, the day-ahead areas implemented
in EMPS (see Chapter 3) are aggregated, according to current control areas6.
The reserve requirements for the control areas are shown in the following Table
5.2. The values chosen as the reserve requirements used as a basis throughout
this thesis are the current requirements for FADR in RGN and the requirements
for secondary control in the RG CE. These requirements are adapted according
to diﬀerent assumptions in succeeding analyses.
Table 5.2: Reserve requirements for countries in RGN and RG CE in MW (in
2010)
DK-E NO1 NO2 NO3 SWE FIN
Upward 580 1200 1220 865
Downward -580 -1200 -1220 865
DK-W DE1 DE2 DE3 DE4 NL BE
Upward 620 640 830 1000 540 300 150
Downward -620 -400 -590 -725 -330 -300 -150
To fulﬁl the given reserve requirements, the day-ahead dispatch of generation
and transmission has to be adapted. Two examples of such a redispatch are
exempliﬁed hereafter. The generation redispatch for the procurement of upward
and downward reserves is illustrated with sketches in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5
6In reality Nordel is operated as one control area, with ACE being abolished. However,
reserve requirements are deﬁned for each country.
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respectively. In these examples power plant 1 is the cheaper and power plant 2
the more expensive one.
Pmax
Pmin 
P
Unit 1 
Pmax
Pmin 
P
Unit 2 
(a) Before Procurement
Pmax
Pmin 
P
Unit 1 
Pmax
Pmin P
Unit 2 
(b) After Procurement
Figure 5.4: Upward reserve procurement
Prior to the reserve procurement (Fig. 5.4a) in the ﬁrst case, there is insuf-
ﬁcient upward reserve capacity available. To fulﬁl the requirements, plant 2 has
to be started up. Regarding the minimum production capacity, plant 2 has to
be started up at least to its minimum level. Simultaneously the production has
to be decreased on plant 1, see Fig. 5.4b. Consequently, the production costs
increase due to the higher marginal production costs of plant 2, additional start
up costs for plant 2 and higher production costs due to reduced eﬃciency on
plant 1.
Pmax
Pmin 
P
Unit 1 
Pmax
Pmin 
P
Unit 2 
(a) Before Procurement
Pmax
Pmin 
P
Unit 1 
Pmax
Pmin 
P
Unit 2 
(b) After Procurement
Figure 5.5: Downward reserve procurement
In the second case (Fig. 5.5a) there is insuﬃcient downward reserve capacity
prior the reserve procurement. This situation periodically occurs during oﬀ-peak
periods, when some of the dispatchable power plants are still in operation at
minimum production capacity to avoid additional shut down and resulting start
up costs. To procure additional downward reserves, one of the plants has to be
shut down. In this case power plant 2 is shut down, the one with higher marginal
costs. The shut down results in an increased production of plant 1, providing
suﬃcient downward reserve capacity. In this case the cost for procuring the
required reserve capacity contains the additional shut down and start up costs
for power plant 2.
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Reserve procurement model
Consecutively, the mathematical description of the developed regulating power
market model for the reserve procurement is presented. As a simpliﬁcation
it is assumed that during the reserve procurement procedure the generation
dispatch, area prices and water values are known for the whole week. Due to
the accounting for the start up state of the thermal power plants, there is a
temporal dependency between single PTUs. However, this dependency is only
between one and the next PTU. As there is a quite stable dispatch pattern
during a week (cf. chapter 4), a perfect knowledge is assumed.
The objective of the reserve procurement procedure is to change the given
day-ahead dispatch in a cost-eﬀective way, in order to allocate suﬃcient upward
r↑a and downward reserve capacity r↓a in each area (a ∈ A) to the fulﬁl given
reserve requirements. The reserve procurement is modelled as a mixed-integer
optimisation problem, on a weekly basis including all PTUs. A comprehended
notation is given in the appendix 5.6.
Reserve requirements Reserve requirements are deﬁned for each control
area r↑rk , r
↓r
k and for the whole system r↑r, r↓r. The according requirement
constraints are deﬁned in equations 5.5 to 5.8.
The sum over all reserve capacity (r↑a,ω,τ , r↓a,ω,τ ) provided in an control area
k plus reserve capacity, which is procured cross-border (e↑l,ω,τ , e
↓
l,ω,τ ) must equal
the given requirements at least.
∀k ∈ K, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
r↑rk · sr ≤
∑
a∈Ak
⎛
⎝r↑a,ω,τ + ∑
l∈Lfa
e↑l,ω,τ −
∑
l∈Lta
e↑l,ω,τ
⎞
⎠+ r↑redk,ω,τ (5.5)
r↓rk · sr ≤
∑
a∈Ak
⎛
⎝r↓a,ω,τ + ∑
l∈Lfa
e↓l,ω,τ −
∑
l∈Lta
e↓l,ω,τ
⎞
⎠+ r↓redk,ω,τ (5.6)
Equations 5.5 and 5.6 deﬁne the requirement constraints for each control
area. The factor sr determines the share of reserve capacity, which has to be
procured within the same control area. Suggested by ERGEG [11] is a share
of 67% of secondary reserves and 50% for the sum of secondary and tertiary
reserves. The suceeding analyses use the lower share of 50% in order to promote
the exchange of balancing services.
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In addition to the reserve provision, r↑redk,ω,τ and r
↓red
k,ω,τ introduce a possible
rationing of reserve capacity to ensure the feasibility of the solution. This ra-
tioning of reserves is comparable to situations in reality, when TSOs operate
outside the requirements, therefore violating operational rules, but supplying
all costumers7.
For the whole system the sum of available reserve capacity has to be equal or
higher than the sum of the reserve requirements, including the possible rationing
of reserve capacity in single control areas.
∀ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
r↑r ≤
∑
a∈A
r↑a,ω,τ +
∑
k∈K
r↑redk,ω,τ (5.7)
r↓r ≤
∑
a∈A
r↓a,ω,τ +
∑
k∈K
r↓redk,ω,τ (5.8)
0 ≤ r↑redk,ω,τ , 0 ≤ r↓redk,ω,τ (5.9)
Provision of reserve capacity The constraints for the upward r↑a,ω,τ and
downward r↓a,ω,τ reserve capacity, which are available in an area are stated in
equation 5.10 and 5.11. Reserve capacity can be provided from hydro and
thermal power plants, which are situated in the according area.
∀ω ∈W , τ ∈ T , a ∈ A:
r↑a,ω,τ =
∑
g∈Ga
r↑thg,ω,τ +
∑
h∈Ha
∑
p∈Ph
(
yhpp − yhp
P
p,ω,τ
)
(5.10)
r↓a,ω,τ =
∑
g∈Ga
r↓thg,ω,τ +
∑
h∈Ha
∑
p∈Ph
(
yhp
P
p,ω,τ − yhpp
)
(5.11)
Hydro power plants The redispatch constraint of hydro power plants to-
gether with their production limit are deﬁned by equation 5.12 and equation
5.13 respectively. yhpPp,ω,τ represents the generation dispatch for each linear piece
of a hydro power plant after the procurement of reserve capacity. The available
7If the reserve reduction would not be possible, it can happen that curtailment of con-
sumption occurs, even though there is suﬃcient production capacity available. However, in
order to fulﬁl the given requirements, production is reduced in order to provide reserves and
thus demand has to be rationed.
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reserve capacity provided from a hydro power plant is the sum of all the reserve
capacity provided from each linear piece (p ∈ Ph). The reserve capacity for
upward regulation is deﬁned as (yhpp − yhp
P
p,ω,τ ) and (yhp
P
p,ω,τ − yhpp ) for downward
regulation. The minimum production capacity, deﬁned as yhp
h
, which normally
is zero, can be negative to account for pumping capabilities of a hydro power
plant.
∀p ∈ P , ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
yhp
P
p,ω,τ = yhp
∗
p,ω,τ + Δ↑yhp
P
p,ω,τ −Δ↓yhp
P
p,ω,τ (5.12)
yhp
p,ω,τ
≤ yhpPp,ω,τ ≤ yhpp,ω,τ (5.13)
0 ≤ Δ↑yhpPp,ω,τ , 0 ≤ Δ↓yhp
P
p,ω,τ (5.14)
Thermal power plants The redispatch constraint of thermal power plants
is deﬁned in equation 5.15. To include the minimum production level as well as
start up and stop costs, the relative variables (xthPg,ω,τ , x↑th
P
g,ω,τ , x↓th
P
g,ω,τ ∈ [0, 1]) are
introduced. xthPg,ω,τ represents the start up state of a thermal power plant. x↑th
P
g,ω,τ
and x↓thPg,ω,τ describe the relative upward and downward reserve capacity available
on each thermal power plant. Equations 5.16 to 5.17 deﬁne the production
constraints of a thermal power plant and its start up constraint, similar to the
methodology suggested by Warland et al. [101]. This deﬁnition allows a linear
approximation of the unit-commitment optimisation for thermal power plants.
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
yth
P
g,ω,τ = yth
∗
g,ω,τ + Δ↑yth
P
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
P
g,ω,τ (5.15)
yth
P
g,ω,τ = ythg,ω · xth
P
g,ω,τ + x↓th
P
g,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(5.16)
x↑th
P
g,ω,τ + x↓th
P
g,ω,τ ≤ xth
P
g,ω,τ (5.17)
0 ≤ x↑thPg,ω,τ , 0 ≤ x↓th
P
g,ω,τ , 0 ≤ xth
P
g,ω,τ ≤ 1 (5.18)
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Equations 5.19 and 5.20 deﬁne the starting up of a thermal power plant
(zthPg,ω,τ ) from one PTU (τ −1) to the next PTU τ , when its start up state xth
P
g,ω,τ
changes. Equation 5.20 deﬁnes the optimization problem as a "round-coupled
problem", i.e. thermal power plants which are started up at the beginning of a
week (τ = 1) are assumed to be started up at the end of the week (τ = max(T )).
The "round-coupling" is implemented to take into account the necessary start up
of power plants with the begin of the new week, while having an independent
optimisation problem for each week. Equations 5.19 and 5.20 result in the
temporal connection between the PTUs. As only the starting up of a power
plant is modelled explicitly, it is assumed that costs for stopping a thermal
power plant are included in its start up costs. In the case of stopping a thermal
power plant equation 5.21 deﬁnes that considered start up costs do not become
negative.
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T/ {1}:
zth
P
g,ω,τ ≥
(
xth
P
g,ω,τ − xth
P
g,ω,τ−1
)
(5.19)
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W :
zth
P
g,ω,τ ≥
(
xth
P
g,ω,1 − xth
P
g,ω,max(T )
)
(5.20)
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
0 ≤ zthPg,ω,τ (5.21)
In order to determine the reserve capacity, which is provided by a thermal
power plant (r↑thg,ω,τ and r↓thg,ω,τ ), the relative values x↑th
P
g,ω,τ and x↓th
P
g,ω,τ have to be
multiplied by the free dispatchable capacity of the power plant
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
,
see equations 5.22 and 5.23.
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
r↑thg,ω,τ ≤ x↑th
P
g,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(5.22)
r↓thg,ω,τ ≤ x↓th
P
g,ω,τ ·
(
ythg,ω − ythg,ω
)
(5.23)
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0 ≤ r↑thg,ω,τ , 0 ≤ r↓thg,ω,τ (5.24)
In contrast to hydro power plants, thermal power plants, base-load power
plants in particular, are subject to limited ramping. Thus, equations 5.25 and
5.26 reduce the reserve capacity, which can be provided by a thermal power
plant to a certain percentage (sthg ) of its production capacity. The maximum
shares of reserves sthg for the diﬀerent technologies used in the further analyses
are stated in Table 5.3.
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
r↑thg,ω,τ ≤ sthg · ythg,ω (5.25)
r↓thg,ω,τ ≤ sthg · ythg,ω (5.26)
Table 5.3: Available reserve capacity for diﬀerent power plant types
Type Nuclear Lignite Hard coal Gas Oil
Capacity available 0 20 50 75 100
as reserve [%]
Generation load balance During the redispatch process, the balance be-
tween production and consumption has to be kept in each area, taking into
account potential exchange. The balance constraint per area is deﬁned in equa-
tion 5.27. It includes the redispatch of hydro and thermal power production,
transmission, as well as the possible shut down and rationing in an area.
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∀a ∈ A, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
0 =
∑
g∈Ga
(
yth
P
g,ω,τ − yth
∗
g,ω,τ
)
+
∑
h∈Ha
∑
p∈Ph
(
yhp
P
p,ω,τ − yhp
∗
p,ω,τ
)
+
∑
l∈Lfa
(
tPl,ω,τ − t∗l,ω,τ
)−∑
l∈Lta
(
tPl,ω,τ − t∗l,ω,τ
)
−12
∑
l∈Lfa∪Lta
(
dPl,ω,τ − d∗l,ω,τ
)
+ yrat
P
a,ω,τ − ysh
P
a,ω,τ
(5.27)
Shut down and rationing Beside the possible redispatch of thermal as well
as hydro power plants, a rationing of demand yratPa,ω,τ and shut down of scheduled
production yshPa,ω,τ is possible. These are included in the balance equation 5.27,
in order to keep the optimisation problem always feasible. Rationing can be
compared to an anticipated curtailment of demand, in order to maintain the
operational security during peak periods. Shut down of scheduled production,
e.g. wind power production, nuclear or other base-load plants might be neces-
sary during oﬀ-peak periods as well. yratPa,ω,τ and ysh
P
a,ω,τ have to be positive, see
equation 5.28.
0 ≤ yratPa,ω,τ , 0 ≤ ysh
P
a,ω,τ (5.28)
Transmission Redispatching the exchange tPl,ω,τ impacts transmission losses
dPl,ω,τ , represented by equation 5.29. Furthermore, the transmission limits have
to be taken into account, stated in equation 5.30 tl and tl represent the direction
dependent NTCs of the according transmission lines.
∀l ∈ L, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
dPl,ω,τ ≥
∣∣tPl,ω,τ · αl∣∣ (5.29)
tl ≤ tPl,ω,τ ≤ tl (5.30)
Cross-border procurement of reserve capacity In addition to the re-
serve capacity, which is available within the same control area, the exchange
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of reserve capacity is introduced by variables e↑l,ω,τ and e
↓
l,ω,τ . To exchange re-
serve capacity, free capacity must be available on the relevant transmission lines,
stated in Equations 5.31 and 5.32. This required transmission capacity is either
freely available after the day-ahead spot market clearing or ise reserved on the
transmission lines through redispatch. For the exchange of reserve capacity, the
direction of the transmission lines has to be regarded, being either from (Lfa) or
to (Lta) an area a.
∀τ ∈ T , ω ∈W , l ∈ L:
tl ≤ tPl,ω,τ + e↑l,ω,τ ≤ tl (5.31)
tl ≤ tPl,ω,τ − e↓l,ω,τ ≤ tl (5.32)
To investigate diﬀerent integration states of regulating power markets, equa-
tion 5.33 is introduced. LPx is the set of lines, on which a cross-border procure-
ment of reserve capacity is allowed. Thus, on all other lines the exchange of
reserve capacity is set to zero.
∀τ ∈ T , ω ∈W , l ∈ L/LPx :
e↑l,ω,τ = 0 , e
↓
l,ω,τ = 0 (5.33)
Reserve procurement costs The objective for the optimisation problem is
the minimisation of the total redispatch costs, which occur during the reserve
procurement procedure. The objective function CPω (.) is deﬁned in equation
5.34.
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∀ω ∈W :
CPω (.) =min
(∑
τ∈T
[∑
a∈A
(
yrat
P
a,ω,τ · crat
P − yshPa,ω,τ · csh
P
)
+
∑
g∈G
(
Δ↑yth
P
g,ω,τ · c↑th
P
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
P
g,ω,τ · c↓th
P
g,ω,τ
+ zth
P
g,ω,τ · scthg + xth
P
g,ω,τ · fcthg
)
+
∑
p∈P
(
Δ↑yhp
P
p,ω,τ · c↑hp
P
p,ω,τ −Δ↓yhp
P
p,ω,τ · c↓hp
P
p,ω,τ
)
+
∑
k∈K
cred
P ·
(
r↑redk,ω,τ + r
↓red
k,ω,τ
)])
−
∑
τ∈T
∑
g∈G
(
zth
∗
g,ω,τ · scthg + xth
∗
g,ω,τ · fcthg
)
(5.34)
The costs for the procurement of reserves includes the cost of redispatching,
the cost of an additional start up of thermal power plants and the cost due to
rationing and shut down. The calculation of procurement cost in Equation 5.34
consist of six parts, where only the ﬁrst ﬁve parts are subject to the optimisation.
The ﬁrst part represents the cost for rationing and shut down, which are
assumed to happen at cratP = 3000e/MWh and cshP = 0.03e/MWh respec-
tively. The value for rationing corresponds to the maximum bid price currently
implemented by EEX European Energy Exchange AG [122]. Due to the for-
mulation as a linear optimisation problem, the shut down of production has to
receive an actual income slightly higher than 0e/MWh. The occurence of neg-
ative price, which can be seen occasionally in regulating power markets cannot
be implement in the linear problem, but in a quadratic problem formulation8.
The second, third and fourth part of the objective function represent the ac-
tual redispatch of power plants, i.e. the decrease of production on infra-marginal
power plants and an increase on more expensive ones. The second and third part
represent thermal power plants, including the costs for the upward and down-
ward redispatch of power plants. In addition to the marginal redispatch costs,
8In the linear formulation of the problem, the transmission losses are solely described by
a lower boundary, see Equation 5.29. If a cost for shut down would be deﬁned in the linear
formulation of the problem, the solver would increase the transmission losses instead of the
production shut down, as there is no upper limit for the transmission losses. However, in the
optimisation it is attained to determine the amount of production, which is necessary to be
shut down, thus deﬁning a small income for the shut down.
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there are further costs due to the start up of thermal power plants scthg,ω,τ and
due to eﬃciency losses for thermal power plants, not running at full production.
Fig. 5.6 shows the example for a production cost curve of a thermal power
plant. To that, its total production cost T cg is plotted over its output yg.
The production cost increase of thermal power plants is assumed to be linear,
resulting in constant marginal production costs mcg. However, as illustrated
in Fig. 5.6, the linear approximation of the production cost does not cross the
origin. This leaves the ﬁxed cost fcg for a thermal power plant, which is started
up. This start up is indicated by xthg,ω,τ .
Figure 5.6: Deﬁnition of ﬁxed and marginal production costs for thermal power
plants
The fourth part of the objective function are costs due to redispatching
hydro power production. These solely include marginal redispatch costs, as
start and stop costs for hydro power plants are negligible. Eﬃciency losses of
hydro power production are taken into account by the piece-wise linear cost
functions of hydro power plants.
The ﬁfth part of the objective function contains costs for rationing reserve
capacity. The rationing is done at a ﬁxed high cost of cred = 2500e/MW. The
cost indicates the violation of system operation rules resulting in a higher risk
of operating the system.
The last part of the procurement costs is constant, representing the start
up and ﬁxed costs for thermal power plants, which are already scheduled due
to the day-ahead market dispatch. The procurement costs should only include
the additional start ups of thermal power plants due to reserve requirements,
while the start up costs, already occurring during the day-ahead spot market
clearing, are subtracted.
Marginal redispatch cost deﬁnition The marginal costs of redispatching a
power plant are deﬁned by equations 5.35 to 5.38. For the thermal power plants
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these marginal redispatch costs are based on the marginal production costs of
the power plant and the area price. bth represents the premium for rescheduling
power plants and deviating from the optimal day-ahead dispatch. For thermal
power plants bth it is assumed to be approximately 1.0259.
∀a ∈ A, g ∈ Ga, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
c↑th
P
g,ω,τ = max
(
mc
th
g · bth
P
, λa,ω,τ
)
(5.35)
c↓th
P
g,ω,τ = min
(
mc
th
g /b
thP , λa,ω,τ
)
(5.36)
For hydro power plants the marginal redispatch costs are based on the water
value va,ω of the according reservoir, the marginal discharge value ηp for each
linear piece p of a hydro power plant and the area price λa,ω,τ . The area price is
regarded, to take into account constraints in the water courses. Due to minimum
discharge constraints, hydro power plants might have to produce, even if it is not
proﬁtable (indicated by a production cost higher than the area price). In such
a case, the marginal redispatch cost is set to the area price in order to prevent
a re-optimisation of the day-ahead spot market dispatch. The premium for
rescheduling is include as well, which is assumed to be 1.05 in the case of hydro
power plants. The cost increase, represents an extra cost due to the deviation
from the optimal production strategy of a hydro power plant. However, the
impact on the reserve procurement is rather small, as hydro power production
is redispatch seldom.
∀a ∈ A, h ∈ Ha, p ∈ Ph, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
c↑hp
P
p,ω,τ = max
(
va,ω
ηp
· bhpP , λa,ω,τ
)
(5.37)
c↓hp
P
p,ω,τ = min
(
va,ω
ηp
/bhp
P
, λa,ω,τ
)
(5.38)
The constraints of the water course are not explicitly deﬁned in the optimi-
sation model. However, the occurrence of active constraints in the water course
9The increase in marginal costs is necessary as well, to prevent a re-optimisation of the
day-ahead dispatch due to diﬀerent optimisation models used for the day-ahead spot and the
regulating power market.
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can be observed in cases, when the production cost for a hydro plant is higher
than the area price and it still is in production. In the case of such a active
constraint the minimum yhp
p,ω,τ
and maximum yhpp,ω,τ production limits are set
to the day-ahead production schedule yhp∗p,ω,τ . In order to ﬁt the resulting re-
serve capacity available from hydro production, to actual values reported by
Nordpool10, the factors yhpB and yhpB are introduced.
∀a ∈ A, h ∈ Ha, p ∈ Ph, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
yhpp,ω,τ = min
(
yhpp , y
hp∗
p,ω,τ + yhp
B · yhpp,ω,τ
)
, if λa,ω,τ ≥ va,ω · ηp
yhpp,ω,τ = yhpp , otherwise
(5.39)
yhp
p,ω,τ
= max
(
yhp
p
, yhp
∗
p,ω,τ − yhp
B · yhpp,ω,τ
)
, if λa,ω,τ ≤ va,ω · ηp
yhp
p,ω,τ
= yhp
p
, otherwise
(5.40)
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Figure 5.7: Average weekly availability of reserve capacity [GW] in Norway in
2010 NordPool vs. IRiE
Linear / Mixed-binary solution The reserve procurement procedure is
executed for each separate week in a year. In order to achieve a meaningful
result, the start up state of a thermal power plant needs to be deﬁned as binary
variables xthPg,ω,τ ∈ [0; 1]. However, with about 300 thermal power plants and
the deﬁnition of 34 sequential periods throughout a week, this optimisation
10The comparison between the simulated available reserve capacity and actual values for
Norway is shown in Fig. 5.7
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problem would result in about 12000 binary variables per week. In order to
reduce this number the problem is solved in two steps, solving an approximated
linear problem and following a reduced mixed-binary problem. To obtain a
linear problem the integrality of the optimisation problem is relaxed, i.e. the
start up state of the thermal power plants xthPg,ω,τ ∈ [0; 1] are deﬁned as linear
variables (0 ≤ xthPg,ω,τ ≤ 1) and the optimisation problem is solved. In the second
step all resulting deﬁnite start up states of thermal power plants (xthPg,ω,τ =
0 ∨ xthPg,ω,τ = 1) are ﬁxed to their values and only the remaining start up states
(0 < xthg,ω,τ < 1) are deﬁned as binary variables. This heuristic reduces the
problem size to about 1500 binary variables per week. The reduction allows to
solve the problem in a reasonable time.
5.1.3 System Balancing
After required reserve capacity is procured, it the system is balanced in real-
time. As electricity cannot be stored to a large extent, production and con-
sumption of electricity has to be kept in balance during real-time operation
of the system. Balance is achieved through the activation of reserve capacity.
The activation of reserve capacity corresponds to the acceptance of bids for
balancing energy in the regulating power market. In order to achieve the best
socio-economic outcome, these bids have to be activated in the order of their
prices, taking into account remaining transmission capacity after the reserve
procurement and transmission losses.
The system balancing is modelled as a linear optimisation problem. The
notation for the following formulation of the model is to be found in appendix
5.6 of this chapter.
System imbalance
Inputs to the system balancing are the dispatch after the reserve procurement
and results from the day-ahead spot market clearing, including area prices and
water values. A further input are the imbalances of the system. The model’s
imbalances include the unplanned outages and load forecast error l˜a,ω,τ and the
wind forecast error w˜a,ω,τ . The former imbalances are represented by recorded
imbalance scenarios of 2010 for the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany [23, 24,
106, 107, 108, 109], as well as recorded imbalance scenarios of 2010 for Norway,
Sweden and Denmark [105]. As there is a diﬀerence between the PTU length
in the RG CE and RGN, the imbalances of RGN are converted to a 15 minute
resolution to achieve a matching PTU length. Recorded imbalances l˜k,ω,τ are
only available for whole control areas. However, the system balancing model is
based on the individual day-ahead areas to account for available transmission
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capacities. Thus, the imbalances are distributed by a share according to the
ratio of the total annual consumption of an area (consa,ω,τ ), see equation 5.41.
This provides imbalance scenarios for all the individual areas.
∀k ∈ K, a ∈ Ak, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
l˜a,ω,τ = l˜k,ω,τ ·
∑
ω∈W,τ∈T consa,ω,τ∑
a∈Ak,ω∈W,τ∈T consa,ω,τ
(5.41)
In addition, imbalances due to the forecast error of wind power production
w˜k,ω,τ are based on wind speed forecasts and installed wind production capacity,
cf. Chapter 7.
System balancing model
Reserve activation The aim of the system balancing is to ensure that the
supply equals the demand in the system within the given transmission limits for
all PTUs. The power system balance constraint is deﬁned for each area by equa-
tion 5.42. It includes the possible change in thermal power production, hydro
power production, transmission with its according losses, rationing of demand
and shut down of production. Whereas, thermal power production is divided
into spinning and non-spinning reserves, as described in Section 5.1.2. The over-
all sum of reserve activation has to equal the imbalances in the according area,
consisting of load and wind forecast errors as well as unplanned outages.
∀a ∈ A, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
l˜a,ω,τ + w˜a,ω,τ =
∑
h∈Ha
∑
p∈Ph
(
Δ↑yhp
B
p,ω,τ −Δ↓yhp
B
p,ω,τ
)
+
∑
g∈Ga
(
Δ↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ + Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ
)
−
∑
l∈Lfa
(
tBl,ω,τ − tPl,ω,τ
)
+
∑
l∈Lta
(
tBl,ω,τ − tPl,ω,τ
)
−12
∑
l∈Lfa∪Lta
(
dBl,ω,τ − dPl,ω,τ
)
+yrat
B
a,ω,τ − ysh
B
a,ω,τ
(5.42)
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Transmission During system balancing the transmission dispatch can be
changed, in order to exchange balancing energy. The constraint for real-time
transmission tBl,ω,τ within its limits is deﬁned in equation 5.43 with the accord-
ing transmission losses deﬁned in equation 5.44. LBx represents the set of lines
for which transmission is allowed to be changed during system balancing. This
deﬁnes whether a line is available for the exchange of balancing energy or not,
in order to study diﬀerent levels of regulating power market integration.
∀l ∈ L, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
tl ≤ tBl,ω,τ ≤ tl (5.43)
dBl,ω,τ ≥
∣∣tBl,ω,τ · αl∣∣ (5.44)
∀l ∈ L/LBx , ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
tBl,ω,τ = tPl,ω,τ (5.45)
Hydro power production The activated hydro reserve capacity is deﬁned
as Δ↑yhyd
B
h,ω,τ and Δ↓y
hydB
h,ω,τ , with the capacity constraints in equations 5.46 for
upward regulation and 5.47 for downward regulation, respectively. The activa-
tion has to be positive and less or equal than the reserve capacity available from
each linear piece of a hydro power plant.
∀p ∈ P , ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
0 ≤ Δ↑yhpBp,ω,τ ≤ yhpp − yhp
P
p,ω,τ (5.46)
0 ≤ Δ↓yhpBp,ω,τ ≤ yhp
P
p,ω,τ − yhpp (5.47)
Thermal power production The limits for the activation of thermal reserve
capacity are deﬁned in equations 5.48 to 5.52. It is distinguished between spin-
ning reserves (Δ↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ , Δ↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ ) and non-spinning reserves (Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ , Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ ).
Spinning reserve capacity is made available after the reserve procurement, as
shown in Fig. 5.3. Non-spinning reserve capacity combines further generation
capacity of dispatchable thermal power plants, which are assumed to be able to
100
5.1. Modelling
start up or shut down in real-time. The non-spinning reserves are illustrated
in Fig. 5.3 as well. Non-spinning reserves are included in the system balancing
model to make dispatchable thermal generation capacity available for system
balancing. The diﬀerence for the utilisation of spinning and non-spinning re-
serves is their activation cost, which is discussed further below.
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
0 ≤ Δ↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ ≤ r↑thg,ω,τ (5.48)
0 ≤ Δ↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ ≤ r↓thg,ω,τ (5.49)
0 ≤ Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ , 0 ≤ Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ (5.50)
0 ≤ ythPg,ω,τ + Δ↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ + Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ ≤ ythg,ω (5.51)
In addition to the limits implied by the capacity of the thermal power plants,
equation 5.52, limits the total reserve activation to a certain percentage of the
installed capacity of the power plant, as deﬁned in the reserve procurement, see
Table 5.3. Therefore, the total activated reserve capacity has to be lower or
equal than the allowed share sthg .
∀g ∈ G, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
−sthg · ythg,ω ≤ Δ↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ + Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ ≤ sthg · ythg,ω (5.52)
Furthermore, Gn deﬁnes the set of thermal power plants, which can provide
non-spinning reserves. These are assumed to be gas and oil-ﬁred turbines. For
all other power plants the activation of non-spinning reserves is prevented by
equations 5.53.
∀g ∈ G/Gn, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ = 0 , Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ = 0 (5.53)
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System balancing costs The objective of the system balancing is to level out
imbalances at minimum costs, through the activation of reserve capacity. The
cost of system balancing is deﬁned to be the cost of settling system imbalances
by the activation of reserves instead of previous trading. This could be on the
day-ahead spot or intra-day markets, which would be possible given a perfect
forecast. The according objective function CBω,τ (.) is stated in equation 5.54.
The linear problem is solved for each PTU τ individually as no temporal depen-
dencies are deﬁned, such as ramping or the start and stop constraints of power
plants. In addition to the activation of reserve capacity, rationing of demand
and shut down of production is included to ensure feasibility of the solution.
These can be compared to the curtailment of consumption or the shut down of
e.g. excess wind production during the real-time operation of the system.
∀ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
CBω
(
yP
)
=min
(∑
τ∈T
[∑
a∈A
(
yrat
B
a,ω,τ · crat
B − yshBa,ω,τ · csh
B
)
+
∑
g∈G
(
Δ↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ · c↑th
B
s
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ · c↓th
B
s
g,ω,τ
+ Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ · c↑th
B
n
g,ω,τ −Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ · c↓th
B
n
g,ω,τ
)
+
∑
p∈P
(
Δ↑yhp
B
p,ω,τ · c↑hp
B
p,ω,τ −Δ↓yhp
B
p,ω,τ · c↓hp
B
p,ω,τ
)⎤⎦
⎞
⎠
−
∑
τ∈T
∑
a∈A
λa,ω,τ ·
(
l˜a,ω,τ + w˜a,ω,τ
)
(5.54)
The last part of the objective function represents the potential cost or beneﬁt
of settling the imbalances at the day-ahead spot market price. The activation
of regulating reserves always bears a cost to the society. Without accounting
for the potential trade in the day-ahead market, the activation of downward
regulating reserves, would actually indicate a beneﬁt. However, settling the
additional energy in one of the previous markets would lead to an increased
beneﬁt, as the cost of immediate actions can be avoided. These are included in
the marginal reserve activation costs. As the intra-day market is not regarded
in this model, it is assumed, that given a perfect forecast, the energy diﬀerence
would have been traded in the day-ahead spot market.
Balancing cost deﬁnition In order to estimate the cost for the real-time
system balancing, the marginal cost of balancing energy has to be determined.
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As discussed in chapter 2, there are only a few researches done on the estima-
tion and forecasting of regulating power prices, but none for the determination
of marginal costs for balancing energy. The objective of the system balanc-
ing model is a socio-economic optimal activation of reserve capacity. Hence,
the costs for balancing energy used in the presented model are based on the
marginal production costs of the providing power plants. The determination of
the costs of balancing energy are stated in equations 5.55 to 5.61. These are
estimates roughly ﬁtted to prices observed in current regulating power markets,
cf. Jaehnert et al. [61]. For hydro power plants the reserve costs are based on
the water value and the area price, including the premium of readiness bhpB ,
as described by Skytte [58]. This premium describes the additional costs of an
immediate production change and the deviation from the optimal production
schedule. The estimate is based on the ﬁtting to observed prices in the Nordic
regulating power market.
∀a ∈ A, h ∈ Ha, p ∈ Ph, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
c↑hp
B
p,ω,τ = max
(
va,ω
ηp
·Δmh,ω,τ · bhpB , λa,ω,τ
)
(5.55)
c↓hp
B
p,ω,τ = min
(
va,ω
ηp
·Δmh,ω,τ/bhpB , λa,ω,τ
)
(5.56)
Activating reserve capacity results in a change of production and simultane-
ously aﬀects the discharge of hydro power plants, hence the reservoir level. The
water value of a reservoir is inﬂuenced by the change in the reservoir level. To
avoid signiﬁcant deviations from the optimal day-ahead dispatch schedule, the
relative reservoir level deviation Δmh,ω,τ is tracked during each week. With the
relative reservoir level deviation, the water value for each reservoir is updated
after each hour of operation.
∀h ∈ H, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
Δmh,ω,τ = 1 +
∑
t=1..τ
∑
p∈Ph
(
Δ↑yhp
B
p,ω,τ −Δ↓yhp
B
p,ω,τ
)
/mh (5.57)
The marginal costs of balancing energy for spinning thermal power plants
are based on their marginal production costs. In addition to the spinning, non-
spinning reserves are deﬁned. There are no start up or minimum production
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requirements deﬁned for the non-spinning reserves. However, these are taken
into account in the costs of the non-spinning reserves. The inclusion is done by
adding or subtracting related start up costs to, respectively from, the marginal
costs of balancing energy. This approach increases the costs quite substantially,
which results in utilisation of non-spinning reserves in exceptional circumstances
only.
∀a ∈ A, g ∈ Ga, ω ∈W , τ ∈ T :
c
↑thBs
g,ω,τ = max
(
cthg · bth
B
, λa,ω,τ
)
(5.58)
c
↓thBs
g,ω,τ = min
(
cthg /b
thB , λa,ω,τ
)
(5.59)
c
↑thBn
g,ω,τ = max
(
cthg · bth
B
+ s
cthg
yth
g,ω
, λa,ω,τ
)
(5.60)
c
↓thBn
g,ω,τ = min
(
cthg /b
thB − sc
th
g
yth
g,ω
, λa,ω,τ
)
(5.61)
Finally, rationing during system balancing is complicated, as it is not pos-
sible to drop the exact amount of demand. These situation additionally pose
severe challenges to keep the system operational. This results in a much higher
cost than for rationing during the day-ahead market clearing or reserve procure-
ment. Thus, the cost of rationing during system balancing estimated to cratB =
10000e/MWh, which is higher than any of the marginal costs for balancing
energy. This value lies within the range of the Value of Lost Load determined
by Frontier Economics [127] with 8 to 16 e/kWh, based on several international
studies. The shut down cost of other than dispatchable production is set to
csh
B = 0.01e/MWh during system balancing11
11Likewise for the reserve procurement, the shut down cost has to be set higher than zero
as well, otherwise resulting in unreasonable results for transmission losses. See the description
of shut down costs during reserve procurement above.
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5.2 Case studies
A set of cases is deﬁned, which represents a step-wise integration of the Northern
European regulating power markets, distinguishing between the system-wide
procurement of reserves and the system-wide activation of reserves.
In order to exchange balancing services between the Nordic system and con-
tinental Europe, free transmission capacity needs to be available after day-ahead
spot market clearing on the HVDC-lines connecting RGN and RG CE. Fig. 5.2
shows percentiles of the total day-ahead exchange on these interconnections for
the diﬀerent inﬂow scenarios. The ﬁgure shows, that only during about 500h in
the 0-percentile all lines are dispatched at their limit coevally in the same di-
rection (import to the Nordic countries). Even during these hours an exchange
of balancing services in one direction is possible, i.e. solely upward regulating
reserves can be exported to continental Europe respectively downward regulat-
ing reserves exported to Nordic Europe. The remaining transmission capacity
oﬀers ample opportunities for the exchange of balancing services in Northern
Europe.
As a basis for the case studies, a wet (1967), an average (1974) and a dry
(1989) year are chosen as representative scenarios, referring to the inﬂow of
the Nordic hydro system. Aggregate production and exchange of these years
is stated in Table 5.4. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the hydro power
productions in these years. These diﬀerences have an impact on the overall
operation of the power system, which is illustrated by the net energy exchange
with continental Europe. The inﬂow situation in the Nordic countries impacts
the thermal production in continental Europe, which is substantially higher in
a dry year, as shown in the last row of Table 5.4. This results in potentially less
available regulating reserves in the continental system during a dry year.
Table 5.4: Basis years for the analyses
Wet Average Dry
Storable & non-storable inﬂow
to Nordic hydro system (TWh) 249 194 146
Hydro production
in Nordic system (TWh) 225 188 167
Annual net energy exchange from
Nordel to UCTE (TWh) 20.6 6.3 -4.7
Thermal production
in continental Europe (TWh) 792 805 817
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For the case studies, diﬀerent steps of regulating power market integration are
deﬁned. These steps reach from the state with no integration up to full integra-
tion of regulating power markets. Additionally a case with reserving transmis-
sion capacity for the regulating power market is included. The diﬀerent cases
are deﬁned as follows:
Case I represents the state of the system before the integration of the German
control areas / regulating power markets, cf. [64]. Regulating reserves have to
be procured locally in each control area. Furthermore, there is no possibility to
exchange balancing energy between Nordel and UCTE and no exchange possi-
bility between UCTE’s control areas. However, the energy exchange is possible
between the control areas in Nordel.
Case II represents the state of the system after integrating the four German
control areas as described in [43]. It is similar to Case I except that the exchange
of reserve capacity and balancing energy is allowed between the German control
areas.
Case III allows the cross-border procurement of 50% of the required regulat-
ing reserves for each control area and the system-wide exchange of balancing
energy, representing a fully integrated European regulating power market.
Case IV includes a capacity reservation on the HVDC lines connecting Nordel
and UCTE. Here 5% of the NTC is withdrawn from the day-ahead spot market
and reserved exclusively for the regulating power market.
5.3 Results
The results of EMPS for a wet, an average and a dry year are taken as the basis
for the further analysis with IRiE. A summary of the results from IRiE is shown
in Table 5.5. The results are divided in the reserve procurement and system
balancing. The exchange values presented in Table 5.5 refer to the HVDC lines
between RGN and RG CE shown in Table 4.4.
5.3.1 Reserve procurement
In general, a higher level of integration results in less redispatch because of
increased ﬂexibility. The integration of the German areas results in a redispatch
reduction of about 20%. The system-wide exchange of reserve capacity causes a
further signiﬁcant reduction by about 40% of the necessary redispatch. This is
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due to an increasing procurement of reserves in the Nordic area, where upward
reserve capacity constitute the highest share. The average upward respectively
downward exchange of reserve capacity in Table 5.5 is the sum of exchange
in both directions. However, the procurement of reserves is almost only done
corss border from RGN to RG CE. The cross-border reserve procurement for
the average year is depicted in Fig. 5.8. The maximum export of reserve
capacity from Nordel is about 2000MW, which complies with the maximum
allowed share of 50% of the reserve requirements in the continental countries in
the model (4070MW). During the summer time a slight dip in the exchange of
reserves can be seen, which is due to already nearly full export in the day-ahead
dispatch.
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Figure 5.8: Exchange of reserve capacity from Nordel to UCTE for case III in
the average year
The average procurement of upward reserves in the average year per coun-
try is shown in Fig. 5.9. The Nordic countries Norway and Sweden are the
exporters, whilst Denmark and Germany are importing reserve capacity. The
high export of reserves from Sweden compared to Norway has two reasons.
Firstly internal congestions are not regarded in 2010, thus an export of reserves,
which are located in northern Sweden occurs. Secondly Sweden has a higher
interconnection capacity to continental Europe. Denmark imports nearly 50%
of its required reserve (1200MW), which corresponds to the maximum allowed
share. Analyses show, that with a relaxation of this maximum allowed share
the import would increase even further.
Case IV with the additional reservation of transmission capacity for the
regulating power market results in a further increase of the cross-border pro-
curement of reserves, due, more available transmission capacity. However, the
only minor increase of exchange shows that there already is ample transmission
capacity available without a reservation.
There is a potential for large savings due to exchange of reserve capacity
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Figure 5.9: Average available reserve capacity and reserve capacity exchange in
the countries for case III in the average year
between countries. The beneﬁt resulting from the integration of the German
areas is about 15 million Euro per annum, somewhat less than estimated in
[43]. This diﬀerence is caused by the diﬀerence between the present procure-
ment regimes in Germany and the approach used in the model. The integrated
reserve procurement and day-market clearing results in a better dispatch than
the present practices in Germany, reducing the potential for savings. Still the
total savings resulting from system-wide exchange of reserve capacity are about
30%, or between 40 to 50 million Euro per annum. These savings show that
there is a huge opportunity for Nordel to provide reserve capcity to the UCTE.
5.3.2 System balancing
The right part of Table 5.5 shows the results for the system balancing. There
is also a signiﬁcant reduction of the reserve activation resulting from the inte-
gration of regulating power markets. Already the integration of the German
areas results in a reduction of about 40% in RG CE. A system-wide exchange
of balancing energy brings a further reduction of about 55% of reserve activa-
tion in the RG CE. At the same time there are only slight changes of reserve
activation in RGN. This results in a net reduction of reserve activation of about
40%, caused by the netting of the imbalances in diﬀerent countries.
In the case of a system-wide exchange, the annual gross balancing energy
exchange is about 4000MWh. The net exchange is smaller compared to the
gross exchange, showing that there is no signiﬁcant total energy export. Hence,
there is an export of generation ﬂexibility. This is also illustrated in Fig. 5.10,
where the balancing energy exchange for case III in the average year is shown.
The exchange seem to be equally distributed in both directions.
The last two columns in Table 5.5 show the shut down of ﬁxed production
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Figure 5.10: Exchange of regulating energy from Nordel to the UCTE for case
III in the average year
and the rationing of demand during system balancing. Shut down and rationing
are applied during hours, when there are not suﬃcient reserves available in an
area. It can be seen, that there is a reduction of rationing and shut down due
to the integration of regulating power markets. This decrease indicates a higher
availability of regulating reserves and hence an increase in system security.
The results show that an integrated balancing of the system results in a sig-
niﬁcant reduction of the system balancing costs. The integration of the German
markets has a beneﬁt of about 180 million Euro per annum, what is comparable
to estimates in [43]. The system-wide integration and an additional reservation
of transmission capacity lead to further reductions of about 90 and about 10
million Euro per annum respectively. The main savings are due to the reduction
of reserve activation in RG CE. With the ability of a system-wide exchange of
balancing energy, the activation of reserves in RGN only changes by a smaller
amount. Hence, there is no signiﬁcant substitution of continental activation of
thermal reserves by Nordic hydro reserves, but a netting of imbalances, resulting
in decreased continental reserve activation.
Case IV with the reservation of transmission capacity leads to an additional
beneﬁt of about 20 million Euro in total. This beneﬁt is due to the increas-
ing exchange possibilities in the regulating power market, assuming that the
reserved capacity was withdrawn from the day-ahead spot-market.
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5.4 Discussion
The IRiE model is developed speciﬁcally for the purpose of simulating regulating
power markets and their integration. Thus, the validity of its results needs to
be commented. Firstly the costs for procurement and for the activation of
regulating reserves are estimates based on the marginal production costs of
thermal power plants and based on the water values for hydro power plants.
These costs are not necessarily reﬂected by prices which are observed in today’s
regulating power markets. The implicit perfect market assumptions potentially
underestimates costs occurring in regulating power markets. Moreover, as the
regulating power market integration leads to increased competition, the model
rather under- than overestimates the beneﬁt of the market integration.
Secondly, the procurement of reserves is executed after the day-ahead sys-
tem dispatch is known. As shown by [128], this sequence of the day-ahead
spot market and the reserve procurement dispenses with the trade-oﬀ between
providing reserve capacity and bidding in the day-ahead spot market. Hence,
reserve prices are often zero. Due to the approach, the resulting simulated re-
serve procurement costs are a lower limit or the actual socio-economic costs for
having the required reserves available in the system.
Finally, while the actual socio-economic outcome is an approximation of
a complex reality, the underlying changes in the operation of the regulating
power market clearly indicate the potential beneﬁts. On the one hand the
procurement of regulating reserves in the Nordic area, signiﬁcantly reduces the
need for redispatch and therefore reduces procurement costs in the continental
system. On the other hand the signiﬁcant reduction of reserve activation due
to a system-wide netting of imbalance reduces the cost of system balancing.
5.5 Conclusion
The model for an integrated Northern European regulating power market is
presented, which is based on a common Northern European day-ahead spot
market clearing. It arises that the Nordic power system has ample regulating
reserves at its disposal, due to the good regulating capability of the hydro power
production. Moreover, after the clearing of the day-ahead spot market, mostly
free transmission capacity remains, leaving the possibility for further exchange.
With the potential integration of national regulating power markets parts
of the required continental regulating reserves can be procured in the Nordic
system and balancing energy can be exchanged system-wide. For this exchange
of balancing services the available transmission capacity after the day-ahead
spot market clearing has to be taken into account.
With a set of diﬀerent cases, a stepwise integration of the Northern Eu-
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ropean regulating power markets is studied. The comparison with the recent
integration of the German regulating markets shows comparable results in the
case of system balancing. A system-wide regulating reserve procurement, re-
duces the necessary redispatch by 40%. On average 20% of reserves required for
the RG CE are procured in RGN. The activation of regulating reserves can be
reduced by 40% due to system-wide netting of imbalances, which is comparable
to results presented by Vandezande [21]. Here, the reserve acitvation is reduced
to 22%, being somewhat less, which is certainly due the consideration of only
two countries.
Summarising, savings can be achieved mainly due to the procurement of
reserves in the Nordic area and the netting of imbalances of diﬀerent countries.
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The notation used throughout the description of the regulating power market
model is stated below.
Indicators
∗ Day-ahead market
P Resource procurement
B System balancing
↑ / ↓ Upward / downward
¯ / Maximum / minimum
Sets and indices
a ∈ A Day-ahead areas deﬁned in EMPS
k ∈ K Control areas
h ∈ H Hydro plants with Ha, Hk being subsets of hydro plantssituated in areas a or k respectively
p ∈ P Linear pieces of all hydro power plants with Ph being thesubset of linear pieces of one hydro power plant h
g ∈ G Thermal plants with Ga, Gk being subsets of thermal plantssituated in areas a or k respectively
l ∈ L
Transmission lines with Lta, Lfa being subsets of lines
transmitting to and from the an area a and LPx , LBx being the
sets of lines across which reserves are procured and activated
ω ∈W Weeks
τ ∈ T PTUs (quarter hours) during a week
Objective functions
CPω (.) Cost function of reserve procurement
CBω,τ (.) Cost function of system balancing
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Water values and area prices
Parameter:
va,ω, λa,ω Water value and day-ahead spot price in each area
Hydro generation
Parameter:
yhp
∗
p,ω,τ Day-ahead dispatch of hydro plant pieces
yhpp,ω,τ , yhpp,ω,τ Maximum and minimum production of hydro plants
ηp
Marginal eﬃciency for a linear piece of a hydro
plant
c↑hp
P
p,ω,τ , c↓hp
P
p,ω,τ Marginal redispatch cost of hydro plant pieces
c↑hp
B
p,ω,τ , c↓hp
B
p,ω,τ
Marginal up- and downward regulating cost of
hydro plant pieces
mh Reservoir content
Variables:
yhp
P
p,ω,τ
Dispatch of hydro plant pieces after reserve
procurement
Δ↑yhp
P
p,ω,τ , Δ↓yhp
P
p,ω,τ
Redispatch of hydro plant pieces during reserve
procurement
Δ↑yhp
B
p,ω,τ , Δ↓yhp
B
p,ω,τ
Up- and downward regulating of hydro plant pieces
during system balancing
Thermal generation
Parameter:
yth
∗
g,ω,τ Day-ahead dispatch of thermal plants
ythg,ω, ythg,ω
Maximum and minimum generation capacity of
thermal plants
xth
∗
g,ω,τ Start up state of thermal plants at day-ahead spot
zth
∗
g,ω,τ
Starting up of thermal plants per time unit at
day-ahead spot
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sthg
Share of thermal power plant capacity available as
reserves
mc
th
g Marginal cost cost of thermal plants
sc
th
g Start up cost of thermal plants
fc
th
g Fixed cost of thermal plants
c↑th
P
g,ω,τ , c↓th
P
g,ω,τ
Marginal redispatch cost thermal plants in reserve
procurement
c
↑thBs
g,ω,τ , c↓th
B
s
g,ω,τ
Marginal up- and downward regulating cost of
thermal plants for spinning reserve
c
↑thBn
g,ω,τ , c↓th
B
n
g,ω,τ
Marginal up- and downward regulating cost of
thermal plants for non-spinning reserve
Variables:
yth
P
g,ω,τ
Dispatch of thermal plants after reserve
procurement
Δ↑yth
P
g,ω,τ , Δ↓yth
P
g,ω,τ
Redispatch of thermal plants during reserve
procurement
Δ↑yth
B
s
g,ω,τ , Δ↓yth
B
s
g,ω,τ
Spinning up- and downward regulating of thermal
plants during system balancing
Δ↑yth
B
n
g,ω,τ , Δ↓yth
B
n
g,ω,τ
Non-spinning up- and downward regulating of
thermal plants during system balancing
xth
P
g,ω,τ
Start up state of thermal plants after reserve
procurement
zth
P
g,ω,τ
Starting up of thermal plants per time unit after
reserve procurement
x↑th
P
g,ω,τ , x↓th
P
g,ω,τ
Up- and downward reserve provision of thermal
plants
r↑thg,ω,τ , r↓thg,ω,τ
Up- and downward reserves provided by a thermal
plant
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Transmission lines
Parameter:
t∗l,ω,τ
Transmission dispatch after day-ahead spot market
clearing
tl, tl Maximum and minimum transmission limits
αl Linear losses of transmission lines
Variables:
tPl,ω,τ , tBl,ω,τ
Transmission dispatch after reserve procurement
and during system balancing
d∗l,ω,τ , dPl,ω,τ , dBl,ω,τ
Transmission losses for day-ahead dispatch, after
reserve procurement and during system balancing
e↑l,ω,τ , e
↓
l,ω,τ Reserve procurement across transmission lines
Rationing and shut down
Parameter:
crat
P , cratB Cost of rationing
csh
P , cshB Cost of shut down
Variables:
yrat
P
a,ω,τ , yrat
B
a,ω,τ
Rationing during reserve procurement and in
system balancing
ysh
P
a,ω,τ , ysh
B
a,ω,τ
Generation shut down during reserve procurement
and system balancing
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Reserve requirements
Parameter:
r↑rk , r
↓r
k
Up- and downward reserve requirements in each
control area
r↑r, r↓r Up- and downward reserve requirements in thetotal system
sr
Share of reserves, which needs to be procured in the
own control area
cred Cost of reserve reduction
Variables:
r↑a,ω,τ , r↑a,ω,τ
Up- and downward reserves available in a control
area
r↑redk,ω,τ , r
↓red
k,ω,τ
Reduction of up- and downward reserve
requirements
System imbalances
Parameter:
l˜a,ω,τ Load forecast in each area
w˜a,ω,τ Wind forecast error in each area
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Analyses
119

Succending the establishment of the regulating power market model, a set of
speciﬁc analyses is performed. These analyses are presented in the second part
of the thesis. The investigation mainly concerns the expected cost increase in
the regulating power market and the potential beneﬁt of integrating national
regulating power markets. The scope of the analyses in Northern Europe, where
a socio-economic view is taken.
The following chapters contain Publication D to Publication G in chrono-
logical order. All analyses are updated with results of the latest and updated
simulations, which however do not change the main conclusions of the publica-
tions.
The analyses include the issue of a transmission capacity reservation to the
exclusive utilisation in the regulating power market, which is presented in Chap-
ter 6. The second analysis assesses the integration of large amounts of wind
power production capacity in the Northern European power system and re-
sulting challenges for the system balancing, presented in Chapter 7. The last
analysis, presented in Chapter 8, addresses various wind power production fore-
cast horizons as well as diﬀerent reserve requirement levels and their impact on
the outcome of the regulating power markets.
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Chapter 6
Transmission capacity
reservation
The investigation of reserving transmission capacity on HVDC lines exclusively
for the exchange in the regulating power market is investigated in Publication
D and presented hereafter. The publication is called "Reservation of transmis-
sion capacity for the exchange of regulating resources in Northern Europe: Is
there a beneﬁt?" Sections 4 and 5 of the publication are included as succeeding
Section 6.2 and 6.3, with minor editorial changes.
6.1 Analysis introduction
In order to exchange regulating reserves, a reservation of transmission capacity
on certain interconnections might be beneﬁcial. Studies done by Abbasy et al.
[78] and Frontier Economics [77], which are done on a simpliﬁed level based on a
statistical analysis, show a beneﬁt of reserving transmission capacity. However,
the withdrawal of transmission capacity from the day-ahead spot market is
not taken into account by Abbasy et al. [78]. Frontier Economics [77] likewise
utilize time-series of imbalances and regulating power prices, neglecting impacts
on prices in the countries.
Beside the studies, in reality a capacity of 100MW is planned to be reserved
for the exchange of regulating resources on the new Skagerrak 4 cable, connect-
ing Norway and Denmark [53].
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6.2 Case studies
In order to answer the question raised, several cases are studied. As a basis
for the study the previously described models are used, representing the 2010’s
state of the power system. The presented analysis is made for an average year
with respect to the inﬂow to the Nordic hydro system, which in this case is 192
TWh per annum.
The studied cases diﬀer in the available transmission capacity for the day-
ahead spot market. A capacity reservation is done on HVDC lines connecting
the Nordic countries and continental Europe, cf. Table 4.1. In the ﬁrst case the
full transmission capacity is oﬀered to the day-ahead spot market. After the day-
ahead spot market clearing, the remaining transmission capacity can be used for
trading in the regulating power market. For the further two studied cases the
transmission capacity oﬀered to the day-ahead spot market on the previously
mentioned HVDC lines is decreased by 5% and 10% respectively in order to
reserve this capacity for the exchange of regulating reserves. The reservation is
done for the exchange of up- as well as downward regulating reserves. In these
cases the remaining transmission capacity after day-ahead spot market clearing
plus the reserved capacity is oﬀered to the regulating power market, including
the reserve procurement and the system balancing.
6.3 Results
The results of the case studies for reserving transmission capacity are shown in
Table 6.1 for the day-ahead market outcome and in Table 6.2 for the regulating
power market outcome. Results for the cases of full capacity available to the
day-ahead spot market, a 5% and a 10% reservation capacity are shown in
the subsequent tables. In addition the case of no integration of the Northern
European regulating power markets, as discussed in chapter 5, is shown as a
comparison to classify the transmission reservation outcomes.
Table 6.1 shows that the reservation of transmission capacity and thus with-
drawal of trading possibilities from the day-ahead market has a strong impact
on the outcome of the day-ahead spot market clearing. The reservation of trans-
mission capacity for balancing reduces the socio-economic beneﬁt by decreasing
the dispatched exchange of electricity between the Nordic area and continental
Europe, by about 4% and 8%. However, the outcomes are quite diﬀerent for
the various market participants. A distinction must be made between Nordic
and continental European participants, as there is a day-ahead spot price de-
crease in the Nordic countries and increase in the continental countries. Due to
these price changes, there is a beneﬁt for continental producers and a loss for
continental consumers. In the Nordic area the outcome is the opposite, with
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large losses for the Nordic producers. For the TSOs1 the reduction of available
transmission capacity on the day-ahead spot market is slightly beneﬁcial. Look-
ing on the individual transmission lines on which capacity is reserved, it shows
that there are diﬀerent outcomes too. A beneﬁt can be seen on the Skagerrak
cable. For the Kontek and the Baltic cable there is no change, whereas on the
NorNed cable a loss can be seen. An explanation for beneﬁt for the TSOs of
reserving transmission capacity can be that the reservation brings the available
transmission capacity to the day-ahead market closer to the optimal transmis-
sion capacity for a TSO. The income to the TSOs is the Congestion capacity
cost, as deﬁned in [129]. This income for the TSO is maximized if the available
transmission capacity is 50% of the transmission capacity which is necessary in
order not to have congestions on the transmission line.
Table 6.1: Day-ahead market outcome of reserving transmission capacity
No
integration
Full
integration
5%
reservation
10%
reservation
Socio-economic outcome [Me] - - -79.5 -260
Gross exchange [TWh] 17.4 17.4 16.8 16.3
TSO outcome [ke] - - 38.0 226
RGN producer outcome [Me] - - -82.1 -277
RGN consumer outcome [Me] - - 17.3 37.4
RG CE producer outcome
[Me] - - 7.5 29.6
RG CE consumer outcome
[Me] - - -19.7 -44.5
The case study shows that there is no linear change of the economic outcome
with the amount of capacity reservation. With a 10% reservation of transmission
capacity for the exchange of regulating resources there is a signiﬁcant higher
decrease of the socio-economic beneﬁt, as well as losses for the Nordic producers
and beneﬁts for the continental producers compared with the 5% reservation.
Table 6.2 shows the outcome on the regulating power market due to the reser-
vation of transmission capacity. The table shows the outcomes for the reserve
procurement as well as the system balancing. By the transmission reservation
the reserve procurement costs are reduced by 3% and 6% respectively, but com-
pared to the process of integrating the markets this is only a minor beneﬁt. The
increase in the externally procured reserves is also only marginal, resulting in
a minor reduction of the necessary redispatch during the reserve procurement.
1TSOs are assumed to be the owner of the HVDC lines in this analysis and thus the
proﬁting companies.
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An explanation for it can be that normally there is already enough free capacity
available after the day-ahead spot market clearing. In the hours where this is
not the case the reservation of 5% or 10% of transmission capacity is not enough
to increase the procurable reserves signiﬁcantly.
The balance settlement costs are reduced by about 10% and 15% respectively
by the additional available transmission capacity for the exchange of balancing
energy. The reservation of capacity for balancing reduces the total activated
reserves slightly by an increased netting of imbalances. The gross exchange of
balancing energy between the Nordic and the continental European countries
increases signiﬁcantly by 15% and 30%. The increase in the exchange of bal-
ancing energy results in an additional beneﬁt for the TSOs, which is four times
as high in the case of reserving 10% of transmission capacity for the exchange
of balancing energy.
Table 6.2: Day-ahead market outcome of reserving transmission capacity
No
integration
Full
integration
5%
reservation
10%
reservation
Reserve procurement costs
[Me] 153 113 110 107
Average reserves procured
from RGN to RG CE [GW] 0 737 788 831
Redispatch [GWh] 5906 4570 4492 4419
Balance settlement costs [Me] 196 105 95.6 91.1
Gross activated reserves
[GWh] 12310 8585 8382 8224
Gross exchange [GWh] 0 4635 5378 6072
TSO income [Me] 0 3.3 8.6 12.0
Combining the outcome of the day-ahead spot market and the regulating
power market shows that there is a beneﬁt for the TSOs to reserve transmission
capacity for the exchange of regulating reserves. As the transmission lines are
operated by the TSOs, they have an incentive for the reservation of transmission
capacity, although this would reduce the socio-economic beneﬁt signiﬁcantly.
Fig. 6.1 depicts the duration curve of the aggregated real-time exchange on
the lines connecting the Nordic and the continental European area. It shows
that the resulting utilisation of the interconnections is quite similar in all cases.
Almost never all of the lines are used at their maximum capacity at the same
time.
In Fig. 6.2 the duration curve for the exchange of balancing energy is shown
for the diﬀerent cases studied. In the case of no integration there is by deﬁnition
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Figure 6.1: Duration curves of real-time exchange between Nordic and conti-
nental European countries
no exchange of balancing energy. There is only a small diﬀerence between
the case of full integration and the case of additional reservation of 10% of
transmission capacity. The increased exchange is mainly during the hours, where
there is only little exchange of balancing energy, which probably results from
additional netting of imbalances. This also results in less activation of regulating
reserves in the continental countries as will be discussed subsequently.
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Figure 6.2: Duration curve of real-time exchange of balancing energy between
Nordic and continental European countries
The reserve activation in Norway (Fig. 6.3a) and Germany (Fig. 6.3b)
is shown in duration curves below. For Norway there is an increase in the
activation of the reserves with the integration of regulating power markets,
whereas the increase due to the reservation of transmission capacity is only
marginal. For Germany the impact is the opposite. There is a signiﬁcant
reduction of reserve activation coming with the integration of the regulating
power markets. The reservation of transmission capacity for the exchange of
regulating reserves reduces such activation even more. Furthermore, due to the
exchange of balancing energy there are about 3000 hours of the year without
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activation of reserves in this area, which are even more in the case of capacity
reservation. The increase of the time, where there is no activation of regulating
reserves is due to the netting of imbalances and the activation of cheaper hydro
reserves situated in the Nordic countries instead of the thermal ones in the
continental countries.
The decrease of reserve activation results in a signiﬁcant decrease of the
expected income for participants bidding in the regulating power market in
continental Europe. As regulating reserves are activated only in a few hours
during a year, it becomes much more improbable for regulating power market
participants to get their bids for balancing energy accepted. Thus, it becomes
much harder to recover ﬁxed costs on the plants, which are used for the provision
of regulating reserves by the sale of balancing energy. The procurement of
regulating reserves with a capacity payment for providing reserves becomes more
important in this case. This payment can be used to recover the ﬁxed cost of
the power plants.
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Figure 6.3: Regulating reserve activation in Germany (transpower area)
In addition to the reduction of activated reserves also the maximum activated
upward reserves are reduced by about 200MW, whereat the maximum activated
downward reserves are increased by about 300MW. This shows that a reduction
of the reserve requirements in this control area would be possible.
6.4 Discussion
The results of the analysis have to been seen within the context of the model.
As described previously the regulating power market incorporates a market se-
quence, where ﬁrst the day-ahead market is clearly and succeedingly reserves are
procured, being the opposite to the market sequences currently implemented in
Europe. Additionally, reserve capacity for secondary control is often contracted
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for a longer period, as stated in Tab. 2.3, where in the model it is only con-
tracted for one hour. Thus, the model results in a better dispatch than can
be expected in the real markets. This results in less beneﬁts in the regulating
power market, by the availability of increased transmission capacity.
The reservation level analysed here are 5% and 10% of the total transmission
capacity between the Nordic are and continental Europe, showing a non-linear
increase of the losses in the day-ahead spot market. However, as part of the
application for the Skagerrak 4 cable only 100 MW are intended to be reserved
for the utilisation in the regulating power market [53]. This can be seen as a
marginal reservation of transmission capacity, potentially being proﬁtable for
the society.
The analysis shows, that withdrawing a part of the transmission capacity
from the day-ahead market leads to signiﬁcant socio-economic losses, which
need to be taken into account. These losses are mainly observed for power
producers in the Nordic area. The analysis also illustrates, that cable owners,
here assumed to be the TSOs are proﬁting from the reservation, in the day-ahead
spot market as well as the regulating power market. Thus, also supervision of
TSO by regulators is necessary, in order to achieve the socio-economic optimal
outcome.
The main result of the analysis is, that an integration of national regulating
power market is socio-economically beneﬁcial. The reservation of transmission
capacity for the exclusive utilisation in the regulating power market, leads to
a further cost reduction, but has to be valued against the losses in the day-
ahead spot market. In the case study presented in this paper, the overall socio-
economic outcome of the transmission reservation is negative.
6.5 Conclusion
The outcome of reserving transmission capacity exclusively to the exchange of
balancing services in Northern European area is assessed. For that, two cases
with a reservation of 5% and 10% of the total transmission capacity are simu-
lated and compared to a third case without a reservation of transmission capac-
ity. The day-ahead market and regulating power market outcome is calculated
for all of the cases.
The simulations show that the reservation of transmission capacity increases
the exchange of balancing services signiﬁcantly. This likewise implies a signif-
icant reduction of reserve procurement and system balancing costs. However,
the resulting cost reduction in the regulating power market is far lower than
the decrease in the socio-economic beneﬁt, which is observed in the day-ahead
market.
Considering diﬀerent participants in the day-ahead market it turns out that
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the outcome of a transmission reservation is diﬀerent for producers, consumers
and the TSOs, which are assumed to be the cable owner. Especially for the
TSOs there is a beneﬁt of reserving transmission capacity in both the day-
ahead market and the regulating power market. Hence, the analysis points out
that it would be proﬁtable for them to implement such a capacity reservation.
This calls for an active role of the regulators in order to achieve the best socio-
economic outcome.
A marginal reservation of transmission capacity as suggested by [53] might
be beneﬁcial. But in this case study, the overall decrease of the socio-economic
beneﬁt in this case study suggests that such reservation is not proﬁtable to be
implemented.
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Large scale wind integration
The second speciﬁc analysis consists of a set of two analyses with the same
scope, which are presented in Publication E and its succeeding Publication
F. The objective of these analyses is to assess the impact of large scale wind
integration on the power system balancing. Therefore a comparison between the
current system and an expected 2020 scenario with a high share of wind power
production is done. In addition, the integration of national regulating power
markets is considered. The potential beneﬁt of using regulating reserves, which
are located in the Nordic area, in order to balance WPP in continental Europe is
investigated. The results show growing imbalances and reserve activation as well
as increasing cost resulting in the regulating power market. With an integration
of national regulating power markets, these costs can be reduced signiﬁcantly,
paving the way for an cost-eﬀective integration of WPP in the European power
system.
This chapter includes Sections V to VIII of Publication F, which are iden-
tical to Sections 7.3 to 7.6, with minor editorial changes. Section 7.2 is added,
presenting a comprehensive overview on the modelling of the wind power pro-
duction. As the second author of this Publication F, I am responsible for the
simulations of the power markets, given the detailed wind power production.
7.1 Analysis introduction
The variability and limited predictability of power production on all time scales
is one of the major challenges when it comes to large scale integration of WPP
in the power system. In a liberalised electricity market WPP is traded in the
day-ahead spot and intra-day market, based on wind speed forecasts. However,
short term deviations, resulting in system imbalances, have to be handled in the
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regulating power market.
For WPP the whole balancing area has to be considered, as smoothing eﬀects
in large geographical areas can reduce the requirement for regulating reserves
[130]. Besides the increasing production changes, there are wind forecast errors,
resulting form the diﬀerence between scheduled and actual WPP. These devia-
tions need to be compensated by the activation of regulating reserves, available
to the power system.
In order to study the eﬀects of increasing WPP on the regulating power
market outcome, the reserve procurement and system balancing in the Northern
European area is simulated and resulting costs are determined. The simulations
are done for national regulating power markets as well as an integrated Northern
European market for the 2010 and 2020 scenario, deﬁned previously in chapter
4.
7.2 Wind power production
7.2.1 WPP Simulation
The simulated real time WPP is based on a mixed input data set including
wind speed measurements and input values from the high resolution numeri-
cal weather prediction tool COSMO EU [119], cf. the deﬁnition of WPP in
EMPS in chapter 4. To account for geographic smoothing eﬀects due to widely
dispersed wind production sites, 3200 wind power facilities are modelled indi-
vidually, ranging from single turbines up to wind farms. This geographic spread
of WPP results in less production variability as wind speed correlation decreases
with distance [120]. However, centralized oﬀshore wind farms in future WPP
scenarios will pose more severe challenges to the system, as they do not comprise
geographical smoothing.
The assumed installed WPP capacity for the 2020 scenario (see Table 7.1)
is based on the TradeWind project [116]. The 2020 scenario is in accordance
with the projects 2020 high scenario, resulting in almost a triplication of the
currently installed WPP capacity.
7.2.2 WPP Forecast Error
Based on WPP forecasts producers are able to estimate their approximate WPP
and reschedule their preliminary production portfolio. At the time of the day-
ahead spot market clearing (12:00), the WPP forecast horizon is between 12
and 36 hours. The rescheduling of power production due to improving WPP
forecasts has to be done via intra-day markets. Fig. 7.1 shows the hourly
forecast errors for 3 and 24 hours ahead, which indicate the improving forecast
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Table 7.1: Installed wind power production capacity per country [MW] in 2010
and 2020
Country 2010 2020
Norway 545 6600
Sweden 1250 10 000
Finland 350 3000
Denmark 3700 6000
Germany 24 900 57 300
Netherlands 2800 10 400
Belgium 1000 2950
Sum 34 245 96 250
over a descending forecast horizon and hence the signiﬁcantly reduced need to
balance WPP. Wind power producers are assumed to balance their production
portfolio either by redispatch of their own production portfolio or in the intra-
day market up to 3 hours before real-time.
It is expected that a rescheduling is much cheaper than settling the imbal-
ances due to the forecast error in the regulating power market. A previous
analysis [131] shows, that neglecting the possibility of the intra-day markets
and using the 24 hours WPP forecast error as system imbalances would result
in enormous costs of about 1.6 billion e per annum. Hence in this analysis, the
3 hours ahead wind speed forecast is used as basis for the WPP forecast error.
The costs due to rescheduling, which occur in the intra-day market are not taken
into account in this analysis. A more detailed analysis of the regulating power
market outcome for diﬀerent WPP forecast horizons is presented in succeeding
Chapter 8.
Even though, the mean absolute forecast error for the whole simulated area
is relatively low (218MW), the maximum forecast error rises up to more than
10 GW for the 3 hours ahead forecast (see Fig. 7.1) during extraordinary events
like fast moving weather fronts.
7.3 Case Studies
The inﬂuences of WPP on system operation are studied based on ﬁve scenarios.
Firstly place 2010 is simulated using the actual installed wind power capacity
and the corresponding imbalances as a reference. Secondly, three cases for the
2020 scenario are simulated. Two diﬀerent cases for the reserve procurement as
well as the system balancing are deﬁned. These cases are no market integration
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Figure 7.1: Aggregated wind power production forecast error [GW] for the
modelled area in 2020
and full market integration.
7.3.1 Market integration
The case no market integration represents the current state. Regulating
reserves have to be procured in the particular country. In countries split into
diﬀerent control areas e.g. Norway and Germany (see Fig. 3.2), reserve re-
quirements are deﬁned by control area; however, the procurement can be done
countrywide under consideration of available transfer capacities. Exchange of
balancing power with neighbouring countries is not possible.
Full market integration describes a future state in which regulating power
markets in Northern Europe are fully integrated. Besides the procurement of
reserves in the own country, they now can also be procured in the whole sim-
ulated area. However, as suggested by ENSTO-E [132] 50% of the required
reserves must be procured in the own country.
7.3.2 Transmission reservation
The cross-border procurement of regulating reserves for full market integra-
tion is split into two cases. These cases analyse an additional reservation of
transmission capacity for the exchange of regulating reserves on cross-border
transmission lines, cf. chapter 6.
In the no-reservation case, full transmission capacity is used in order to
clear the day-ahead market. Free transmission capacity after day-ahead mar-
ket clearing is used for cross-border reserve procurement and the exchange of
regulating energy.
In the case of reserving transmission capacity only 90% of the available
cross-border transmission capacity is disposable to the day-ahead market while
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the remaining 10% are exclusively reserved for the cross-border procurement
of regulating reserves. Further transfer capacity not utilized after day ahead
market clearing is also viable for the exchange of regulating reserves.
Given available transmission capacity, exchange of regulating energy is en-
abled in the fully integrated market. This exchange results in the activation of
the system-wide most economical reserves.
7.4 Results
The EMPS model is run with diﬀerent hydrological years, to reﬂect the hydro
inﬂow stochasticity. Solving the model results in the day-ahead market dispatch.
One of the main results of the dispatch is the available capacity after the day-
ahead market clearing. Fig. 7.2 to Fig. 7.4 depict the cumulative transmission of
the HVDC lines connecting Nordic with continental Europe. The dotted black
lines indicate the transmission limits. The graphs display the percentiles of
the transmission dispatch duration curve, considering the diﬀerent inﬂow years.
Instead of analysing single transmission lines, the evaluation of transmission
corridors (here Nordic to continental Europe), results in smoother duration
curves and disposable transmission capacity during most of the time. It evinces,
that only in wet years, during about 200 hours, all the transmission lines are
congested in the same direction at the same time in the 2010 scenario (Fig. 7.2).
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Figure 7.2: Transmission dispatch 2010
This value increases up to about 1500 hours in 2020 (Fig. 7.3), when there
is full export on all the transmission lines from Northern to continental Europe.
The remaining free transmission capacity can be used for cross-border reserve
procurement and the exchange of regulating energy. However, also during con-
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gested hours a one directional exchange is viable (downward regulating reserves
in this case).
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Figure 7.3: Transmission dispatch 2020 no reservation
Fig. 7.4 shows the case of transmission reservation, where bidirectional
transmission capacity is always at disposal. As discussed in the previous chapter
6 capacity reservation comes at a decreased socio-economic beneﬁt in the day-
ahead market clearing. Thus, a trade-oﬀ between the day-ahead spot and the
regulating power market is necessary.
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Figure 7.4: Transmission dispatch 2020 with reservation
Another important result are the day-ahead market prices (see Fig. 7.5),
indicating the marginal production cost during a certain hour in the system.
In a well-functioning regulating power market the regulating power prices lie in
the vicinity of the day-ahead market prices. I.e. the day-ahead market price
also gives a rough indication for the marginal production cost of the available
regulating reserves. Comparing day-ahead market prices for the 2010 and 2020
scenario, it can be seen, that volatility increases in Germany, but decreases in
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Norway. However, the average day-ahead market price is lower in both countries
indicating cheaper regulating reserves in 2020 compared to 2010.
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Figure 7.5: Day-ahead market prices Norway, Germany
Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 give an overview on the results of the regulating
power market simulations for the deﬁned scenarios and cases.
Table 7.2 presents results of the current market situation, without an in-
tegration of the Nordic and continental European regulating power markets.
Due to the increased reserve requirements, the reserve procurement costs are
more than doubled in 2020. The additional WPP in 2020 increase the system
imbalances by about 90%. Hence, the gross reserve activation rises by about
80%. The fact that reserve activation increases less than system imbalances, is
caused by the netting of imbalances within the Nordic system and in Germany.
As new WPP mainly will be built in continental Europe, there only is a minor
increase of imbalances and therefore reserve activation in the Nordic area. The
balancing costs are estimated to increase only by about 25%, far less than the
increase in reserve activation. The reason for that is the overall decrease of day-
ahead prices in the 2020 scenario and the expected availability of more reserve
capacity than in 2010.
Table 7.3 contains results for the full market integration case, i.e. the pos-
sibility of cross-border procurement of regulating reserves and the exchange of
regulating energy is given. Again the 2010 scenario and two cases for 2020
scenario - with and without transmission reservation for the regulating power
market - are analysed. In 2010 the average cross-border procurement is about
10% of the total reserve requirement (nearly only upward regulating reserves),
resulting in a possible cost reduction of 40%. Fig. 7.6 depicts the annual av-
erage distribution and procurement of upward regulating reserves for this case.
It can be seen that there is an export of reserves from Sweden and Norway to
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Table 7.2: Regulating Power Market Outcome - No Market Integration
2010 2020
Total reserve requirements [MW] 7080 13460
Procurement costs [Me] 146.5 343.6
Gross imbalance [GWh] 13637 24622
Gross reserve activation [GWh] 8945 14670
Gross reserve activation in the Nordic area [GWh] 3597 4209
Balancing costs [Me] 126.8 154.6
Denmark and Germany. The Danish import covers nearly 50% of the required
reserves, which equals the limit set for the cross-border procurement of reserves.
Surprisingly there also is an export of reserves from the Netherlands, which can
be explained by its rather low reserve requirements.
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Figure 7.6: Reserve procurement and exchange in 2010 - full integration
As described previously it is assumed that there will be an increase in re-
serve requirements in 2020. With the additional transmission capacity, the
cross-border procurement of reserves is more than doubled. Furthermore, the
cross-border procurement will increase by another 15% in the case of reserved
transmission capacity. Unlike 2010 there is a notable cross-border procurement
of downward regulating reserves, of about 16% of the total cross-border pro-
curement. Fig. 7.7 and 7.8 depict the annual average procurement of upward
regulating reserves in 2020. There is no mentionable diﬀerence between the case
with and without transmission reservation. Compared to 2010 it can be noticed,
that due to the additionally installed hydro capacity in southern Norway, sig-
niﬁcantly more reserves are available in the system.
Fig. 7.7 and 7.8 show that the main additional export of regulating reserves
138
7.4. Results
Table 7.3: Regulating Power Market Outcome - Full Market Integration
2010 2020
no res. with res.
Total reserve requirements [MW] 7080 13460 13460
Mean cross-border procurement [MW] 765 1854 2134
Procurement costs [Me] 88.3 248.3 233.6
Gross imbalance [GWh] 13637 24622 24622
Gross reserve activation [GWh] 6761 10464 10231
Gross reserve activation in the Nordic area [GWh] 4664 7824 8093
Regulating energy exchange [GWh] 3190 6340 8941
Balancing costs [Me] 91.8 85.5 74.5
is from Norway to Germany. When comparing the 2020 reserve procurement
costs in Table 7.3 with the numbers of the no market integration scenario in
Table 7.2, a cost reduction of about 30% is detectable.
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Figure 7.7: Reserve procurement and exchange in 2020 - full integration and no
transmission reservation
Fig. 7.9 shows the cross-border procurement of upward as well as downward
regulating reserves for 2020 with no transmission reservation. It displays that in
most instances there is an export from Nordic to Continental Europe, but with
exceptions during a minority of hours, in which the exchange characteristics
are turned around. Furthermore, the maximum cross-border procurement of
reserves is about 4.6 GW, which corresponds to 50% of the reserve requirements
in the continental countries.
In the lower part of Table 7.3 results for the system balancing in the case of
full market integration can be found. As stated above, imbalances nearly double
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Figure 7.8: Reserve procurement and exchange 2020 - full integration with
reservation
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Figure 7.9: Hourly cross-border procurement of regulating reserves from Nordic
to continental Europe in 2020 - no reservation
in 2020 compared to 2010. However, the activation of reserves only amounts
up to about 40%-50% of the total imbalances, which is a drastic reduction,
compared with the case of no market integration, where it is about 60%-70%.
The reduction is achieved by cross-border netting of imbalances of the diﬀer-
ent countries. In the case of WPP, the netting can also be interpreted as the
geographical smoothing of WPP. There is no signiﬁcant further increase in im-
balance netting in the case of transmission reservation, as the reserve activation
only decreases by about 2%. Considering the reserve activation in the Nordic
system solely, it can be seen, that its share of the overall activated reserves
increases dramatically from 40% to 70% in 2010 and from 30% to 80% in 2020,
when integrating markets. The share increases not only due to the decreased
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overall activation, but also due to an ascending activation in the Nordic area.
Fig. 7.10 depicts the reserve activation duration curve in 2020 for the no and
full market integration case. The characteristics discussed above, the overall
decrease and Nordic increase of reserve activation, are clearly illustrated. Fur-
thermore it can be seen, that there are about 5000 hours with no activation of
reserves in the continental area, in case of full market integration.
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Figure 7.10: Nordic and continental regulating reserve activation in 2020 - no
reservation
Fig. 7.11 shows the country wise activation of regulating reserves for the no
and full market integration case in 2010 and 2020. It is obvious that market
integration drastically reduces the activation of reserves in Denmark, Germany
and Netherlands. As Belgium has no direct connection to the Nordic area, only
a minor reduction in reserve activation is noticed. Due to its hydro resources,
Norway is the main provider of regulating reserves.
As can be seen in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, the reserve activation in the
Nordic system, assuming a fully integrated market, increases by about 1100
GWh when being compared to the no market integration scenario in 2010. The
exchange of regulating energy would be about 3200 GWh between the Nordic
and the continental European system in 2010. The diﬀerence between these
values result from the netting of imbalances between those systems. The same
accounts for the 2020 scenario. With the reservation of transmission capacity,
the exchange of regulating energy increases by further 30%.
Fig. 7.12 depicts the duration curve of the regulating energy exchange for
all scenarios while Fig. 7.13 illustrates the hourly exchange for one year, taking
the 2020 scenario without transmission reservation as an example. The duration
curve shows, that there is an exchange of upward as well as downward regulating
energy, where the net export of regulating energy from Nordic to continental
Europe is less than 10% of the gross export.
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Figure 7.11: Country wise annual regulating reserve activation [GWh]
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Figure 7.12: Duration curve of regulating energy exchange from Nordic to con-
tinental Europe
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The hourly exchange of regulating energy in Fig. 7.13 is quite even dis-
tributed during the whole year. The maximum and minimum exchange is about
6 GW, which roughly equals the installed transmission capacity, between Nordic
and continental Europe. However, this amount of transferred energy in combi-
nation with the quarter hourly changes comprises enormous challenges to the
operation of the HVDC connections.
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Figure 7.13: Hourly regulating energy exchange from Nordic to continental
Europe 2020 no reservation
Finally, analysing the balancing costs shows that there can be high savings
by integrating regulating power markets, amounting up to about 30% in 2010
and around 50% in 2020. With no market integration, the increasing system im-
balances from 2010 to 2020 are accompanied by rising balancing costs. In case
of integrated markets the system balancing costs decrease over the examined
time period, which is in contradiction to expected results. A reason for that are
additional possibilities of exchanging regulating energy with the Nordic system,
due to transmission expansion and the increasing hydro capacity in the Nordic
system, providing cheap regulating reserves. Another reason can be, as previ-
ously mentioned, the overall decreased day-ahead prices, also leading to lower
costs for system balancing. While balancing costs decrease there is a signiﬁcant
increase in the costs for reserve procurement, leading to an overall increase in
costs.
7.5 Discussion
System parameters, i.e. the power plant portfolio of thermal plants, inter-area
transmission capacities, reserve requirements and WPP capacities are updated
for the 2020 scenarios. It is attempted to incorporate the supposed system
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expansion in the upcoming years as realistically as possible. The inﬂuence and
necessity of these modiﬁcations become obvious, when comparing the simulated
market outcomes with results from a previous work [131]. In this previous
work, the estimated balancing costs of about 1.6 billion e in 2020, are multiple
higher than the 85.5 million e mentioned in this paper. The main drivers for
this amazingly high gap are the additional available transfer capacities and the
forecast length of WPP. The forecast length was reduced from 24h to 3h as it is
assumed that the interim ﬂuctuations are taken care of in the intra-day market,
reducing the gross imbalance by about 40%. Trading on the intra-day markets
implies shifting balancing responsibility from TSOs to wind power producers.
Thus, costs for TSOs, which are analysed in this paper, will be reduced. In
contrast costs for wind power producers will increase, which are not taken into
account here. The increase of transfer capacities between Nordic and continental
Europe opens up new possibilities of retrieving balancing services from the least
cost source in an integrated market. This causes a further signiﬁcant reduction
of balancing costs.
7.6 Conclusion
The installation and integration of large amounts of WPP capacity into the
power system comprises exceptional challenges. Amongst others, the procure-
ment of regulating reserves and the system balancing are of outstanding impor-
tance.
The analyses include ﬁve scenarios for two market models simulating a non-
and a fully integrated Northern European regulating power market. The reg-
ulating power market outcome without integration shows that gross system
imbalances and gross activation of regulating reserves are almost doubled in the
2020 scenario. With an overall amount of 343 Me the reserve procurement costs
are more than twice as high as the 2010 results. The system balancing costs
increase by about 28 Me.
Using the potential of a fully integrated market with its system-wide reserve
procurement and exchange possibilities, the procurement costs could be cut
down by 40% in 2010, while in the 2020 scenarios the costs are reduced by about
30%. Almost the same conclusion can be drawn for the balancing costs, being
reduced by 50% to about billion 74 Me in the 2020 scenario with a reservation
of transmission capacity. As most of the cheap regulating reserves are situated
in the Nordic area, their exchange will grow and become more important in
future scenarios, whereas the activation of reserves in continental Europe will
decrease by about 30%.
The implementation of transmission reservation for the exchange of balanc-
ing services leads to a rather small additional reduction of procurement and
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balancing costs, coming at the expense of a decreased socio-economic beneﬁt in
the day-ahead spot market.
The investigated scenarios conﬁrm that WPP results in an enormous in-
crease of activating regulating reserves, especially in a split market environ-
ment. However, regulating power market integration would signiﬁcantly reduce
the activation and hence the cost for reserve procurement as well as for system
balancing.
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Chapter 8
Reserve requirement levels
The ﬁnal analysis addresses the requirements for the procurement of reserve
capacity in the regulating power market. At ﬁrst the impact of diﬀerent forecast
horizons of WPP on reserve requirements is assessed. Succeedingly a set of
diﬀerent reserve requirement levels is analysed, showing their inﬂuence on the
regulating power market outcome.
This chapter includes Publication G. Succeeding Sections 8.3 to 8.5 are
identical to Sections III and IV of the publication, with minor editorial changes.
Section 8.2 is added in this thesis, stating important assumptions for the anal-
yses.
8.1 Analysis introduction
Balancing supply and demand at every time instance is one of the crucial chal-
lenges in operating a power system. Beside load uncertainties and unplanned
outages of power plants or transmission lines, the forecast of intermittent power
production like WPP results in system imbalances. Diﬀerent studies show, that
integration of WPP is expected to increase system imbalances and hence costs
in the regulating power markets, cf. [131, 133, 134]. Succeeding the more gen-
eral expectations retrieved in those studies, this two-part analysis investigates
the more speciﬁc questions:
• What is the impact of the WPP forecast horizons / quality on the regu-
lating power market operation?
• How do diﬀerent reserve requirements levels inﬂuence the regulating power
market operation?
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As a basis for deﬁning reserve requirements the standard deviation of the
WPP forecast error is utilized. In the analyses, the current situation of na-
tional regulating power markets and an integrated regulating power market are
simulated.
8.2 Modelling assumptions
The analyses are executed with the previously presented power market models,
including the day-ahead spot and the regulating power market. To assess the
impact of increasing WPP penetration of the power system, the 2010 and 2020
scenario of the Northern European power system are utilised.
Wind power production WPP is expected to be one of the main drivers for
future changes in the power system. As shown in Table 7.1, a signiﬁcant increase
of installed WPP capacity is expected, from about 34GW in 2010 to 96GW in
2020. Beside its intermittency, WPP is not perfectly predictable, but needs to
be forecasted. These WPP forecasts imply an error, which is the main reason
for the need of additional regulating reserves. The forecast horizons included
in the analyses are 1h, 3h, 6h, 12h and 24h respectively. Fig. 8.1 shows the
logarithmic plot of the WPP forecast error standard deviations (σ	WPPh ) for
individual countries and the aggregated system in 2010 and 2020. The WPP
forecast error is taken from WPP simulations [135] using wind speeds forecasts
from the COSMO EU weather model by Deutscher Wetterdienst [119]. The
WPP forecast error increases signiﬁcantly with a longer forecast horizon h. The
standard deviation σ	WPP24 for the 24h ahead forecast is nearly 10 times as high
as for the 1h ahead forecast.
System imbalances In addition to the WPP forecast error there are load
forecast errors and unplanned outages of generation facilities, which result into
additional imbalances in the system. To model these imbalances recorded data
of 2010 is used, as described in chapter 5. An geographic overview of the total
system imbalances including load forecast errors, unplanned outages and a 6h
ahead WPP forecast for the 2010 and the 2020 scenario are shown in Fig. 8.2.
The ﬁgure shows the annual sum of absolute positive and negative imbalances
for each area. The expected future impact of WPP on system balancing is illus-
trated clearly. In 2010 the highest imbalances are observed in highly populated
areas as western Germany, the Stockholm area and the Netherlands. Addition-
ally, high imbalances occur in Eastern Germany, where there already is a high
share of installed WPP. In 2020 the ﬁgure changes and the highest imbalances
are observed from oﬀshore WPP in the German North Sea.
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Figure 8.1: WPP forecast error standard deviation σ	WPPh for the modelled
countries [119, 135]
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Figure 8.2: Annual system imbalance with a 6h WPP forecast horizon
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Reserve requirements Considering expected system imbalances certain re-
quirements for regulating reserves are deﬁned per control area / country. In the
analyses a distinction is made between operating reserves ROP , which refer to
load imbalances and unplanned outages and WPP reserves RWPP , which are
dedicated to level out WPP imbalances. The total requirements are deﬁned in
an ad-hoc approach by summing up operating and WPP reserves1.
The annual WPP forecast error standard deviation σ	WPPh is chosen as the
basis for the amount of WPP reserves RWPP , cf. [121] and [136]. Operating
reserves are deﬁned considering current requirements implemented by TSOs.
These are the requirements for Fast Active Disturbance Reserves (FADR) in
RGN and for secondary reserves in RG CE, cf. chapter 5. Today, in Germany
TSOs are responsible and in Denmark the TSO can be responsible for levelling
out WPP imbalances. Thus, the current reserve requirements implemented in
these both countries are decreased by necessary WPP reserves. The resulting
operating reserves per country are stated in Table 8.1, which are used for the
2010 as well as the 2020 scenario.
Table 8.1: Operating reserves ROP in MW 2010 and 2020
Country NO SWE DK DE NL BE
upward 1200 1220 525 2320 300 150
downward 1200 1220 525 1355 300 150
Reserve reduction, shut down and rationing Important variables in the
analyses are a possible reduction of reserve capacity, the shut down of production
and the rationing of demand. These are implemented to ensure feasibility of
the solution.
In reality a possible reduction of reserve requirements corresponds to oper-
ating the system outside given regulations, e.g. outside the (n-1) criteria, which
can also be seen in reality. A reduction of reserve requirements is assumed to
be done at high prices for reserve capacity. The cost for reserve reduction is not
included in the overall regulating power market costs2.
1The main objective for the speciﬁcation of reserve requirements is to deﬁne a set of diﬀerent
requirement levels, which accounts for the WPP forecast error. The deﬁnition of requirement
levels is rather diﬀerent in the regarded countries, from a simple approach, suggested by
ENTSO-E [16], to a rather complex approach used in Germany [74]. As reserve requirements
are deﬁned in the same way for all the countries, the ad-hoc approach is chosen.
2As shown in Chapter 5, the costs for the reduction of reserve capacity are part of the
objective function (Equation 5.54). However, these are just potential costs, describing the
increased risk of operating the system with less reserve capacity. Hence, if reserve reduction
occurs, these costs are withdrawn after the solution of the optimisation problem.
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Shut down of production corresponds to either must-run units like nuclear
power plants, heat-driven electricity production (district heating) or WPP. Con-
trarily, rationing corresponds to a curtailment of consumption, which can hap-
pen during reserve procurement, i.e. on a day-ahead basis or during real-time
operation of the system. In the case of rationing during the day-head dispatch,
exceptional actions can be taken in reality to hinder a curtailment. These ac-
tions are not implemented in the model, but solely described by a high cost.
Rationing during system balancing is much more complicated, as it is not pos-
sible to drop the exact amount of demand. These situation also pose severe
challenges to keep the system operational, resulting in a much higher cost.
8.3 Analyses
The analyses presented in this chapter include two power system scenarios (2010
and 2020) and two states of regulating power market integration, no integration
(NoIn) and full integration (FuIn), as described in chapter 5.
In subsection 8.3.1, the impact of diﬀerent WPP forecast horizons and their
inherent forecast errors on the regulating power market outcome is analysed. In
the second part (subsection 8.3.2) the outcome for various reserve requirement
levels is analysed.
8.3.1 WPP forecast horizons
The basis for the ﬁrst analysis are diﬀerent WPP forecast horizons and their
resulting forecast error. As described in chapter 3, the basis for the regulating
power market is a day-ahead market. Hence, settling all forecasted WPP in the
day-ahead market would result in a forecast horizon of 12h to 36h. However,
with shorter WPP forecasts available, trading can be done in intra-day markets
in order to adjust the production dispatch. In the analyses it is assumed that
the common day-ahead system dispatch resembles the situation after the ﬁnal
trades in the intra-day markets, i.e. no trades can be done before real-time
system balancing.
Beside the strict length of a forecast horizon, these diﬀerent horizons shall
also represent improved forecasting techniques and hence better quality, result-
ing in fewer forecasting errors. The WPP forecast horizons used in the analysis
are a perfect WPP prediction and forecasts for 1h, 3h, 6h, 12h and 24h hours
ahead.
The underlying requirements for the procurement of regulating reserve are
operating reserves ROP plus WPP reserves (RWPP = 2 ·σ	WPPh ). The resulting
reserve requirements are plotted in Fig. 8.3. There is no big dependency of the
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reserve requirements on the forecast horizon in 2010. However, using the ap-
proach of the standard deviation in 2020, results in more than a quadruplication
of the reserve requirements.
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Figure 8.3: Reserve requirements of for diﬀerent forecast horizons (sum of up-
and downward reserve requirements)
The resulting outcome, i.e. the total costs in the regulating power market,
including reserve procurement and system balancing are show in Fig. 8.4. In
both, 2010 and 2020, costs increase with a longer forecast horizon. The costs
with a perfect WPP forecast nearly equal in 2010 and 2020, as system imbalances
are the same. However, the costs for the 24h ahead WPP forecast are eight times
as high than the costs for the perfect forecast in 2020, but only two times as
high in 2010. This points out the growing importance of high-quality WPP
forecasting in the future. By an integration of regulating power markets, with
cross-border procurement of reserves as well as their activation, a cost reduction
down to about 60% can be achieved in all of the cases.
8.3.2 Reserve requirement level
An important design variable in regulating power markets is the amount of reg-
ulating reserves which are required to be available during system balancing, cf.
[20]. As shown in the previous subsection, WPP will become a more impor-
tant issue in regulating power markets, i.e. the system operation. One way
to determine regulating reserves requirements is based on the WPP forecast
error standard deviation σ	WPPh , cf. [121] and [136]. To analyse diﬀerent re-
serve requirements, ﬁve levels are chosen. These levels are deﬁned as follows:
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Figure 8.4: Total regulating power market costs for diﬀerent forecast horizons
0 : no reserves required
OP : ROP only
1WPP : ROP plus RWPP = 1 · σ	WPPh
2WPP : ROP plus RWPP = 2 · σ	WPPh
3WPP : ROP plus RWPP = 3 · σ	WPPh
For this analysis a WPP forecast horizon of six hours is assumed. The
chosen WPP forecast horizon is arbitrary, but is assumed to be a reasonable
choice between the best available WPP forecast and the possibility to reschedule
production.
The resulting total reserve requirements for the deﬁned reserve requirement
levels in 2010 and 2020 are shown in Fig. 8.5. WPP forecast errors do not have
a big impact on the reserve requirements in 2010, but a signiﬁcant impact in
2020. A higher increase of reserve requirements occurs in continental Europe,
due to more installed WPP capacity.
The cross-border procurement of reserves in the case of a full-integrated
Northern European regulating power market is depicted in Fig. 8.6. The val-
ues shown are the annual average sum of reserves, which are required in RG
CE areas, but are procured in RGN. This corresponds to an export of reserve
capacity from RGN to RG CE.
In 2010 almost only upward regulating reserves are procured cross-border,
as there are suﬃcient downward regulating reserve available in the continental
system. Depending on the requirement level, the cross-border procurement
amounts up to 1100MW on average, which corresponds to about one-ﬁfth of
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Figure 8.5: Reserve requirements for diﬀerent reserve levels (sum of up- and
downward reserve requirements)
the upward reserves required in the continental system.
In 2020 the cross-border procurement of regulating reserves becomes much
higher, now including a considerable share of downward reserves. The reserves
procured cross-border account for about one-ﬁfth of the required upward re-
serves and additionally one-tenth of the downward reserves.
0 OP 1WPP 2WPP 3WPP
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Reserve requirement level
R
es
er
ve
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
[G
W
]
Upward
Downward
(a) 2010
0 OP 1WPP 2WPP 3WPP
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Reserve requirement level
R
es
er
ve
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
[G
W
]
Upward
Downward
(b) 2020
Figure 8.6: Average export of regulating reserve capacity from RGN to RG CE
In the case of insuﬃcient reserve resources, the requirements are reduced,
to ensure feasibility of the solution. The number of hours with requirement
reduction in the system is plotted in Fig. 8.7. A reduction of requirements only
occurs in the 2020 scenario. Furthermore, the reduction only happens for the
reserve levels 2WPP and 3WPP, where it is highest in the case of non-integrated
markets. The shortage of reserves is mostly observed in the Netherlands, North-
154
8.3. Analyses
ern and Eastern Germany. Reductions up to 60% of the requirements occur in
the Netherlands. In 2020 and the 3WPP reserve level the requirements cannot
be met in about 4500 hours of the year, i.e. half of the time. This indicates
probably unnecessary high requirements.
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Figure 8.7: Annual number of hours with a reduction of reserve requirements
Fig. 8.8 illustrates the system balancing in 2010 and 2020. Activation of
reserves includes the shut down of production and rationing of demand. The
overall system balancing is nearly the same for all requirement levels in 2010 and
2020. In the case of individual national regulating power markets, no diﬀerences
in reserve activation are perceived, as the reserves have to be activated in the
countries, where the imbalances occur. However, in the case of full integration
an exchange of balancing energy is possible. Thus, there are diﬀerences in the
activation between the deﬁned requirement levels. Less reserves are activated
in the Nordic area at higher requirement levels, i.e. the exchange of balancing
energy is decreased. At higher requirement levels a larger amount of spinning
(cheaper) reserves is available in the continental areas and hence activated.
In 2010 as well as 2020, an integration of regulating power markets decreases
the activation of regulating reserves signiﬁcantly to about two-thirds due to the
netting of imbalances in opposite directions, which occur in diﬀerent countries.
The shut down of production, mainly WPP, is plotted in Fig. 8.9. In 2010
in the case of no reserves required, a large amount of production is shut down
(1TWh), while high rationing occurs simultaneously. Shut down is reduced
drastically with a procurement of reserves and decreases further at higher re-
quirement levels.
In 2020 the situation changes drastically. Shut down of production as well
is the highest for no procurement of reserves in the no integration case. As in
2010 this comes with simultaneous rationing. However, in 2020 the reduction
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Figure 8.8: Gross system imbalance and reserve activation for diﬀerent reserve
levels
of shut down at higher requirement levels is not as much as in 2010 and a total
minimum shut down is observed at a requirement level of 1WPP. For higher
requirement levels shut down increases again, signiﬁcantly during the reserve
procurement process. Here, WPP needs to be shut down in order to start up
thermal power plants, which can provide regulating reserves.
In the full integration case, nearly no shut down occurs in 2010. Almost the
same accounts for the system balancing in 2020. However, there is signiﬁcant
shut down during reserve procurement in 2020, amounting up to 2.8TWh for
the 3WPP reserve level.
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Figure 8.9: WPP shut-down during reserve procurement and system balancing
for diﬀerent reserve levels
In contrary to the shut down of production, there can be rationing of de-
mand. In Fig. 8.10 the annual sum of PTUs, when rationing occurs in the
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system is plotted. In contrast to the energy, which is plotted for the shut down,
the number of PTUs is chosen here, as every time rationing occurs the operation
of the system is jeopardised, which can lead to serve challenges. In 2010 and
2020 a total rationing of 14GWh respectively 21GWh occurs for no procurement
of reserves in the case of no market integration. This complies to rationing dur-
ing 764 PTUs in 2010 and 590 PTUs in 2020, which certainly is not acceptable
in the view of security of supply3. Most of the rationing is observed in Denmark,
due to its high share of WPP and limited regulating reserves. In 2010, with the
sole procurement of the operating reserves the number of PTUs with rationing is
reduced to 16 and at 1WPP down to zero (see Fig. 8.10a). In 2020 even with a
reserve level of 3WPP the number of PTUs with rationing is only reduced down
to 13 (see Fig. 8.10b). Now rationing not only occurs in Denmark, but also
Belgium, the Netherlands and Northern Germany, due to the high expansion of
WPP. Together with the reduction of reserves (Fig. 8.7), it illustrates that the
system would be operated at its limits.
With the integration of regulating power markets and the possible exchange
of balancing energy, rationing does not occur for any of the reserve requirement
levels. It shows, that there are suﬃcient reserves available in the whole system,
it is solely necessary to utilise these reserves system-wide. Comparing the full
integration case with no integration clearly points out the beneﬁt of market
integration in the view of operational security.
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Figure 8.10: Annual number of PTUs with rationing during system balancing
Interestingly enough, there is no rationing and no signiﬁcant shut down in
the case of full market integration, when there are no reserves required. This
implies, there are actually suﬃcient reserves available in the whole system and
would not be necessary to be procured. A further implication is, that beside
3The common accepted limit for rationing is 1h (4 PTUs) per annum.
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the suﬃcient availability of reserves, there is also suﬃcient transmission capacity
available to provide exchange balancing energy during system balancing.
The level of reserve requirement has a signiﬁcant impact on the total costs in
the regulating power market as well, shown in Fig. 8.11. Plotted are the socio-
economic costs, which occur during reserve procurement and system balancing.
In the case of no reserve requirements, there are only costs due to system bal-
ancing. With this level and no integration enormous costs occur during system
balancing, mainly due to rationing.
In 2010, minimum overall costs are observed for the reserve level OP in the
case of no as well as full market integration. With an increased requirement level
the overall costs become higher. While there is a strict increase of reserve pro-
curement costs, there is a decrease of the system balancing costs down to about
175e/MWh and 100e/MWh for no and full market integration respectively.
Today’s implemented reserve requirement level corresponds to approximately
1WPP (see the deﬁnition of reserve requirements in 8.2), which indicates a
slight over procurement of reserves in an optimum socio-economic view.
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Figure 8.11: Total regulating power market costs for diﬀerent reserve levels
The total regulating power market costs increase signiﬁcantly in 2020, espe-
cially for the no market integration case. The highest costs are observed likewise
for the no reserve level. The overall cost minimum in the no market integration
case is observed at a reserve level of 1WPP, but it still is at OP for full market
integration. Equally, the increase of reserve procurement costs and decrease of
system balancing costs at higher reserve requirement levels can be spotted. But
system balancing costs actually increase again for the 3WPP reserve level in
the case of no market integration. The cost increase is due to the utilization of
more expensive regulating reserves4.
4In the case of high reserve requirements a lot of thermal plants have to be started up
to provide regulating reserves. This includes plants with higher marginal production costs,
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Furthermore, the analysis points out, that with an integration of regulat-
ing power markets socio-economic costs can be reduced down to about 60%.
There is a cost reduction for the procurement of reserves as well as for their
activation. During reserve procurement costs are reduced due to the utilisa-
tion of Nordic hydro reserves and the preventition of unnecessary starting up of
thermal power plants. The costs for balancing the system are reduced, due to
netting of imbalances and hence less reserve activation. These savings indicate
the improved eﬃciency of utlising reserves, which are available in the system.
Together with the possible shut down and rationing it evinces, that rather low
reserve requirement levels are necessary and economically optimal.
8.3.3 System overview / development
In contrast to Fig. 8.2, showing the geographic distribution of system imbal-
ances, Fig. 8.12 and Fig. 8.13 illustrate the location of procured and activated
regulating reserves in 2010 and 2020 respectively. Shown are ﬁgures for the
6h ahead WPP forecasts and the 1WPP reserve requirement level. There is
no integration of regulating power markets in 2010, while a full integration of
markets is expected in 2020.
The available reserves after the reserve procurement for these two repre-
sentative cases are depicted in Fig. 8.12. There will be no big change in the
continental area, where approximately the same reserves are available in 2010
and 2020. However, the availability of reserves in the Nordic area increases,
especially in southern and south-western Norway. Mainly reserve capacity from
this part of Norway is exported to continental Europe in 2020, which can then
be used to balance WPP in the North Sea area.
Likewise during system balancing (shown in Fig. 8.13) a clear change from
activating regulating reserves in continental Europe to an activation of reserves
in Nordic Europe is observed. The increased reserve activation reaches up to
the most northern areas, but especially hydro resources in southern and south-
western Norway are utilised to balance the system. Also with a signiﬁcant
increase of imbalances due to WPP expansion, reserve activation in continental
Europe is almost constant.
8.4 Discussion
As described in chapter 5 several simplifying assumptions are taken in the course
of modelling the regulating power market. Regulating reserves used up to now
in the Nordic system are manually activated reserves. Thus, it is assumed that
likewise resulting in higher marginal regulating costs.
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Figure 8.12: Reserve procurement for 6 hours WPP forecast and 1WPP require-
ment level - Geographic distribution
hydro units do not need to be started up to provide reserves and that they
can provide their full capacity as reserves. This probably over estimates the
availability of regulating reserves in the Nordic area. However, when comparing
the available reserves with the potential cross-border procurement of reserves
from the Nordic area, it shows that these cross-border procured reserves are
only minor compared to the available reserves.
A surprising result is that rather low levels of reserve requirements result in
no rationing and hence low system balancing costs. One reason for this may be,
that average values over one PTU are used for imbalances, shaving oﬀ peaks.
Another issue is the perfect market implementation, assuming that all capacity
(which can provide regulating reserves) is available during system balancing,
regardless if it was procured or not. This can explain why so few rationing
is observed, when no reserves are required. Moreover, some of the thermal
plants are assumed to be able to provide non-spinning reserves at high costs.
These plants step in for balancing in this case. However, the analyses clearly
demonstrates, that an integration of markets signiﬁcantly reduces the risk of
rationing, as none is observed even without a procurement of reserves.
A further issue is the eﬃcient utilisation of large scale WPP in the power
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Figure 8.13: Reserve activation for 6 hours WPP forecast and 1WPP require-
ment level - Geographic distribution
system. It is argued that with increasing WPP more regulating reserves are
necessary, which is also conﬁrmed in the ﬁrst part of the analyses. However, in
the second part it is illustrated that an increase in reserve requirements possibly
results in an increased shut down of WPP in order to start thermal power plants,
which can supply regulating reserves. Thus, the overall WPP production is
reduced again. Solutions to this challenge are various. One can be to deﬁne
the optimal reserve requirements, based on the least WPP shut down. The
shut down not only includes WPP, but also other must-run power plants like
nuclear or lignite power plants. Their decommissioning and substitution with
thermal power plants, which are suited better to provide regulating reserves,
would likewise reduce the shut down of production. Another possibility could
be to include WPP itself for reserve provision as discussed in [63] and deﬁned in
the grid code of the Irish power system [137]. The ﬁnal and suggested option is
the integration of national regulating power markets, making regulating reserves
in the Nordic system available to the continental European system and thus
signiﬁcantly reducing the shut down of production.
In Europe the bulk energy is traded on the day-ahead spot markets, which re-
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sults in the system dispatch fr the next day. In the case of varying renewable
energy sources, such as WPP, this implies a production forecast horizon of 12
to 36 hours, assuming a day-ahead spot market clearing at noon. This forecast
is approximated with the 24h forecast horizon in this analysis. As it is shown in
the analysis, shorter forecast horizons lead to a signiﬁcant reduction of imbal-
ances and hence costs in the regulating power market. It is argued that WPP
producers have the ability to adjust their portfolio given updated and improved
forecasts. In order to do so, WPPs either need own re-dispatchable production
capacity or have to trade on intra-day markets, which are not regarded in the
previous analyses. By trading in intra-day markets, parts of the responsibility
for balancing the system is taken over by WPPs from TSOs. Thus, TSOs face
less imbalances in real-time and hence reduced costs. This reduction come by
shifting the costs from the regulating power market to the intra-day markets.
By the utilisation of intra-day markets, it can be argued that the remaining
forecast error, which needs to be regarded for system balancing is an 1h ahead
forecast error, which complies with the closure time of intra-day markets. But
validity of this assumption, intra-day markets need to be liquid, which is not the
case so far in Northern Europe, cf. Weber [138]. Furthermore, close to real-time
trades in the intra-day market are certainly based on fast-changeable production
capacity, which likewise can be used in the regulating power markets. Thus, it
can be assumed, that costs in the intra-day market converge to the costs in the
regulating power market with decreasing forecast horizon.
The analysis of various WPP forecast horizons shows a tremendous diﬀerence
for total costs (in the 2020 scenario) in the regulating power market, with around
400 million e using the 1h ahead WPP forecast, up to more than 5 billion e
using the 24h ahead WPP forecast. The increase in socio-economic costs due
to additional WPP lies somewhere in between. The ﬁgures for the 24h ahead
WPP forecast certainly overestimate the costs, as there still is suﬃcient time
to adjust the system dispatch. However, the ﬁgures for the 1h ahead and 3h
ahead WPP forecast underestimate the socio-economic costs, as the trade in
the intra-day markets is not regarded. Especially on this short horizons, these
costs are close to the ones which would occur for system balancing. Thus, the 6
hour forecast horizon is chosen as the basis for the second part of the analysis,
assuming that succeeding trades on the intra-day markets are only marginal.
In order to assess the total socio-economic costs of integrating large amounts
of WPP in the system, all of the physical power markets, encompassing the day-
ahead spot-market, intra-day markets and the regulating power market with the
reserve procurement and system balancing have to be regarded.
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8.5 Conclusion
The expected increase of WPP capacity in Northern Europe with its inher-
ent production forecast error will result in higher system imbalances. To level
out these imbalances regulating reserves are required. The analyses assess the
impact of diﬀerent WPP forecast horizons and a set of diﬀerent reserve require-
ments in the current power system (2010) and a future scenario (2020) with
high WPP penetration.
The analysed WPP forecast horizons reach from a perfect WPP prediction
to a 24h ahead forecast. Shorter forecast horizons lead to a signiﬁcant reduction
of system imbalances and hence less regulating reserves are required, resulting
in lower regulating power market costs, while the resulting cost increase on
intra-day markets is not regarded here. Interpreting the shorter forecast WPP
horizon as improved WPP forecast, which can be expected in the future, the
potential cost savings become tremendous in 2020. This clearly points out the
value of high-quality WPP forecasts.
For a secure and eﬃcient operation of the power system the deﬁnition of the
reserve requirement level in the power system is of high importance. The re-
sulting socio-economic optimal reserve requirement levels are rather low. While
WPP does not have a big impact on the regulating power market outcome in
2010, it impacts the outcome signiﬁcantly in 2020. Without an integration of
national regulating power markets in 2020, the power system is operated at its
limits, resulting in unacceptable rationing of demand, signiﬁcant shut down of
production and high costs in the regulating power market. With an integration
of regulating power markets, rationing can be avoided, resulting in a securer
operation of the system. Likewise much less production will be shut down and
the costs in the regulating power market are reduced.
The analyses show that prospectively growing WPP will cause a signiﬁcant
cost increase in the regulating power market. However, when integrating the
Northern European regulating power markets these costs can be reduced by
approximately 40% (300 million e in the case of a 6h ahead WPP forecast),
while the system security is increased, due to an eﬃcient system-wide utilisation
of all available regulating reserves.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and future
research
This chapter ﬁnalises the thesis. Section 9.1 summarises the main conclusion of
the previous chapters including the model development and analyses. Recom-
mendations for potential further developments of the regulating power market
model and future research topics are given in section 9.2.
9.1 Conclusion
To ensure the secure operation of the power system it is crucial to balance
the production and consumption of electricity continuously. The change of
the European power system towards sustainable power production leads to a
higher variability and less predictability of power production. Thus, increased
imbalances can be expected in the power system. To prospectively ensure the
system balance, more regulating reserves are required in the power system.
Due to its unique characteristics, the Nordic and particularly the Norwe-
gian hydro-based power system is capable to provide such balancing services to
continental Europe. As the Nordic and the continental European power system
are not synchronously connected, balancing services have to be exchanged via
HVDC lines. Hence, the exchange of frequency containment reserves (primary
control) is put aside in this thesis and the scope is set on the exchange of fre-
quency restoration and replacement reserves (secondary and tertiary control).
In Europe balancing services are traded through national regulating power
markets. To enable an exchange of balancing services across borders, an integra-
tion of these national markets is necessary. This development might eventually
lead to one multinational European regulating power market. There already is
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large progress in the coupling and integration of European day-ahead spot mar-
kets, while several pilot projects are commenced for the integration of European
regulating power markets.
The main part of the research, documented in this thesis, is dedicated to
the development of a mathematical model for the study of national regulating
power markets and their integration. This regulating power market model is
based on a common day-ahead spot market model. It includes detailed data
models of Northern European power system for the current state (2010) and
a future scenario (2020). These power system scenarios are utilised to analyse
the future power market outcome and assess the beneﬁt of integrating national
regulating power markets in Northern Europe.
Day-ahead spot market
In 2020 large wind power production capacity is expected in the system, result-
ing in a signiﬁcant share of electricity production from this source. In Germany
a signiﬁcant reduction of nuclear power is expected, which is in line with current
policies. In addition, it is assumed that the increased wind power production
substitutes a certain share of base-load production from lignite power plants,
while hard coal and gas-ﬁred power plants are still needed as reserve capacity.
The simulations show, that there are considerable changes in the operation of
the power system, when moving from the 2010 to the 2020 scenario.
The impact of stochastic inﬂow to the Nordic system is reduced, but due to
the wind power production a higher volatility of the system dispatch and con-
sequently of electricity prices is observed. However, the average electricity price
decreases in the Nordic area as well as in continental Europe. Furthermore, the
operating hours and proﬁt margins for thermal power plants are reduced sub-
stantially, which challenges their proﬁtability. In a free market environment the
non-proﬁtable power plants will be mothballed or decommissioned completely,
if there is no additional support. Finally, with the signiﬁcant increase in in-
terconnection capacity, the exchange between the Nordic area and continental
Europe is nearly doubled.
Regulating power market
To assess the regulating power market outcome, a dedicated mathematical
model is developed. The regulating power market model explicitly addresses
the exchange of balancing services between the Nordic and continental Euro-
pean power system. Therefore, available transmission capacity is taken into
account for the exchange of reserve capacity as well as balancing energy across
national borders. With a set of diﬀerent cases the model is utilised to assess a
stepwise integration of the Northern European regulating power markets.
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A comparison with the recent integration of the German regulating power
markets shows similar results in the case of system balancing of about 200 mil-
lion e. Whereas the beneﬁt resulting from the system-wide reserve procurement
is lower than observed in reality (20 million e in the model, 100 million e in
reality). There are two reasons for the discrepancy. Firstly, the market design in
the model assumes an integrated clearing of the day-ahead spot market and the
procurement of reserves. This results in a more eﬃcient dispatch than achieved
by current practices in reality. Hence, there already are lower costs for the
procurement of reserves before the market integration. Secondly, a perfect mar-
ket is assumed, neglecting potential market power. Assessing the integration of
Northern European regulating power markets shows signiﬁcant additional ben-
eﬁts. With the possible exchange of reserve capacity on average 20% of reserve
capacity, which is required in the continental area is procured in the Nordic
countries. This results in savings of about 40 million e, which are potentially
even higher in reality as discussed above. The activation of regulating reserves
can be reduced by 40% due to system-wide netting of imbalances, resulting in
extra savings of about 100 million e.
Altogether, the integration of regulating power markets could result in sig-
niﬁcant savings already in the 2010 scenario. Illustrating its capability of simu-
lating regulating power markets and their outcome, the developed model is used
as basis for further analyses.
Transmission capacity reservation
The exclusive reservation of transmission capacity for the utilisation in the reg-
ulating power market leads to an increased exchange of balancing services. This
likewise results in decreased reserve activation, due to more imbalance netting.
In 2010, this reservation reduces the costs in the regulating power market by
about 20 million e per annum. However, this transmission reservation results
in much higher losses on the day-ahead spot market clearing, than the savings
that are achieved in the regulating power market. Furthermore, the day-ahead
market losses are much higher for a 10% reservation than for a 5% reserva-
tion, which indicates a non-linear increase. Thus, a small reservation on single
transmission lines might result in a socio-economic surplus. But the analysis
clearly shows the importance of the impact on the day-ahead market in such an
assessment.
Large scale wind power production
The prospective integration of large amounts of wind power production capac-
ity into the power system from 34GW in 2010 up to 96GW in 2020 comprise
challenges to the operation of the power system. To that, the assumed forecast
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horizon of wind power production is essential for the estimation of costs in the
regulating power market. With a detailed 3h ahead forecasts and simulations
of wind power production, the regulating power market outcome is analysed in
2010 and 2020. Therefore, it is assumed that wind power producers are able to
adjust their production portfolio through trading on intra-day market, which
requires liquid intra-day markets. The potential costs for the additional trade
in intra-day market has not been assessed in this research.
Up to 2020 (in the case of national regulating power markets), the simu-
lations show a doubling of system imbalances due to increasing wind power
production capacity and hence activation of regulating reserves. Assuming a
3h ahead forecast for wind power production results in a total cost increase of
about 230 million e in national regulating power markets up to 2020. With the
integration of regulating power markets, reserve procurement costs can be re-
duced by about 30% and the cost for system balancing by about 50%. Together
the potential savings amount to approximately 170 million e per annum.
The signiﬁcant cost increase up to 2020, especially in the case of national
regulating power markets, illustrates the impact of the expected high share of
wind power production in the system. The potential savings point out the value
and importance of integrating regulating power markets in Northern Europe.
These savings can account for approximately 70% of the cost increase in the
regulating power markets caused by increased wind power production.
Reserve requirement levels
Succeeding the simulation for a speciﬁc case of large scale wind power integra-
tion in the system, the impact of diﬀerent wind power forecast horizons and
their inherent forecast error on the outcome of the regulating power market is
analysed. Furthermore, a set of diﬀerent reserve requirements levels and their
regulating power market outcome as well as impact on the system operation is
assessed.
Shorter forecast horizons, resulting in reduced wind power forecast errors
lead to a reduction of costs in the regulating power market. These cost reduc-
tions become signiﬁcant in the 2020 scenario. The costs in the regulating power
market are approximately 5.5 billion e for the 24h forecast horizon, while they
would be only about 500 million e for the 3h forecast horizon (in the case of
national regulating power markets). This indicates the value and importance
of good quality wind power production forecasts and short forecast horizons.
Shorter forecast horizons however, require additional trading of intra-day mar-
kets, which need to be liquid and cause additional costs to market participants,
which are not regarded in the analysis.
Moreover, the analysis shows that in the case of national regulating power
markets, the system is operated at its limits in 2020. This results in rationing
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of reserve capacity and an increased number of hours with rationing of demand,
jeopardising system security. Concurrently, independent national regulating
power markets result in high costs for the procurement of reserve capacity and
the system balancing. An integration of regulating power markets not only sig-
niﬁcantly reduces the costs in the regulating power market down to about 60%,
but also increases system security, due to an increased availability of regulating
reserves in the power system.
The Nordic, especially the Norwegian hydro based power system, with its high
production ﬂexibility is capable to provide balancing services, which can be
used in the continental power system. Mostly there is suﬃcient transmission
capacity available after the day-ahead spot market clearing, in order to exchange
balancing services. Even in the case of a full utilisation of the transmission
capacity, exchange of balancing services is possible in the reverse direction.
Furthermore, a redispatch of the system is possible to free up transmission
capacity, if the redispatch is socio-economically beneﬁcial.
The integration of regulating power markets results in the cross-border pro-
curement of a signiﬁcant share of reserve capacity, particularly from Germany,
the Netherlands and Western Denmark in the Nordic area. Furthermore, the
activation of regulating reserves is reduced by about 40% due to netting of im-
balances. As discussed above, the assumption on the forecast horizon of wind
power production has a signiﬁcant impact on the outcome of the regulating
power market. A shorter length of the forecast horizon implies a shifting from
the regulating power market to intra-day markets, which is not regarded in the
analyses. Assuming a 6 hours forecast horizon for wind power, the integration of
Northern European regulating power markets would lead to savings of at least
140 million e in 2010 and at least 300 million e per annum in 2020. The three
main reason for the savings are:
• The availability of free transmission capacity after the day-ahead spot
market clearing for the exchange of balancing services
• The cheaper provision of regulating reserves from hydro power plants
which are located in the Nordic area, compared to thermal power plants,
which are located in continental Europe
• The reduced activation of regulating reserves due to the netting of coun-
teracting imbalances in diﬀerent control areas / countries
The research quantiﬁes the signiﬁcant cost increases in the regulating power
market, which the future power system is expected to face. Furthermore, it
shows that a regulating power market integration counteracts this cost increase,
while the system security is improved. This can be achieved on the basis of an
eﬃcient system-wide utilisation of all available regulating reserves.
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9.2 Future research
The main objective of the research was the development of a regulating power
market model for Northern Europe, explicitly addressing the cross-border ex-
change of balancing services. Corresponding to the two main parts of the thesis,
recommendations for future research can be mainly split in two areas, modelling
issues and analyses.
As discussed in the previous chapters simpliﬁcations are necessary to imple-
ment the mathematical model of the regulating power market. Future research
can tackle several issues. The most important issue, already mentioned in the
project statement is the determination of costs for balancing services. Estimates
on these cost are done during the research, which however are quite general. An
improvement of these estimates is of signiﬁcant importance to achieve precise
economic results for the outcome of regulating power market integration.
A modelling issue is the explicit implementation of secondary and tertiary
regulating reserves. So far the division is done in spinning and non-spinning
reserves. With the introduction of AGC in the Nordic power system, a provision
of secondary reserves to continental Europe can be introduced. However, it
can be expected, that hydro power plants can provide less reserves based on
AGC than with manual activation. Thus, the explicit modelling of automatic
activated reserve is necessary for the improvement of the model.
Another issue regards the sequence of power markets. As stated in the
model description the reserve procurement follows the day-ahead market clear-
ing, while in most European countries the sequence is inverse. For a better
representation of reality the latter market sequence should be implemented.
Moreover, as regulating power markets become more important for intermittent
power producers as well as balancing service providers, a trade-oﬀ between the
day-ahead spot and the regulating power market will become crucial. Thus, a
coupling of the regulating power market model with the day-ahead spot market
model is certainly of interest, which provides a feedback of the regulating power
market outcome to the day-ahead spot market model.
Finally, the modelling of intra-day markets should be addressed. As stated
previously, by trading in intra-day markets, balancing responsibility is shifted
from TSOs to power producers. This likewise implies a shift of costs from the
regulating power market to intra-day markets. In order to answer the question
of the overall socio-economic cost increase due to more varying and not perfectly
predictable power production, the trade on all physical power markets has to
be regarded.
The set of analyses which is presented only covers selected topics, based on a
2010 and 2020 scenario. The EU 20-20-20 targets are only an intermediate step
to a sustainable European power system. The development and implementation
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of future scenarios for 2030 or 2050 with further signiﬁcant increases of power
production from renewable sources are certainly of interest. It becomes particu-
larly interesting, when the installed generation capacity from renewable sources
increases to a level, where traditional thermal production capacity is driven out
and not adequate to serve the demand of electricity. It can be expected, that
in this case an integration of regulating power markets is not only beneﬁcial,
but indispensable. The main location for new renewable energy production fa-
cilities is expected to be the North Sea area. Hence, it will be of importance to
include not only Northern Europe, but extent the modelled area to the UK and
potentially France, encircling the North Sea. These analyses should include a
potential oﬀshore grid.
The developed regulating power market model has the objective of max-
imising the social welfare in the modelled area. The research shows that the
integration of regulating power markets results in cost reductions. However,
European power markets encompass several diﬀerent countries as well as sev-
eral diﬀerent types of market participants. In this regards, the outcome for
the diﬀerent countries respectively diﬀerent market participants is of interest.
Among all the market participants there will be winners and losers. Assess-
ing the outcome for diﬀerent groups of participants respectively countries can
help to identify the potential motivation for or resistance against multinational
regulating power markets and estimate the transfer of proﬁts which would be
necessary to achieve a common beneﬁt.
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